February 2022 - U-Boot

[PATCH u-boot-marvell RFC] PLEASE TEST: ddr: marvell: a38x: fix BYTE_HOMOGENEOUS_SPLIT_OUT decision
by Marek Behún 16 Feb '22

16 Feb '22

From: Marek Behún <marek.behun(a)nic.cz> In commit 3fc92a215b69 ("ddr: marvell: a38x: fix SPLIT_OUT_MIX state decision") I ported a cleaned up and changed version of patch mv_ddr: a380: fix SPLIT_OUT_MIX state decision In the port we removed checking for BYTE_HOMOGENEOUS_SPLIT_OUT bit, because: - the fix seemed to work without it - the bit was checked for only at one place out of two, while the second bit, BYTE_SPLIT_OUT_MIX, was checked for in both cases - without the removal it didn't work on Allied Telesis' x530 board We recently had a chance to test on more boards, and it seems that the change needs to be opposite: instead of removing the check for BYTE_HOMOGENEOUS_SPLIT_OUT from the first if() statement, the check needs to be added also to the second one - it needs to be at both places. With this change all the Turris Omnia boards I have had available to test seem to work, I didn't encounter not even one failed DDR training. As last time, I am noting that I do not understand what this code is actually doing, I haven't studied the DDR training algorithm and I suspect that no one will be able to explain it to U-Boot contributors, so we are left with this blind poking in the code with testing whether it works on several boards and hoping it doesn't break anything for anyone :-(. Signed-off-by: Marek Behún <marek.behun(a)nic.cz> --- drivers/ddr/marvell/a38x/ddr3_training_centralization.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/ddr/marvell/a38x/ddr3_training_centralization.c b/drivers/ddr/marvell/a38x/ddr3_training_centralization.c index 42308b6965..be9f985f22 100644 --- a/drivers/ddr/marvell/a38x/ddr3_training_centralization.c +++ b/drivers/ddr/marvell/a38x/ddr3_training_centralization.c @@ -180,7 +180,8 @@ static int ddr3_tip_centralization(u32 dev_num, u32 mode) [bit_id], EDGE_1); if (current_byte_status & - BYTE_SPLIT_OUT_MIX) { + (BYTE_SPLIT_OUT_MIX | + BYTE_HOMOGENEOUS_SPLIT_OUT)) { if (cur_start_win[bit_id] >= 64) cur_start_win[bit_id] -= 64; else @@ -197,7 +198,8 @@ static int ddr3_tip_centralization(u32 dev_num, u32 mode) EDGE_1); if (cur_end_win[bit_id] >= 64 && (current_byte_status & - BYTE_SPLIT_OUT_MIX)) { + (BYTE_SPLIT_OUT_MIX | + BYTE_HOMOGENEOUS_SPLIT_OUT))) { cur_end_win[bit_id] -= 64; DEBUG_CENTRALIZATION_ENGINE (DEBUG_LEVEL_INFO, -- 2.34.1

3 4

[PATCH 1/1] doc: describe generation of SMBIOS table
by Heinrich Schuchardt 16 Feb '22

16 Feb '22

SMBIOS is not x86 specific. So we should have an architecture independent page describing it. Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt(a)canonical.com> --- doc/arch/x86.rst | 2 +- doc/develop/index.rst | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/doc/arch/x86.rst b/doc/arch/x86.rst index 5494155a51..634387ac09 100644 --- a/doc/arch/x86.rst +++ b/doc/arch/x86.rst @@ -732,7 +732,7 @@ SMBIOS tables To generate SMBIOS tables in U-Boot, for use by the OS, enable the CONFIG_GENERATE_SMBIOS_TABLE option. The easiest way to provide the values to use is via the device tree. For details see -device-tree-bindings/sysinfo/smbios.txt +:download:`smbios.txt <../device-tree-bindings/sysinfo/smbios.txt>`. TODO List --------- diff --git a/doc/develop/index.rst b/doc/develop/index.rst index 97148875ef..93ebfa485f 100644 --- a/doc/develop/index.rst +++ b/doc/develop/index.rst @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ Implementation makefiles menus printf + smbios uefi/index version -- 2.34.1

1 1

[PATCH 1/2] miiphyutil: Fix inconsistent miiphy_write() error return value
by Daniel Klauer 16 Feb '22

16 Feb '22

miiphy_write() should not directly return the error return value from bus->write(), because that is typically a -errno value, while generally miiphy_write() and other miiphy_*() functions return 1 on error. Some miiphy_write() callers only check for > 0 to detect errors. Fix it to match miiphy_read(), which also converts bus->read() failure to "return 1". Signed-off-by: Daniel Klauer <daniel.klauer(a)gin.de> --- common/miiphyutil.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/common/miiphyutil.c b/common/miiphyutil.c index 7d4d15ed91..86a27665e3 100644 --- a/common/miiphyutil.c +++ b/common/miiphyutil.c @@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static struct mii_dev *miiphy_get_active_dev(const char *devname) * This API is deprecated. Use phy_read on a phy_device found via phy_connect * * Returns: - * 0 on success + * 0 on success, 1 on error */ int miiphy_read(const char *devname, unsigned char addr, unsigned char reg, unsigned short *value) @@ -264,18 +264,23 @@ int miiphy_read(const char *devname, unsigned char addr, unsigned char reg, * This API is deprecated. Use phy_write on a phy_device found by phy_connect * * Returns: - * 0 on success + * 0 on success, 1 on error */ int miiphy_write(const char *devname, unsigned char addr, unsigned char reg, unsigned short value) { struct mii_dev *bus; + int ret; bus = miiphy_get_active_dev(devname); - if (bus) - return bus->write(bus, addr, MDIO_DEVAD_NONE, reg, value); + if (!bus) + return 1; - return 1; + ret = bus->write(bus, addr, MDIO_DEVAD_NONE, reg, value); + if (ret < 0) + return 1; + + return 0; } /***************************************************************************** -- 2.32.0

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[PATCH 1/2] efi_loader: fix dual signed image certification
by Ilias Apalodimas 16 Feb '22

16 Feb '22

The EFI spec allows for images to carry multiple signatures. Currently we don't adhere to the verification process for such images. The spec says: "Multiple signatures are allowed to exist in the binary's certificate table (as per PE/COFF Section "Attribute Certificate Table"). Only one hash or signature is required to be present in db in order to pass validation, so long as neither the SHA-256 hash of the binary nor any present signature is reflected in dbx." With our current implementation signing the image with two certificates and inserting both of them in db and one of them dbx doesn't always reject the image. The rejection depends on the order that the image was signed and the order the certificates are read (and checked) in db. While at it move the sha256 hash verification outside the signature checking loop, since it only needs to run once per image and get simplify the logic for authenticating an unsigned imahe using sha256 hashes. Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas(a)linaro.org> --- changes since RFC: - none lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 88 +++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c index f41cfa4fccd5..5df35939f702 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c @@ -516,53 +516,6 @@ err: } #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT -/** - * efi_image_unsigned_authenticate() - authenticate unsigned image with - * SHA256 hash - * @regs: List of regions to be verified - * - * If an image is not signed, it doesn't have a signature. In this case, - * its message digest is calculated and it will be compared with one of - * hash values stored in signature databases. - * - * Return: true if authenticated, false if not - */ -static bool efi_image_unsigned_authenticate(struct efi_image_regions *regs) -{ - struct efi_signature_store *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL; - bool ret = false; - - dbx = efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u"dbx"); - if (!dbx) { - EFI_PRINT("Getting signature database(dbx) failed\n"); - goto out; - } - - db = efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u"db"); - if (!db) { - EFI_PRINT("Getting signature database(db) failed\n"); - goto out; - } - - /* try black-list first */ - if (efi_signature_lookup_digest(regs, dbx, true)) { - EFI_PRINT("Image is not signed and its digest found in \"dbx\"\n"); - goto out; - } - - /* try white-list */ - if (efi_signature_lookup_digest(regs, db, false)) - ret = true; - else - EFI_PRINT("Image is not signed and its digest not found in \"db\" or \"dbx\"\n"); - -out: - efi_sigstore_free(db); - efi_sigstore_free(dbx); - - return ret; -} - /** * efi_image_authenticate() - verify a signature of signed image * @efi: Pointer to image @@ -608,14 +561,7 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) if (!efi_image_parse(new_efi, efi_size, &regs, &wincerts, &wincerts_len)) { EFI_PRINT("Parsing PE executable image failed\n"); - goto err; - } - - if (!wincerts) { - /* The image is not signed */ - ret = efi_image_unsigned_authenticate(regs); - - goto err; + goto out; } /* @@ -624,18 +570,18 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) db = efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u"db"); if (!db) { EFI_PRINT("Getting signature database(db) failed\n"); - goto err; + goto out; } dbx = efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u"dbx"); if (!dbx) { EFI_PRINT("Getting signature database(dbx) failed\n"); - goto err; + goto out; } if (efi_signature_lookup_digest(regs, dbx, true)) { EFI_PRINT("Image's digest was found in \"dbx\"\n"); - goto err; + goto out; } /* @@ -678,7 +624,8 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) if (guidcmp(auth, &efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7)) { EFI_PRINT("Certificate type not supported: %pUs\n", auth); - continue; + ret = false; + goto out; } auth += sizeof(efi_guid_t); @@ -686,7 +633,8 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) } else if (wincert->wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) { EFI_PRINT("Certificate type not supported\n"); - continue; + ret = false; + goto out; } msg = pkcs7_parse_message(auth, auth_size); @@ -717,32 +665,32 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) */ /* try black-list first */ if (efi_signature_verify_one(regs, msg, dbx)) { + ret = false; EFI_PRINT("Signature was rejected by \"dbx\"\n"); - continue; + goto out; } if (!efi_signature_check_signers(msg, dbx)) { + ret = false; EFI_PRINT("Signer(s) in \"dbx\"\n"); - continue; + goto out; } /* try white-list */ if (efi_signature_verify(regs, msg, db, dbx)) { ret = true; - break; + continue; } EFI_PRINT("Signature was not verified by \"db\"\n"); + } - if (efi_signature_lookup_digest(regs, db, false)) { - ret = true; - break; - } - EFI_PRINT("Image's digest was not found in \"db\" or \"dbx\"\n"); - } + /* last resort try the image sha256 hash in db */ + if (!ret && efi_signature_lookup_digest(regs, db, false)) + ret = true; -err: +out: efi_sigstore_free(db); efi_sigstore_free(dbx); pkcs7_free_message(msg); -- 2.32.0

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[PATCH u-boot-marvell 1/3] arm: a37xx: pci: Do not try to access other buses when link is down
by Pali Rohár 16 Feb '22

16 Feb '22

If a PIO request is executed while link-down, the whole controller gets stuck in a non-functional state, and even after link comes up again, PIO requests won't work anymore, and a reset of the whole PCIe controller is needed. Therefore we need to prevent sending PIO requests while the link is down. Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/pci/pci-aardvark.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-aardvark.c b/drivers/pci/pci-aardvark.c index 1eb257ea8b4a..ccaeecaca8e3 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci-aardvark.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-aardvark.c @@ -177,6 +177,23 @@ static inline uint advk_readl(struct pcie_advk *pcie, uint reg) return readl(pcie->base + reg); } +/** + * pcie_advk_link_up() - Check if PCIe link is up or not + * + * @pcie: The PCI device to access + * + * Return true on link up. + * Return false on link down. + */ +static bool pcie_advk_link_up(struct pcie_advk *pcie) +{ + u32 val, ltssm_state; + + val = advk_readl(pcie, ADVK_LMI_PHY_CFG0); + ltssm_state = (val & ADVK_LMI_PHY_CFG0_LTSSM_MASK) >> ADVK_LMI_PHY_CFG0_LTSSM_SHIFT; + return ltssm_state >= ADVK_LMI_PHY_CFG0_LTSSM_L0 && ltssm_state < ADVK_LMI_PHY_CFG0_LTSSM_DISABLED; +} + /** * pcie_advk_addr_valid() - Check for valid bus address * @@ -195,6 +212,10 @@ static bool pcie_advk_addr_valid(struct pcie_advk *pcie, if (busno == 0 && (dev != 0 || func != 0)) return false; + /* Access to other buses is possible when link is up */ + if (busno != 0 && !pcie_advk_link_up(pcie)) + return false; + /* * In PCI-E only a single device (0) can exist on the secondary bus. * Beyond the secondary bus, there might be a Switch and anything is @@ -618,23 +639,6 @@ retry: return ret; } -/** - * pcie_advk_link_up() - Check if PCIe link is up or not - * - * @pcie: The PCI device to access - * - * Return 1 (true) on link up. - * Return 0 (false) on link down. - */ -static int pcie_advk_link_up(struct pcie_advk *pcie) -{ - u32 val, ltssm_state; - - val = advk_readl(pcie, ADVK_LMI_PHY_CFG0); - ltssm_state = (val & ADVK_LMI_PHY_CFG0_LTSSM_MASK) >> ADVK_LMI_PHY_CFG0_LTSSM_SHIFT; - return ltssm_state >= ADVK_LMI_PHY_CFG0_LTSSM_L0 && ltssm_state < ADVK_LMI_PHY_CFG0_LTSSM_DISABLED; -} - /** * pcie_advk_wait_for_link() - Wait for link training to be accomplished * -- 2.20.1

2 5

[BUG] clean target deletes lib/acpi/dsdt.c
by Heinrich Schuchardt 16 Feb '22

16 Feb '22

Hello Simon, The clean target deletes lib/acpi/dsdt.c. But without it building some x86 targets fails: +Some images are invalid x86: + edison +make[3]: *** No rule to make target 'lib/acpi/dsdt.asl', needed by 'lib/acpi/dsdt.c'. Stop. Should lib/acpi/dsdt.c be generated code? Or is the clean target wrong? Maybe we should just rename lib/acpi/dsdt.c. Best regards Heinrich

1 0

[PATCH] kontron-sl-mx8mm: change environment address variables
by Heiko Thiery 16 Feb '22

16 Feb '22

Currently the space between kernel_addr_r and the fdt_addr_r is only 32MB. To have enought space to load kernel images bigger than 32MB change the varialbes to a feasable value. The new environment variables layout is based on the scheme from "include/configs/ti_armv7_common.h". The CONFIG_SYS_LOAD_ADDR value is set to 0x42000000. Signed-off-by: Heiko Thiery <heiko.thiery(a)gmail.com> --- configs/kontron-sl-mx8mm_defconfig | 2 +- include/configs/kontron-sl-mx8mm.h | 15 ++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/configs/kontron-sl-mx8mm_defconfig b/configs/kontron-sl-mx8mm_defconfig index 940bf07a92..030e2251e7 100644 --- a/configs/kontron-sl-mx8mm_defconfig +++ b/configs/kontron-sl-mx8mm_defconfig @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ CONFIG_SPL_SERIAL=y CONFIG_BOOTCOUNT_BOOTLIMIT=3 CONFIG_SPL=y CONFIG_DISTRO_DEFAULTS=y -CONFIG_SYS_LOAD_ADDR=0x40480000 +CONFIG_SYS_LOAD_ADDR=0x42000000 CONFIG_FIT=y CONFIG_FIT_EXTERNAL_OFFSET=0x3000 CONFIG_SPL_LOAD_FIT=y diff --git a/include/configs/kontron-sl-mx8mm.h b/include/configs/kontron-sl-mx8mm.h index d1e87f97d6..0af6a9ab30 100644 --- a/include/configs/kontron-sl-mx8mm.h +++ b/include/configs/kontron-sl-mx8mm.h @@ -67,15 +67,20 @@ #define FEC_QUIRK_ENET_MAC -#define CONFIG_EXTRA_ENV_SETTINGS \ +#define ENV_MEM_LAYOUT_SETTINGS \ + "loadaddr=" __stringify(CONFIG_SYS_LOAD_ADDR) "\0" \ "kernel_addr_r=0x42000000\0" \ - "fdt_addr_r=0x44000000\0" \ - "ramdisk_addr_r=0x46400000\0" \ - "pxefile_addr_r=0x46000000\0" \ - "scriptaddr=0x46000000\0" \ + "fdt_addr_r=0x48000000\0" \ + "fdtoverlay_addr_r=0x49000000\0" \ + "ramdisk_addr_r=0x48080000\0" \ + "scriptaddr=0x40000000\0"\ + "pxefile_addr_r=0x40100000\0" \ + +#define CONFIG_EXTRA_ENV_SETTINGS \ "dfu_alt_info=sf 0:0=flash-bin raw 0x400 0x1f0000\0" \ "bootdelay=3\0" \ "hostname=" CONFIG_HOSTNAME "\0" \ + ENV_MEM_LAYOUT_SETTINGS \ BOOTENV #endif /* __KONTRON_MX8MM_CONFIG_H */ -- 2.30.2

2 1

[PATCH v2] dm: Fix OF_BAD_ADDR definition
by Patrice Chotard 16 Feb '22

16 Feb '22

When OF_LIVE flag is enabled on a 64 bits platform, there is an issue when dev_read_addr() is called and need to perform an address translation using __of_translate_address(). In case of error, __of_translate_address() return's value is OF_BAD_ADDR (wich is defined in include/dm/of.h to ((u64)-1) = 0xffffffffffffffff). The return value of dev_read_addr() is often compared to FDT_ADDR_T_NONE which is defined as (-1U) = 0xffffffff. In this case the comparison is always false. To fix this issue, define FDT_ADDR_T_NONE to (ulong)(-1) in case of AARCH64. Update accordingly related tests. Signed-off-by: Patrice Chotard <patrice.chotard(a)foss.st.com> --- Changes in v2: - define FDT_ADDR_T_NONE as ((ulong)(-1)) and keep OF_BAD_ADDR unchanged include/fdtdec.h | 5 ++++- test/dm/ofnode.c | 2 +- test/dm/pci.c | 4 ++-- test/dm/test-fdt.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/fdtdec.h b/include/fdtdec.h index 6c7ab887b2..e9e2916d6e 100644 --- a/include/fdtdec.h +++ b/include/fdtdec.h @@ -24,16 +24,19 @@ typedef phys_addr_t fdt_addr_t; typedef phys_size_t fdt_size_t; -#define FDT_ADDR_T_NONE (-1U) #define FDT_SIZE_T_NONE (-1U) #ifdef CONFIG_PHYS_64BIT +#define FDT_ADDR_T_NONE ((ulong)(-1)) + #define fdt_addr_to_cpu(reg) be64_to_cpu(reg) #define fdt_size_to_cpu(reg) be64_to_cpu(reg) #define cpu_to_fdt_addr(reg) cpu_to_be64(reg) #define cpu_to_fdt_size(reg) cpu_to_be64(reg) typedef fdt64_t fdt_val_t; #else +#define FDT_ADDR_T_NONE (-1U) + #define fdt_addr_to_cpu(reg) be32_to_cpu(reg) #define fdt_size_to_cpu(reg) be32_to_cpu(reg) #define cpu_to_fdt_addr(reg) cpu_to_be32(reg) diff --git a/test/dm/ofnode.c b/test/dm/ofnode.c index cea0746bb3..e6c925eba6 100644 --- a/test/dm/ofnode.c +++ b/test/dm/ofnode.c @@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static int dm_test_ofnode_get_reg(struct unit_test_state *uts) ut_assert(ofnode_valid(node)); addr = ofnode_get_addr(node); size = ofnode_get_size(node); - ut_asserteq(FDT_ADDR_T_NONE, addr); + ut_asserteq_64(FDT_ADDR_T_NONE, addr); ut_asserteq(FDT_SIZE_T_NONE, size); node = ofnode_path("/translation-test@8000/noxlatebus@3,300/dev@42"); diff --git a/test/dm/pci.c b/test/dm/pci.c index fa2e4a8559..00e4440a9d 100644 --- a/test/dm/pci.c +++ b/test/dm/pci.c @@ -331,10 +331,10 @@ static int dm_test_pci_addr_live(struct unit_test_state *uts) struct udevice *swap1f, *swap1; ut_assertok(dm_pci_bus_find_bdf(PCI_BDF(0, 0x1f, 0), &swap1f)); - ut_asserteq(FDT_ADDR_T_NONE, dev_read_addr_pci(swap1f)); + ut_asserteq_64(FDT_ADDR_T_NONE, dev_read_addr_pci(swap1f)); ut_assertok(dm_pci_bus_find_bdf(PCI_BDF(0, 0x1, 0), &swap1)); - ut_asserteq(FDT_ADDR_T_NONE, dev_read_addr_pci(swap1)); + ut_asserteq_64(FDT_ADDR_T_NONE, dev_read_addr_pci(swap1)); return 0; } diff --git a/test/dm/test-fdt.c b/test/dm/test-fdt.c index 8866d4d959..e1de066226 100644 --- a/test/dm/test-fdt.c +++ b/test/dm/test-fdt.c @@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ static int dm_test_fdt_livetree_writing(struct unit_test_state *uts) /* Test setting generic properties */ /* Non-existent in DTB */ - ut_asserteq(FDT_ADDR_T_NONE, dev_read_addr(dev)); + ut_asserteq_64(FDT_ADDR_T_NONE, dev_read_addr(dev)); /* reg = 0x42, size = 0x100 */ ut_assertok(ofnode_write_prop(node, "reg", 8, "\x00\x00\x00\x42\x00\x00\x01\x00")); -- 2.17.1

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Boot logging to file in ESP
by Tom Hale 16 Feb '22

16 Feb '22

Can U-Boot log its output to file? I'm a digital nomad operating a RPi 4B headless. I have 2 boot USB keys: one "known-good", and one for experimentation. Plugging into a monitor (which I don't have in my backpack) isn't trivial. Is there a way to have U-Boot write all output to a file on the ESP so I can read it from there rather than from a monitor? Thanks, Tom

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[scan-admin@coverity.com: New Defects reported by Coverity Scan for Das U-Boot]
by Tom Rini 15 Feb '22

15 Feb '22

Hey all, Here's the latest report. ----- Forwarded message from scan-admin(a)coverity.com ----- Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 22:13:51 +0000 (UTC) From: scan-admin(a)coverity.com To: tom.rini(a)gmail.com Subject: New Defects reported by Coverity Scan for Das U-Boot Hi, Please find the latest report on new defect(s) introduced to Das U-Boot found with Coverity Scan. 2 new defect(s) introduced to Das U-Boot found with Coverity Scan. 2 defect(s), reported by Coverity Scan earlier, were marked fixed in the recent build analyzed by Coverity Scan. New defect(s) Reported-by: Coverity Scan Showing 2 of 2 defect(s) ** CID 348361: Code maintainability issues (SIZEOF_MISMATCH) /boot/pxe_utils.c: 369 in label_boot_kaslrseed() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 348361: Code maintainability issues (SIZEOF_MISMATCH) /boot/pxe_utils.c: 369 in label_boot_kaslrseed() 363 364 if (dm_rng_read(dev, buf, n)) { 365 printf("Reading RNG failed\n"); 366 goto err; 367 } 368 >>> CID 348361: Code maintainability issues (SIZEOF_MISMATCH) >>> Passing argument "buf" of type "u64 *" and argument "8 /* sizeof (buf) */" to function "fdt_setprop" is suspicious. In this case, "sizeof (u64 *)" is equal to "sizeof (u64)", but this is not a portable assumption. 369 err = fdt_setprop(working_fdt, nodeoffset, "kaslr-seed", buf, sizeof(buf)); 370 if (err < 0) { 371 printf("Unable to set kaslr-seed on chosen node: %s\n", fdt_strerror(err)); 372 goto err; 373 } 374 err: ** CID 348360: Control flow issues (DEADCODE) /tools/mkeficapsule.c: 216 in create_auth_data() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 348360: Control flow issues (DEADCODE) /tools/mkeficapsule.c: 216 in create_auth_data() 210 cert.size = file_size; 211 212 ret = read_bin_file(ctx->key_file, &key.data, &file_size); 213 if (ret < 0) 214 return -1; 215 if (ret < 0) >>> CID 348360: Control flow issues (DEADCODE) >>> Execution cannot reach this statement: "return -1;". 216 return -1; 217 if (file_size > UINT_MAX) 218 return -1; 219 key.size = file_size; 220 221 /* ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ To view the defects in Coverity Scan visit, https://u15810271.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=HRESupC-2F2Czv4BOaCWWCy7my0P… To manage Coverity Scan email notifications for "tom.rini(a)gmail.com", click https://u15810271.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=HRESupC-2F2Czv4BOaCWWCy7my0P… ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Tom

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