Some mkimage features require linking with OpenSSL. Instead of linking OpenSSL based on the individual platform symbols, create a single Kconfig symbol which can be selected by platforms as necessary. Then, all OpenSSL-dependent image types can be enabled at once.

Cc: Stefano Babic sbabic@denx.de Cc: Fabio Estevam festevam@gmail.com Cc: "NXP i.MX U-Boot Team" uboot-imx@nxp.com Cc: Stefan Roese sr@denx.de Cc: Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland samuel@sholland.org --- arch/arm/mach-imx/mxs/Kconfig | 2 ++ arch/arm/mach-mvebu/Kconfig | 1 + common/Kconfig.boot | 2 ++ scripts/config_whitelist.txt | 1 - tools/Kconfig | 3 +++ tools/Makefile | 22 +++++++--------------- tools/mxsimage.c | 3 --- 7 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-imx/mxs/Kconfig b/arch/arm/mach-imx/mxs/Kconfig index 9f48ffda414..f067a9c38e0 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-imx/mxs/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm/mach-imx/mxs/Kconfig @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ if ARCH_MX23 config MX23 bool default y + select MKIMAGE_LINK_OPENSSL

choice prompt "MX23 board select" @@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ if ARCH_MX28 config MX28 bool default y + select MKIMAGE_LINK_OPENSSL

choice prompt "MX28 board select" diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/Kconfig b/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/Kconfig index cda65f74786..2a4f861015d 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm/mach-mvebu/Kconfig @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ config ARMADA_38X bool select ARMADA_32BIT select HAVE_MVEBU_EFUSE + select MKIMAGE_LINK_OPENSSL

config ARMADA_38X_HS_IMPEDANCE_THRESH hex "Armada 38x USB 2.0 High-Speed Impedance Threshold (0x0 - 0x7)" diff --git a/common/Kconfig.boot b/common/Kconfig.boot index 89a3161f1fa..7d022d1ccfa 100644 --- a/common/Kconfig.boot +++ b/common/Kconfig.boot @@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ config FIT_SIGNATURE select RSA_VERIFY select IMAGE_SIGN_INFO select FIT_FULL_CHECK + select MKIMAGE_LINK_OPENSSL help This option enables signature verification of FIT uImages, using a hash signed and verified using RSA. If @@ -115,6 +116,7 @@ config FIT_CIPHER bool "Enable ciphering data in a FIT uImages" depends on DM select AES + select MKIMAGE_LINK_OPENSSL help Enable the feature of data ciphering/unciphering in the tool mkimage and in the u-boot support of the FIT image. diff --git a/scripts/config_whitelist.txt b/scripts/config_whitelist.txt index 3dbcc042a8a..e013e1f26aa 100644 --- a/scripts/config_whitelist.txt +++ b/scripts/config_whitelist.txt @@ -1066,7 +1066,6 @@ CONFIG_MXC_UART_BASE CONFIG_MXC_USB_FLAGS CONFIG_MXC_USB_PORT CONFIG_MXC_USB_PORTSC -CONFIG_MXS CONFIG_MXS_AUART CONFIG_MXS_AUART_BASE CONFIG_MXS_OCOTP diff --git a/tools/Kconfig b/tools/Kconfig index b2f5012240c..df3dffa9e18 100644 --- a/tools/Kconfig +++ b/tools/Kconfig @@ -9,4 +9,7 @@ config MKIMAGE_DTC_PATH some cases the system dtc may not support all required features and the path to a different version should be given here.

+config MKIMAGE_LINK_OPENSSL + bool + endmenu diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile index d020c55d664..8843185703c 100644 --- a/tools/Makefile +++ b/tools/Makefile @@ -75,9 +75,10 @@ ECDSA_OBJS-$(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE) := $(addprefix lib/ecdsa/, ecdsa-libcrypto.o) AES_OBJS-$(CONFIG_FIT_CIPHER) := $(addprefix lib/aes/, \ aes-encrypt.o aes-decrypt.o)

-# Cryptographic helpers that depend on openssl/libcrypto -LIBCRYPTO_OBJS-$(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE) := $(addprefix lib/, \ - fdt-libcrypto.o) +# Cryptographic helpers and image types that depend on openssl/libcrypto +OPENSSL_OBJS-$(CONFIG_MKIMAGE_LINK_OPENSSL) := \ + lib/fdt-libcrypto.o \ + mxsimage.o \

ROCKCHIP_OBS = lib/rc4.o rkcommon.o rkimage.o rksd.o rkspi.o

@@ -101,7 +102,6 @@ dumpimage-mkimage-objs := aisimage.o \ kwbimage.o \ lib/md5.o \ lpc32xximage.o \ - mxsimage.o \ omapimage.o \ os_support.o \ pblimage.o \ @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ dumpimage-mkimage-objs := aisimage.o \ zynqimage.o \ zynqmpimage.o \ zynqmpbif.o \ - $(LIBCRYPTO_OBJS-y) \ + $(OPENSSL_OBJS-y) \ $(LIBFDT_OBJS) \ gpimage.o \ gpimage-common.o \ @@ -136,12 +136,7 @@ fit_info-objs := $(dumpimage-mkimage-objs) fit_info.o fit_check_sign-objs := $(dumpimage-mkimage-objs) fit_check_sign.o file2include-objs := file2include.o

-ifneq ($(CONFIG_MX23)$(CONFIG_MX28)$(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE),) -# Add CONFIG_MXS into host CFLAGS, so we can check whether or not register -# the mxsimage support within tools/mxsimage.c . -HOSTCFLAGS_mxsimage.o += -DCONFIG_MXS -endif - +ifneq ($(CONFIG_MKIMAGE_LINK_OPENSSL),) ifdef CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE # This affects include/image.h, but including the board config file # is tricky, so manually define this options here. @@ -159,12 +154,9 @@ ifdef CONFIG_SYS_U_BOOT_OFFS HOSTCFLAGS_kwbimage.o += -DCONFIG_SYS_U_BOOT_OFFS=$(CONFIG_SYS_U_BOOT_OFFS) endif

-ifneq ($(CONFIG_ARMADA_38X),) +# Enable image features which depend on OpenSSL. HOSTCFLAGS_kwbimage.o += -DCONFIG_KWB_SECURE -endif

-# MXSImage needs LibSSL -ifneq ($(CONFIG_MX23)$(CONFIG_MX28)$(CONFIG_ARMADA_38X)$(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE)$(CONFIG_FIT_CIPHER),) HOSTCFLAGS_kwbimage.o += \ $(shell pkg-config --cflags libssl libcrypto 2> /dev/null || echo "") HOSTLDLIBS_mkimage += \ diff --git a/tools/mxsimage.c b/tools/mxsimage.c index 002f4b525aa..2bfbb421eb6 100644 --- a/tools/mxsimage.c +++ b/tools/mxsimage.c @@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ * Copyright (C) 2012-2013 Marek Vasut marex@denx.de */

-#ifdef CONFIG_MXS - #include <errno.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> @@ -2363,4 +2361,3 @@ U_BOOT_IMAGE_TYPE( NULL, mxsimage_generate ); -#endif

Most Allwinner sunxi SoCs have separate boot ROMs in non-secure and secure mode. The non-secure boot ROM (NBROM) uses the existing sunxi_egon image type. The secure boot ROM (SBROM) uses a completely different image type, known as TOC0.

A TOC0 image is composed of a header and two or more items. These items include signed firmware and a key chain linking to a root-of-trust public key (ROTPK) hash burned to eFuses in the SoC. Signatures are made using RSA-2048 + SHA256.

This TOC0 implementation has been verified to work with the A64, H5, H6, and H616 SBROMs.

Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland samuel@sholland.org --- arch/arm/Kconfig | 1 + common/image.c | 1 + include/image.h | 1 + include/sunxi_image.h | 191 ++++++++++++ tools/Makefile | 1 + tools/sunxi_toc0.c | 710 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 905 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/sunxi_toc0.c

diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig index 0448787b8bc..97bf21da2e2 100644 --- a/arch/arm/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig @@ -998,6 +998,7 @@ config ARCH_SUNXI select DM_SCSI if SCSI select DM_SERIAL select DM_USB if DISTRO_DEFAULTS + select MKIMAGE_LINK_OPENSSL select OF_BOARD_SETUP select OF_CONTROL select OF_SEPARATE diff --git a/common/image.c b/common/image.c index 51854aae5dd..d354d5d8d37 100644 --- a/common/image.c +++ b/common/image.c @@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ static const table_entry_t uimage_type[] = { { IH_TYPE_MTKIMAGE, "mtk_image", "MediaTek BootROM loadable Image" }, { IH_TYPE_COPRO, "copro", "Coprocessor Image"}, { IH_TYPE_SUNXI_EGON, "sunxi_egon", "Allwinner eGON Boot Image" }, + { IH_TYPE_SUNXI_TOC0, "sunxi_toc0", "Allwinner TOC0 Boot Image" }, { -1, "", "", }, };

diff --git a/include/image.h b/include/image.h index 459685d4d43..c01cd2982e6 100644 --- a/include/image.h +++ b/include/image.h @@ -312,6 +312,7 @@ enum { IH_TYPE_IMX8IMAGE, /* Freescale IMX8Boot Image */ IH_TYPE_COPRO, /* Coprocessor Image for remoteproc*/ IH_TYPE_SUNXI_EGON, /* Allwinner eGON Boot Image */ + IH_TYPE_SUNXI_TOC0, /* Allwinner TOC0 Boot Image */

IH_TYPE_COUNT, /* Number of image types */ }; diff --git a/include/sunxi_image.h b/include/sunxi_image.h index 5b2055c0af3..bdf80ec0e0a 100644 --- a/include/sunxi_image.h +++ b/include/sunxi_image.h @@ -9,9 +9,12 @@ * * Shared between mkimage and the SPL. */ + #ifndef SUNXI_IMAGE_H #define SUNXI_IMAGE_H

+#include <linux/types.h> + #define BOOT0_MAGIC "eGON.BT0" #define BROM_STAMP_VALUE 0x5f0a6c39 #define SPL_SIGNATURE "SPL" /* marks "sunxi" SPL header */ @@ -79,4 +82,192 @@ struct boot_file_head { /* Compile time check to assure proper alignment of structure */ typedef char boot_file_head_not_multiple_of_32[1 - 2*(sizeof(struct boot_file_head) % 32)];

+struct toc0_main_info { + uint8_t name[8]; + __le32 magic; + __le32 checksum; + __le32 serial; + __le32 status; + __le32 num_items; + __le32 length; + uint8_t platform[4]; + uint8_t reserved[8]; + uint8_t end[4]; +}; + +#define TOC0_MAIN_INFO_NAME "TOC0.GLH" +#define TOC0_MAIN_INFO_MAGIC 0x89119800 +#define TOC0_MAIN_INFO_END "MIE;" + +struct toc0_item_info { + __le32 name; + __le32 offset; + __le32 length; + __le32 status; + __le32 type; + __le32 load_addr; + uint8_t reserved[4]; + uint8_t end[4]; +}; + +#define TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_CERT 0x00010101 +#define TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE 0x00010202 +#define TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_KEY 0x00010303 +#define TOC0_ITEM_INFO_END "IIE;" + +struct toc0_small_tag { + uint8_t tag; + uint8_t length; +}; + +typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_int; +typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_oct; +typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_seq; +typedef struct toc0_small_tag toc0_small_exp; + +#define TOC0_SMALL_INT(len) { 0x02, (len) } +#define TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(len) { 0x30, (len) } +#define TOC0_SMALL_EXP(tag, len) { 0xa0 | (tag), len } + +struct toc0_large_tag { + uint8_t tag; + uint8_t prefix; + uint8_t length_hi; + uint8_t length_lo; +}; + +typedef struct toc0_large_tag toc0_large_int; +typedef struct toc0_large_tag toc0_large_bit; +typedef struct toc0_large_tag toc0_large_seq; + +#define TOC0_LARGE_INT(len) { 0x02, 0x82, (len) >> 8, (len) & 0xff } +#define TOC0_LARGE_BIT(len) { 0x03, 0x82, (len) >> 8, (len) & 0xff } +#define TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(len) { 0x30, 0x82, (len) >> 8, (len) & 0xff } + +/* + * This looks somewhat like an X.509 certificate, but it is not valid BER. + * + * Some differences: + * - Some X.509 certificate fields are missing or rearranged. + * - Some sequences have the wrong tag. + * - Zero-length sequences are accepted. + * - Large strings and integers must be an even number of bytes long. + * - Positive integers are not zero-extended to maintain their sign. + * + * See https://linux-sunxi.org/TOC0 for more information. + */ +struct toc0_cert_item { + toc0_large_seq tag_totalSequence; + struct toc0_totalSequence { + toc0_large_seq tag_mainSequence; + struct toc0_mainSequence { + toc0_small_exp tag_explicit0; + struct toc0_explicit0 { + toc0_small_int tag_version; + uint8_t version; + } explicit0; + toc0_small_int tag_serialNumber; + uint8_t serialNumber; + toc0_small_seq tag_signature; + toc0_small_seq tag_issuer; + toc0_small_seq tag_validity; + toc0_small_seq tag_subject; + toc0_large_seq tag_subjectPublicKeyInfo; + struct toc0_subjectPublicKeyInfo { + toc0_small_seq tag_algorithm; + toc0_large_seq tag_publicKey; + struct toc0_publicKey { + toc0_large_int tag_n; + uint8_t n[256]; + toc0_small_int tag_e; + uint8_t e[3]; + } publicKey; + } subjectPublicKeyInfo; + toc0_small_exp tag_explicit3; + struct toc0_explicit3 { + toc0_small_seq tag_extension; + struct toc0_extension { + toc0_small_int tag_digest; + uint8_t digest[32]; + } extension; + } explicit3; + } mainSequence; + toc0_large_bit tag_sigSequence; + struct toc0_sigSequence { + toc0_small_seq tag_algorithm; + toc0_large_bit tag_signature; + uint8_t signature[256]; + } sigSequence; + } totalSequence; +}; + +#define sizeof_field(TYPE, MEMBER) sizeof((((TYPE *)0)->MEMBER)) + +#define TOC0_CERT_ITEM { \ + TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_totalSequence)), \ + { \ + TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_mainSequence)), \ + { \ + TOC0_SMALL_EXP(0, sizeof(struct toc0_explicit0)), \ + { \ + TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_explicit0, version)), \ + 0, \ + }, \ + TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_mainSequence, serialNumber)), \ + 0, \ + TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), \ + TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), \ + TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), \ + TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), \ + TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_subjectPublicKeyInfo)), \ + { \ + TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), \ + TOC0_LARGE_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_publicKey)), \ + { \ + TOC0_LARGE_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_publicKey, n)), \ + {}, \ + TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_publicKey, e)), \ + {}, \ + }, \ + }, \ + TOC0_SMALL_EXP(3, sizeof(struct toc0_explicit3)), \ + { \ + TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(sizeof(struct toc0_extension)), \ + { \ + TOC0_SMALL_INT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_extension, digest)), \ + {}, \ + }, \ + }, \ + }, \ + TOC0_LARGE_BIT(sizeof(struct toc0_sigSequence)), \ + { \ + TOC0_SMALL_SEQ(0), \ + TOC0_LARGE_BIT(sizeof_field(struct toc0_sigSequence, signature)), \ + {}, \ + }, \ + }, \ +} + +struct toc0_key_item { + __le32 vendor_id; + __le32 key0_n_len; + __le32 key0_e_len; + __le32 key1_n_len; + __le32 key1_e_len; + __le32 sig_len; + uint8_t key0[512]; + uint8_t key1[512]; + uint8_t reserved[32]; + uint8_t sig[256]; +}; + +#define TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS 3 +#define TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN \ + ALIGN( \ + sizeof(struct toc0_main_info) + \ + sizeof(struct toc0_item_info) * TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS + \ + sizeof(struct toc0_cert_item) + \ + sizeof(struct toc0_key_item), \ + 32) + #endif diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile index 8843185703c..cb8418466f0 100644 --- a/tools/Makefile +++ b/tools/Makefile @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ AES_OBJS-$(CONFIG_FIT_CIPHER) := $(addprefix lib/aes/, \ OPENSSL_OBJS-$(CONFIG_MKIMAGE_LINK_OPENSSL) := \ lib/fdt-libcrypto.o \ mxsimage.o \ + sunxi_toc0.o \

ROCKCHIP_OBS = lib/rc4.o rkcommon.o rkimage.o rksd.o rkspi.o

diff --git a/tools/sunxi_toc0.c b/tools/sunxi_toc0.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f0bf86b477c --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/sunxi_toc0.c @@ -0,0 +1,710 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* + * (C) Copyright 2018 Arm Ltd. + * (C) Copyright 2020-2021 Samuel Holland samuel@sholland.org + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <stdint.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <openssl/asn1t.h> +#include <openssl/pem.h> +#include <openssl/rsa.h> + +#include <image.h> +#include <sunxi_image.h> + +#include "imagetool.h" +#include "mkimage.h" + +/* + * NAND requires 8K padding. For other devices, BROM requires only + * 512B padding, but let's use the larger padding to cover everything. + */ +#define PAD_SIZE 8192 + +#define pr_err(fmt, args...) fprintf(stderr, "TOC0 ERR: " fmt, ##args) +#define pr_warn(fmt, args...) fprintf(stderr, "TOC0 WRN: " fmt, ##args) +#define pr_info(fmt, args...) fprintf(stderr, "TOC0 INF: " fmt, ##args) + +static char *fw_key_file = "fw_key.pem"; +static char *key_item_file = "key_item.bin"; +static char *root_key_file = "root_key.pem"; + +/* + * Create a key item in @buf, containing the public keys @root_key and @fw_key, + * and signed by the RSA key @root_key. + */ +static int toc0_create_key_item(uint8_t *buf, uint32_t *len, + RSA *root_key, RSA *fw_key) +{ + struct toc0_key_item *key_item = (void *)buf; + uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; + unsigned int sig_len; + int n_len, e_len; + + /* Store key 0. */ + n_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_n(root_key), key_item->key0); + e_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_e(root_key), key_item->key0 + n_len); + if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key0)) { + pr_err("Root key is too large\n"); + goto err; + } + key_item->key0_n_len = cpu_to_le32(n_len); + key_item->key0_e_len = cpu_to_le32(e_len); + + /* Store key 1. */ + n_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_n(fw_key), key_item->key1); + e_len = BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_e(fw_key), key_item->key1 + n_len); + if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key1)) { + pr_err("Firmware key is too large\n"); + goto err; + } + key_item->key1_n_len = cpu_to_le32(n_len); + key_item->key1_e_len = cpu_to_le32(e_len); + + /* Sign the key item. */ + key_item->sig_len = cpu_to_le32(RSA_size(root_key)); + SHA256(buf, key_item->sig - buf, digest); + if (!RSA_sign(NID_sha256, digest, sizeof(digest), + key_item->sig, &sig_len, root_key)) { + pr_err("Failed to sign key item\n"); + goto err; + } + if (sig_len != sizeof(key_item->sig)) { + pr_err("Signature length mismatch\n"); + goto err; + } + + *len = sizeof(*key_item); + ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; + +err: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Verify the key item in @buf, containing two public keys @key0 and @key1, + * and signed by the RSA key @key0. If @root_key is provided, only signatures + * by that key will be accepted. @key1 is returned in @key. + */ +static int toc0_verify_key_item(const uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len, + RSA *root_key, RSA **fw_key) +{ + struct toc0_key_item *key_item = (void *)buf; + uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; + int n_len, e_len; + RSA *key0 = NULL; + RSA *key1 = NULL; + BIGNUM *n, *e; + + if (len < sizeof(*key_item)) + goto err; + + /* Load key 0. */ + n_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key0_n_len); + e_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key0_e_len); + if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key0)) + goto err; + n = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key0, n_len, NULL); + e = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key0 + n_len, e_len, NULL); + key0 = RSA_new(); + if (!key0) + goto err; + if (!RSA_set0_key(key0, n, e, NULL)) + goto err; + + /* If a root key was provided, compare it to key 0. */ + if (root_key && (BN_cmp(n, RSA_get0_n(root_key)) || + BN_cmp(e, RSA_get0_e(root_key)))) { + pr_err("Root key mismatch\n"); + goto err; + } + + /* Verify the key item signature. */ + SHA256(buf, key_item->sig - buf, digest); + if (!RSA_verify(NID_sha256, digest, sizeof(digest), + key_item->sig, le32_to_cpu(key_item->sig_len), key0)) { + pr_err("Bad key item signature\n"); + goto err; + } + + if (fw_key) { + /* Load key 1. */ + n_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key1_n_len); + e_len = le32_to_cpu(key_item->key1_e_len); + if (n_len + e_len > sizeof(key_item->key1)) + goto err; + n = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key1, n_len, NULL); + e = BN_bin2bn(key_item->key1 + n_len, e_len, NULL); + key1 = RSA_new(); + if (!key1) + goto err; + if (!RSA_set0_key(key1, n, e, NULL)) + goto err; + + if (*fw_key) { + /* If a FW key was provided, compare it to key 1. */ + if (BN_cmp(n, RSA_get0_n(*fw_key)) || + BN_cmp(e, RSA_get0_e(*fw_key))) { + pr_err("Firmware key mismatch\n"); + goto err; + } + } else { + /* Otherwise, send key1 back to the caller. */ + *fw_key = key1; + key1 = NULL; + } + } + + ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; + +err: + RSA_free(key0); + RSA_free(key1); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Create a certificate in @buf, describing the firmware with SHA256 digest + * @digest, and signed by the RSA key @fw_key. + */ +static int toc0_create_cert_item(uint8_t *buf, uint32_t *len, RSA *fw_key, + uint8_t digest[static SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]) +{ + static const struct toc0_cert_item cert_item_template = TOC0_CERT_ITEM; + struct toc0_cert_item *cert_item = (void *)buf; + uint8_t cert_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + struct toc0_totalSequence *totalSequence; + struct toc0_sigSequence *sigSequence; + struct toc0_extension *extension; + struct toc0_publicKey *publicKey; + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; + unsigned int sig_len; + + memcpy(cert_item, &cert_item_template, sizeof(*cert_item)); + *len = sizeof(*cert_item); + + /* + * Fill in the public key. + * + * Only 2048-bit RSA keys are supported. Since this uses a fixed-size + * structure, it may fail for non-standard exponents. + */ + totalSequence = &cert_item->totalSequence; + publicKey = &totalSequence->mainSequence.subjectPublicKeyInfo.publicKey; + if (BN_bn2binpad(RSA_get0_n(fw_key), publicKey->n, sizeof(publicKey->n)) < 0 || + BN_bn2binpad(RSA_get0_e(fw_key), publicKey->e, sizeof(publicKey->e)) < 0) { + pr_err("Incorrect key size\n"); + goto err; + } + + /* Fill in the firmware digest. */ + extension = &totalSequence->mainSequence.explicit3.extension; + memcpy(&extension->digest, digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); + + /* + * Sign the certificate. + * + * In older SBROM versions (and by default in newer versions), + * the last 4 bytes of the certificate are not signed. + * + * (The buffer passed to SHA256 starts at tag_mainSequence, but + * the buffer size does not include the length of that tag.) + */ + SHA256((uint8_t *)totalSequence, sizeof(struct toc0_mainSequence), + cert_digest); + sigSequence = &totalSequence->sigSequence; + if (!RSA_sign(NID_sha256, cert_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, + sigSequence->signature, &sig_len, fw_key)) { + pr_err("Failed to sign certificate\n"); + goto err; + } + if (sig_len != sizeof(sigSequence->signature)) { + pr_err("Signature length mismatch\n"); + goto err; + } + + ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; + +err: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Verify the certificate in @buf, describing the firmware with SHA256 digest + * @digest, and signed by the RSA key contained within. If @fw_key is provided, + * only that key will be accepted. + * + * This function is only expected to work with images created by mkimage. + */ +static int toc0_verify_cert_item(const uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len, RSA *fw_key, + uint8_t digest[static SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]) +{ + const struct toc0_cert_item *cert_item = (const void *)buf; + uint8_t cert_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + const struct toc0_totalSequence *totalSequence; + const struct toc0_sigSequence *sigSequence; + const struct toc0_extension *extension; + const struct toc0_publicKey *publicKey; + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; + RSA *key = NULL; + BIGNUM *n, *e; + + /* Extract the public key from the certificate. */ + totalSequence = &cert_item->totalSequence; + publicKey = &totalSequence->mainSequence.subjectPublicKeyInfo.publicKey; + n = BN_bin2bn(publicKey->n, sizeof(publicKey->n), NULL); + e = BN_bin2bn(publicKey->e, sizeof(publicKey->e), NULL); + key = RSA_new(); + if (!key) + goto err; + if (!RSA_set0_key(key, n, e, NULL)) + goto err; + + /* If a key was provided, compare it to the embedded key. */ + if (fw_key && (BN_cmp(RSA_get0_n(key), RSA_get0_n(fw_key)) || + BN_cmp(RSA_get0_e(key), RSA_get0_e(fw_key)))) { + pr_err("Firmware key mismatch\n"); + goto err; + } + + /* If a digest was provided, compare it to the embedded digest. */ + extension = &totalSequence->mainSequence.explicit3.extension; + if (digest && memcmp(&extension->digest, digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) { + pr_err("Firmware digest mismatch\n"); + goto err; + } + + /* Verify the certificate's signature. See the comment above. */ + SHA256((uint8_t *)totalSequence, sizeof(struct toc0_mainSequence), + cert_digest); + sigSequence = &totalSequence->sigSequence; + if (!RSA_verify(NID_sha256, cert_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, + sigSequence->signature, + sizeof(sigSequence->signature), key)) { + pr_err("Bad certificate signature\n"); + goto err; + } + + ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; + +err: + RSA_free(key); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Always create a TOC0 containing 3 items. The extra item will be ignored on + * SoCs which do not support it. + */ +static int toc0_create(uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len, RSA *root_key, RSA *fw_key, + uint8_t *key_item, uint32_t key_item_len, + uint8_t *fw_item, uint32_t fw_item_len, uint32_t fw_addr) +{ + struct toc0_main_info *main = (void *)buf; + struct toc0_item_info *item = (void *)(main + 1); + uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + uint32_t *buf32 = (void *)buf; + RSA *orig_fw_key = fw_key; + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; + uint32_t checksum = 0; + uint32_t item_offset; + uint32_t item_length; + int i; + + /* Hash the firmware for inclusion in the certificate. */ + SHA256(fw_item, fw_item_len, digest); + + /* Create the main TOC0 header, containing three items. */ + memcpy(main->name, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_NAME, sizeof(main->name)); + main->magic = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_MAIN_INFO_MAGIC); + main->checksum = cpu_to_le32(BROM_STAMP_VALUE); + main->num_items = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS); + memcpy(main->end, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_END, sizeof(main->end)); + + /* The first item links the ROTPK to the signing key. */ + item_offset = sizeof(*main) + TOC0_DEFAULT_NUM_ITEMS * sizeof(*item); + /* Using an existing key item avoids needing the root private key. */ + if (key_item) { + item_length = sizeof(*key_item); + if (toc0_verify_key_item(key_item, item_length, + root_key, &fw_key)) + goto err; + memcpy(buf + item_offset, key_item, item_length); + } else if (toc0_create_key_item(buf + item_offset, &item_length, + root_key, fw_key)) { + goto err; + } + + item->name = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_KEY); + item->offset = cpu_to_le32(item_offset); + item->length = cpu_to_le32(item_length); + memcpy(item->end, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_END, sizeof(item->end)); + + /* The second item contains a certificate signed by the firmware key. */ + item_offset = item_offset + item_length; + if (toc0_create_cert_item(buf + item_offset, &item_length, + fw_key, digest)) + goto err; + + item++; + item->name = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_CERT); + item->offset = cpu_to_le32(item_offset); + item->length = cpu_to_le32(item_length); + memcpy(item->end, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_END, sizeof(item->end)); + + /* The third item contains the actual boot code. */ + item_offset = ALIGN(item_offset + item_length, 32); + item_length = fw_item_len; + if (buf + item_offset != fw_item) + memmove(buf + item_offset, fw_item, item_length); + + item++; + item->name = cpu_to_le32(TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE); + item->offset = cpu_to_le32(item_offset); + item->length = cpu_to_le32(item_length); + item->load_addr = cpu_to_le32(fw_addr); + memcpy(item->end, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_END, sizeof(item->end)); + + /* Pad to the required block size with 0xff to be flash-friendly. */ + item_offset = item_offset + item_length; + item_length = ALIGN(item_offset, PAD_SIZE) - item_offset; + memset(buf + item_offset, 0xff, item_length); + + /* Fill in the total padded file length. */ + item_offset = item_offset + item_length; + main->length = cpu_to_le32(item_offset); + + /* Verify enough space was provided when creating the image. */ + assert(len >= item_offset); + + /* Calculate the checksum. Yes, it's that simple. */ + for (i = 0; i < item_offset / 4; ++i) + checksum += le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]); + main->checksum = cpu_to_le32(checksum); + + ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; + +err: + if (fw_key != orig_fw_key) + RSA_free(fw_key); + + return ret; +} + +static const struct toc0_item_info * +toc0_find_item(const struct toc0_main_info *main, + uint32_t name, uint32_t *offset, uint32_t *length) +{ + const struct toc0_item_info *item = (void *)(main + 1); + uint32_t item_offset, item_length; + uint32_t num_items, main_length; + int i; + + num_items = le32_to_cpu(main->num_items); + main_length = le32_to_cpu(main->length); + + for (i = 0; i < num_items; ++i, ++item) { + if (le32_to_cpu(item->name) != name) + continue; + + item_offset = le32_to_cpu(item->offset); + item_length = le32_to_cpu(item->length); + + if (item_offset > main_length || + item_length > main_length - item_offset) + continue; + + *offset = item_offset; + *length = item_length; + + return item; + } + + return NULL; +} + +static int toc0_verify(const uint8_t *buf, uint32_t len, RSA *root_key) +{ + const struct toc0_main_info *main = (void *)buf; + const struct toc0_item_info *item; + uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + uint32_t main_length = le32_to_cpu(main->length); + uint32_t checksum = BROM_STAMP_VALUE; + uint32_t *buf32 = (void *)buf; + uint32_t length, offset; + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; + RSA *fw_key = NULL; + int i; + + if (len < main_length) + goto err; + + /* Verify the main header. */ + if (memcmp(main->name, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_NAME, sizeof(main->name))) + goto err; + if (le32_to_cpu(main->magic) != TOC0_MAIN_INFO_MAGIC) + goto err; + /* Verify the checksum without modifying the buffer. */ + for (i = 0; i < main_length / 4; ++i) + checksum += le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]); + if (checksum != 2 * le32_to_cpu(main->checksum)) + goto err; + /* The length must be at least 512 byte aligned. */ + if (main_length % 512) + goto err; + if (memcmp(main->end, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_END, sizeof(main->end))) + goto err; + + /* Verify the key item if present. */ + item = toc0_find_item(main, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_KEY, &offset, &length); + if (!item) + fw_key = root_key; + else if (toc0_verify_key_item(buf + offset, length, root_key, &fw_key)) + goto err; + + /* Hash the firmware to compare with the certificate. */ + item = toc0_find_item(main, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE, &offset, &length); + if (!item) { + pr_err("Image does not contain a firmware item\n"); + goto err; + } + SHA256(buf + offset, length, digest); + + /* Verify the certificate item. */ + item = toc0_find_item(main, TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_CERT, &offset, &length); + if (!item) { + pr_err("Image does not contain a certificate item\n"); + goto err; + } + if (toc0_verify_cert_item(buf + offset, length, fw_key, digest)) + goto err; + + ret = EXIT_SUCCESS; + +err: + if (fw_key != root_key) + RSA_free(fw_key); + + return ret; +} + +static int toc0_check_params(struct image_tool_params *params) +{ + if (!params->dflag) + return -EINVAL; + + if (params->keydir) { + asprintf(&fw_key_file, "%s/%s", params->keydir, fw_key_file); + asprintf(&key_item_file, "%s/%s", params->keydir, key_item_file); + asprintf(&root_key_file, "%s/%s", params->keydir, root_key_file); + } + + return 0; +} + +static int toc0_verify_header(unsigned char *buf, int image_size, + struct image_tool_params *params) +{ + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; + RSA *root_key = NULL; + FILE *fp; + + /* A root public key is optional. */ + fp = fopen(root_key_file, "rb"); + if (fp) { + pr_info("Verifying image with existing root key\n"); + root_key = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (!root_key) + root_key = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); + fclose(fp); + if (!root_key) { + pr_err("Failed to read public key from '%s'\n", + root_key_file); + goto err; + } + } + + ret = toc0_verify(buf, image_size, root_key); + +err: + RSA_free(root_key); + + return ret; +} + +static const char *toc0_item_name(uint32_t name) +{ + if (name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_CERT) + return "Certificate"; + if (name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE) + return "Firmware"; + if (name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_KEY) + return "Key"; + return "(unknown)"; +} + +static void toc0_print_header(const void *buf) +{ + const struct toc0_main_info *main = buf; + const struct toc0_item_info *item = (void *)(main + 1); + uint32_t head_length, main_length, num_items; + uint32_t item_offset, item_length, item_name; + int load_addr = -1; + int i; + + num_items = le32_to_cpu(main->num_items); + head_length = sizeof(*main) + num_items * sizeof(*item); + main_length = le32_to_cpu(main->length); + + printf("Allwinner TOC0 Image\n" + "Size: %d bytes\n" + "Contents: %d items\n" + " 00000000:%08x Headers\n", + main_length, num_items, head_length); + + for (i = 0; i < num_items; ++i, ++item) { + item_offset = le32_to_cpu(item->offset); + item_length = le32_to_cpu(item->length); + item_name = le32_to_cpu(item->name); + + if (item_name == TOC0_ITEM_INFO_NAME_FIRMWARE) + load_addr = le32_to_cpu(item->load_addr); + + printf(" %08x:%08x %s\n", + item_offset, item_length, + toc0_item_name(item_name)); + } + + if (num_items && item_offset + item_length < main_length) { + item_offset = item_offset + item_length; + item_length = main_length - item_offset; + + printf(" %08x:%08x Padding\n", + item_offset, item_length); + } + + if (load_addr != -1) + printf("Load address: 0x%08x\n", load_addr); +} + +static void toc0_set_header(void *buf, struct stat *sbuf, int ifd, + struct image_tool_params *params) +{ + uint32_t key_item_len = 0; + uint8_t *key_item = NULL; + int ret = EXIT_FAILURE; + RSA *root_key = NULL; + RSA *fw_key = NULL; + FILE *fp; + + /* Either a key item or the root private key is required. */ + fp = fopen(key_item_file, "rb"); + if (fp) { + pr_info("Creating image using existing key item\n"); + key_item_len = sizeof(struct toc0_key_item); + key_item = OPENSSL_malloc(key_item_len); + if (!key_item || fread(key_item, key_item_len, 1, fp) != 1) { + pr_err("Failed to read key item from '%s'\n", + root_key_file); + goto err; + } + fclose(fp); + fp = NULL; + } + + fp = fopen(root_key_file, "rb"); + if (fp) { + root_key = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (!root_key) + root_key = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); + fclose(fp); + fp = NULL; + } + + /* When using an existing key item, the root key is optional. */ + if (!key_item && (!root_key || !RSA_get0_d(root_key))) { + pr_err("Failed to read private key from '%s'\n", + root_key_file); + goto err; + } + + /* The certificate/firmware private key is always required. */ + fp = fopen(fw_key_file, "rb"); + if (fp) { + fw_key = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); + fclose(fp); + fp = NULL; + } + if (!fw_key) { + /* If the root key is a private key, it can be used instead. */ + if (root_key && RSA_get0_d(root_key)) { + pr_info("Using root key as firmware key\n"); + fw_key = root_key; + } else { + pr_err("Failed to read private key from '%s'\n", + fw_key_file); + goto err; + } + } + + /* Warn about potential compatiblity issues. */ + if (key_item || fw_key != root_key) + pr_warn("Only H6 supports separate root and firmware keys\n"); + + ret = toc0_create(buf, params->file_size, root_key, fw_key, + key_item, key_item_len, + buf + TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN, + params->orig_file_size, params->addr); + +err: + OPENSSL_free(key_item); + OPENSSL_free(root_key); + if (fw_key != root_key) + OPENSSL_free(fw_key); + if (fp) + fclose(fp); + + if (ret != EXIT_SUCCESS) + exit(ret); +} + +static int toc0_check_image_type(uint8_t type) +{ + return type == IH_TYPE_SUNXI_TOC0 ? 0 : 1; +} + +static int toc0_vrec_header(struct image_tool_params *params, + struct image_type_params *tparams) +{ + tparams->hdr = calloc(tparams->header_size, 1); + + /* Save off the unpadded data size for SHA256 calculation. */ + params->orig_file_size = params->file_size - TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN; + + /* Return padding to 8K blocks. */ + return ALIGN(params->file_size, PAD_SIZE) - params->file_size; +} + +U_BOOT_IMAGE_TYPE( + sunxi_toc0, + "Allwinner TOC0 Boot Image support", + TOC0_DEFAULT_HEADER_LEN, + NULL, + toc0_check_params, + toc0_verify_header, + toc0_print_header, + toc0_set_header, + NULL, + toc0_check_image_type, + NULL, + toc0_vrec_header +);

SPL uses the image header to detect the boot device and to find the offset of U-Boot proper. Since this information is stored differently in eGON and TOC0 image headers, add code to find the correct value based on the image type currently in use.

Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland samuel@sholland.org --- arch/arm/include/asm/arch-sunxi/spl.h | 2 -- arch/arm/mach-sunxi/board.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------ include/sunxi_image.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/arch-sunxi/spl.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/arch-sunxi/spl.h index 58cdf806d9a..157b11e4897 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/arch-sunxi/spl.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/arch-sunxi/spl.h @@ -19,8 +19,6 @@ #define SUNXI_BOOTED_FROM_MMC0_HIGH 0x10 #define SUNXI_BOOTED_FROM_MMC2_HIGH 0x12

-#define is_boot0_magic(addr) (memcmp((void *)(addr), BOOT0_MAGIC, 8) == 0) - uint32_t sunxi_get_boot_device(void);

#endif diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-sunxi/board.c b/arch/arm/mach-sunxi/board.c index 9b84132eda6..8147f250f87 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-sunxi/board.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-sunxi/board.c @@ -237,10 +237,13 @@ void s_init(void)

static int sunxi_get_boot_source(void) { - if (!is_boot0_magic(SPL_ADDR + 4)) /* eGON.BT0 */ - return SUNXI_INVALID_BOOT_SOURCE; + if (is_egon_image((void *)SPL_ADDR)) + return ((struct boot_file_head *)SPL_ADDR)->boot_media; + if (is_toc0_image((void *)SPL_ADDR)) + return ((struct toc0_main_info *)SPL_ADDR)->platform[0];

- return readb(SPL_ADDR + 0x28); + /* Not a valid BROM image, so we must have been booted via FEL. */ + return SUNXI_INVALID_BOOT_SOURCE; }

/* The sunxi internal brom will try to loader external bootloader @@ -285,13 +288,18 @@ uint32_t sunxi_get_boot_device(void) return -1; /* Never reached */ }

+#define is_toc0_magic(foo) true + #ifdef CONFIG_SPL_BUILD static u32 sunxi_get_spl_size(void) { - if (!is_boot0_magic(SPL_ADDR + 4)) /* eGON.BT0 */ - return 0; + if (is_egon_image((void *)SPL_ADDR)) + return ((struct boot_file_head *)SPL_ADDR)->length; + if (is_toc0_image((void *)SPL_ADDR)) + return ((struct toc0_main_info *)SPL_ADDR)->length;

- return readl(SPL_ADDR + 0x10); + /* Unknown size, so fall back to the default offset. */ + return 0; }

/* diff --git a/include/sunxi_image.h b/include/sunxi_image.h index bdf80ec0e0a..b0424b6b7f1 100644 --- a/include/sunxi_image.h +++ b/include/sunxi_image.h @@ -270,4 +270,18 @@ struct toc0_key_item { sizeof(struct toc0_key_item), \ 32)

+static inline bool is_egon_image(void *addr) +{ + struct boot_file_head *head = addr; + + return memcmp(head->magic, BOOT0_MAGIC, 8) == 0; +} + +static inline bool is_toc0_image(void *addr) +{ + struct toc0_main_info *main = addr; + + return memcmp(main->name, TOC0_MAIN_INFO_NAME, 8) == 0; +} + #endif