[PATCH] board: amlogic: fix buffler overflow in serial & usid read

While meson_sm_read_efuse() doesn't overflow, the string is not zero terminated and env_set() will buffer overflow and add random characters to environment.
Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong neil.armstrong@linaro.org --- board/amlogic/jethub-j80/jethub-j80.c | 6 ++++-- board/amlogic/p200/p200.c | 3 ++- board/amlogic/p201/p201.c | 3 ++- board/amlogic/p212/p212.c | 3 ++- board/amlogic/q200/q200.c | 3 ++- 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/board/amlogic/jethub-j80/jethub-j80.c b/board/amlogic/jethub-j80/jethub-j80.c index 185880de13..d10492cc46 100644 --- a/board/amlogic/jethub-j80/jethub-j80.c +++ b/board/amlogic/jethub-j80/jethub-j80.c @@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ int misc_init_r(void) { u8 mac_addr[EFUSE_MAC_SIZE]; - char serial[EFUSE_SN_SIZE]; - char usid[EFUSE_USID_SIZE]; + char serial[EFUSE_SN_SIZE + 1]; + char usid[EFUSE_USID_SIZE + 1]; ssize_t len; unsigned int adcval; int ret; @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ int misc_init_r(void) if (!env_get("serial")) { len = meson_sm_read_efuse(EFUSE_SN_OFFSET, serial, EFUSE_SN_SIZE); + serial[len] = '\0'; if (len == EFUSE_SN_SIZE) env_set("serial", serial); } @@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ int misc_init_r(void) if (!env_get("usid")) { len = meson_sm_read_efuse(EFUSE_USID_OFFSET, usid, EFUSE_USID_SIZE); + usid[len] = '\0'; if (len == EFUSE_USID_SIZE) env_set("usid", usid); } diff --git a/board/amlogic/p200/p200.c b/board/amlogic/p200/p200.c index 7c432f9d28..37a54e715c 100644 --- a/board/amlogic/p200/p200.c +++ b/board/amlogic/p200/p200.c @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ int misc_init_r(void) { u8 mac_addr[EFUSE_MAC_SIZE]; - char serial[EFUSE_SN_SIZE]; + char serial[EFUSE_SN_SIZE + 1]; ssize_t len;
if (!eth_env_get_enetaddr("ethaddr", mac_addr)) { @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ int misc_init_r(void) if (!env_get("serial#")) { len = meson_sm_read_efuse(EFUSE_SN_OFFSET, serial, EFUSE_SN_SIZE); + serial[len] = '\0'; if (len == EFUSE_SN_SIZE) env_set("serial#", serial); } diff --git a/board/amlogic/p201/p201.c b/board/amlogic/p201/p201.c index 7c432f9d28..37a54e715c 100644 --- a/board/amlogic/p201/p201.c +++ b/board/amlogic/p201/p201.c @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ int misc_init_r(void) { u8 mac_addr[EFUSE_MAC_SIZE]; - char serial[EFUSE_SN_SIZE]; + char serial[EFUSE_SN_SIZE + 1]; ssize_t len;
if (!eth_env_get_enetaddr("ethaddr", mac_addr)) { @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ int misc_init_r(void) if (!env_get("serial#")) { len = meson_sm_read_efuse(EFUSE_SN_OFFSET, serial, EFUSE_SN_SIZE); + serial[len] = '\0'; if (len == EFUSE_SN_SIZE) env_set("serial#", serial); } diff --git a/board/amlogic/p212/p212.c b/board/amlogic/p212/p212.c index fcef90bce5..90ac9f885d 100644 --- a/board/amlogic/p212/p212.c +++ b/board/amlogic/p212/p212.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ int misc_init_r(void) { u8 mac_addr[EFUSE_MAC_SIZE]; - char serial[EFUSE_SN_SIZE]; + char serial[EFUSE_SN_SIZE + 1]; ssize_t len;
if (!eth_env_get_enetaddr("ethaddr", mac_addr)) { @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ int misc_init_r(void) if (!env_get("serial#")) { len = meson_sm_read_efuse(EFUSE_SN_OFFSET, serial, EFUSE_SN_SIZE); + serial[len] = '\0'; if (len == EFUSE_SN_SIZE) env_set("serial#", serial); } diff --git a/board/amlogic/q200/q200.c b/board/amlogic/q200/q200.c index 3aa6d8f200..1c47f4645f 100644 --- a/board/amlogic/q200/q200.c +++ b/board/amlogic/q200/q200.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ int misc_init_r(void) { u8 mac_addr[EFUSE_MAC_SIZE]; - char serial[EFUSE_SN_SIZE]; + char serial[EFUSE_SN_SIZE + 1]; ssize_t len;
if (!eth_env_get_enetaddr("ethaddr", mac_addr)) { @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ int misc_init_r(void) if (!env_get("serial#")) { len = meson_sm_read_efuse(EFUSE_SN_OFFSET, serial, EFUSE_SN_SIZE); + serial[len] = '\0'; if (len == EFUSE_SN_SIZE) env_set("serial#", serial); }
--- base-commit: b145877c22b391a4872c875145a8f86f6ffebaba change-id: 20240319-u-boot-fix-p200-serial-a017f57caf88
Best regards,

On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 03:53:24PM +0100, Neil Armstrong wrote:
While meson_sm_read_efuse() doesn't overflow, the string is not zero terminated and env_set() will buffer overflow and add random characters to environment.
In the Linux kernel we would give this a CVE because it's information disclosure bug...
Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong neil.armstrong@linaro.org
board/amlogic/jethub-j80/jethub-j80.c | 6 ++++-- board/amlogic/p200/p200.c | 3 ++- board/amlogic/p201/p201.c | 3 ++- board/amlogic/p212/p212.c | 3 ++- board/amlogic/q200/q200.c | 3 ++- 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/board/amlogic/jethub-j80/jethub-j80.c b/board/amlogic/jethub-j80/jethub-j80.c index 185880de13..d10492cc46 100644 --- a/board/amlogic/jethub-j80/jethub-j80.c +++ b/board/amlogic/jethub-j80/jethub-j80.c @@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ int misc_init_r(void) { u8 mac_addr[EFUSE_MAC_SIZE];
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
This one is also a problem. You can't pass non-terminated strings to eth_env_set_enetaddr(). We call strlen() on it in either hsearch_r() or env_get_from_linear().
All the other functions had a mac_addr[] issue as well.
Btw, this kind of bug is a good candidate for a static checker warning. I can create a Smatch check for this. It would probably be easier in Coccinelle even, but I'm the Smatch maintainer.
regards, dan carpenter
- char serial[EFUSE_SN_SIZE];
- char usid[EFUSE_USID_SIZE];
- char serial[EFUSE_SN_SIZE + 1];
- char usid[EFUSE_USID_SIZE + 1]; ssize_t len; unsigned int adcval; int ret;
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ int misc_init_r(void) if (!env_get("serial")) { len = meson_sm_read_efuse(EFUSE_SN_OFFSET, serial, EFUSE_SN_SIZE);
if (len == EFUSE_SN_SIZE) env_set("serial", serial);serial[len] = '\0';

On 20/03/2024 06:28, Dan Carpenter wrote:
On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 03:53:24PM +0100, Neil Armstrong wrote:
While meson_sm_read_efuse() doesn't overflow, the string is not zero terminated and env_set() will buffer overflow and add random characters to environment.
In the Linux kernel we would give this a CVE because it's information disclosure bug...
Yes probably
Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong neil.armstrong@linaro.org
board/amlogic/jethub-j80/jethub-j80.c | 6 ++++-- board/amlogic/p200/p200.c | 3 ++- board/amlogic/p201/p201.c | 3 ++- board/amlogic/p212/p212.c | 3 ++- board/amlogic/q200/q200.c | 3 ++- 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/board/amlogic/jethub-j80/jethub-j80.c b/board/amlogic/jethub-j80/jethub-j80.c index 185880de13..d10492cc46 100644 --- a/board/amlogic/jethub-j80/jethub-j80.c +++ b/board/amlogic/jethub-j80/jethub-j80.c @@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ int misc_init_r(void) { u8 mac_addr[EFUSE_MAC_SIZE];
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
This one is also a problem. You can't pass non-terminated strings to eth_env_set_enetaddr(). We call strlen() on it in either hsearch_r() or env_get_from_linear().
All the other functions had a mac_addr[] issue as well.
Ack, I'll also fix those, I should have checked before...
Btw, this kind of bug is a good candidate for a static checker warning. I can create a Smatch check for this. It would probably be easier in Coccinelle even, but I'm the Smatch maintainer.
Would be nice!
regards, dan carpenter
- char serial[EFUSE_SN_SIZE];
- char usid[EFUSE_USID_SIZE];
- char serial[EFUSE_SN_SIZE + 1];
- char usid[EFUSE_USID_SIZE + 1]; ssize_t len; unsigned int adcval; int ret;
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ int misc_init_r(void) if (!env_get("serial")) { len = meson_sm_read_efuse(EFUSE_SN_OFFSET, serial, EFUSE_SN_SIZE);
if (len == EFUSE_SN_SIZE) env_set("serial", serial);serial[len] = '\0';
Thanks, Neil

On Wed, Mar 20, 2024 at 09:26:29AM +0100, Neil Armstrong wrote:
On 20/03/2024 06:28, Dan Carpenter wrote:
On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 03:53:24PM +0100, Neil Armstrong wrote:
While meson_sm_read_efuse() doesn't overflow, the string is not zero terminated and env_set() will buffer overflow and add random characters to environment.
In the Linux kernel we would give this a CVE because it's information disclosure bug...
Yes probably
Yes, but this isn't the Linux kernel and we aren't a CNA. I don't object to someone getting a CVE if so inclined, but we don't have the resources to follow in the kernel's footsteps here either.
participants (3)
-
Dan Carpenter
-
Neil Armstrong
-
Tom Rini