We want to always build mkeficapsule if tools-only_defconfig is used.

Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro takahiro.akashi@linaro.org --- configs/tools-only_defconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/configs/tools-only_defconfig b/configs/tools-only_defconfig index f482c9a1c1b0..5427797dd4c3 100644 --- a/configs/tools-only_defconfig +++ b/configs/tools-only_defconfig @@ -31,3 +31,4 @@ CONFIG_I2C_EDID=y # CONFIG_VIRTIO_MMIO is not set # CONFIG_VIRTIO_PCI is not set # CONFIG_VIRTIO_SANDBOX is not set +CONFIG_TOOLS_MKEFICAPSULE=y

With this enhancement, mkeficapsule will be able to sign a capsule file when it is created. A signature added will be used later in the verification at FMP's SetImage() call.

To do that, We need specify additional command parameters: -monotonic-cout <count> : monotonic count -private-key <private key file> : private key file -certificate <certificate file> : certificate file Only when all of those parameters are given, a signature will be added to a capsule file.

Users are expected to maintain and increment the monotonic count at every time of the update for each firmware image.

Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro takahiro.akashi@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org --- tools/Kconfig | 8 + tools/Makefile | 8 +- tools/eficapsule.h | 115 +++++++++++++ tools/mkeficapsule.c | 401 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 4 files changed, 494 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/eficapsule.h

diff --git a/tools/Kconfig b/tools/Kconfig index 91ce8ae3e516..117c921da3fe 100644 --- a/tools/Kconfig +++ b/tools/Kconfig @@ -90,4 +90,12 @@ config TOOLS_SHA512 help Enable SHA512 support in the tools builds

+config TOOLS_MKEFICAPSULE + bool "Build efimkcapsule command" + default y if EFI_CAPSULE_ON_DISK + help + This command allows users to create a UEFI capsule file and, + optionally sign that file. If you want to enable UEFI capsule + update feature on your target, you certainly need this. + endmenu diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile index 1763f44cac43..a10aa091021f 100644 --- a/tools/Makefile +++ b/tools/Makefile @@ -238,8 +238,12 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MIPS) += mips-relocs hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1_COMPILER) += asn1_compiler HOSTCFLAGS_asn1_compiler.o = -idirafter $(srctree)/include

-mkeficapsule-objs := mkeficapsule.o $(LIBFDT_OBJS) -hostprogs-$(CONFIG_EFI_HAVE_CAPSULE_SUPPORT) += mkeficapsule +HOSTLDLIBS_mkeficapsule += -luuid +ifeq ($(CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO),y) +HOSTLDLIBS_mkeficapsule += \ + $(shell pkg-config --libs libssl libcrypto 2> /dev/null || echo "-lssl -lcrypto") +endif +hostprogs-$(CONFIG_TOOLS_MKEFICAPSULE) += mkeficapsule

# We build some files with extra pedantic flags to try to minimize things # that won't build on some weird host compiler -- though there are lots of diff --git a/tools/eficapsule.h b/tools/eficapsule.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8c1560bb0671 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/eficapsule.h @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright 2021 Linaro Limited + * Author: AKASHI Takahiro + * + * derived from efi.h and efi_api.h to make the file POSIX-compliant + */ + +#ifndef _EFI_CAPSULE_H +#define _EFI_CAPSULE_H + +#include <stdint.h> +#include <pe.h> /* WIN_CERTIFICATE */ + +/* + * Gcc's predefined attributes are not recognized by clang. + */ +#ifndef __packed +#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__)) +#endif + +#ifndef __aligned +#define __aligned(x) __attribute__((__aligned__(x))) +#endif + +typedef struct { + uint8_t b[16]; +} efi_guid_t __aligned(8); + +#define EFI_GUID(a, b, c, d0, d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, d6, d7) \ + {{ (a) & 0xff, ((a) >> 8) & 0xff, ((a) >> 16) & 0xff, \ + ((a) >> 24) & 0xff, \ + (b) & 0xff, ((b) >> 8) & 0xff, \ + (c) & 0xff, ((c) >> 8) & 0xff, \ + (d0), (d1), (d2), (d3), (d4), (d5), (d6), (d7) } } + +#define EFI_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT_CAPSULE_ID_GUID \ + EFI_GUID(0x6dcbd5ed, 0xe82d, 0x4c44, 0xbd, 0xa1, \ + 0x71, 0x94, 0x19, 0x9a, 0xd9, 0x2a) + +#define EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_FIT_GUID \ + EFI_GUID(0xae13ff2d, 0x9ad4, 0x4e25, 0x9a, 0xc8, \ + 0x6d, 0x80, 0xb3, 0xb2, 0x21, 0x47) + +#define EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_RAW_GUID \ + EFI_GUID(0xe2bb9c06, 0x70e9, 0x4b14, 0x97, 0xa3, \ + 0x5a, 0x79, 0x13, 0x17, 0x6e, 0x3f) + +#define EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID \ + EFI_GUID(0x4aafd29d, 0x68df, 0x49ee, 0x8a, 0xa9, \ + 0x34, 0x7d, 0x37, 0x56, 0x65, 0xa7) + +/* flags */ +#define CAPSULE_FLAGS_PERSIST_ACROSS_RESET 0x00010000 + +struct efi_capsule_header { + efi_guid_t capsule_guid; + uint32_t header_size; + uint32_t flags; + uint32_t capsule_image_size; +} __packed; + +struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_header { + uint32_t version; + uint16_t embedded_driver_count; + uint16_t payload_item_count; + uint32_t item_offset_list[]; +} __packed; + +/* image_capsule_support */ +#define CAPSULE_SUPPORT_AUTHENTICATION 0x0000000000000001 + +struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_image_header { + uint32_t version; + efi_guid_t update_image_type_id; + uint8_t update_image_index; + uint8_t reserved[3]; + uint32_t update_image_size; + uint32_t update_vendor_code_size; + uint64_t update_hardware_instance; + uint64_t image_capsule_support; +} __packed; + +/** + * win_certificate_uefi_guid - A certificate that encapsulates + * a GUID-specific signature + * + * @hdr: Windows certificate header + * @cert_type: Certificate type + * @cert_data: Certificate data + */ +struct win_certificate_uefi_guid { + WIN_CERTIFICATE hdr; + efi_guid_t cert_type; + uint8_t cert_data[]; +} __packed; + +/** + * efi_firmware_image_authentication - Capsule authentication method + * descriptor + * + * This structure describes an authentication information for + * a capsule with IMAGE_ATTRIBUTE_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED set + * and should be included as part of the capsule. + * Only EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID is accepted. + * + * @monotonic_count: Count to prevent replay + * @auth_info: Authentication info + */ +struct efi_firmware_image_authentication { + uint64_t monotonic_count; + struct win_certificate_uefi_guid auth_info; +} __packed; + +#endif /* _EFI_CAPSULE_H */ diff --git a/tools/mkeficapsule.c b/tools/mkeficapsule.c index afdcaf7e7933..3e6f36430d74 100644 --- a/tools/mkeficapsule.c +++ b/tools/mkeficapsule.c @@ -15,21 +15,17 @@ #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/types.h>

-typedef __u8 u8; -typedef __u16 u16; -typedef __u32 u32; -typedef __u64 u64; -typedef __s16 s16; -typedef __s32 s32; - -#define aligned_u64 __aligned_u64 - -#ifndef __packed -#define __packed __attribute__((packed)) +#include <linux/kconfig.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO +#include <openssl/asn1.h> +#include <openssl/bio.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/pem.h> +#include <openssl/pkcs7.h> #endif

-#include <efi.h> -#include <efi_api.h> +#include "eficapsule.h"

static const char *tool_name = "mkeficapsule";

@@ -38,12 +34,25 @@ efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_type_uboot_fit = EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_FIT_GUID; efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_type_uboot_raw = EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_RAW_GUID; +efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID; + +#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO +static const char *opts_short = "f:r:i:I:v:p:c:m:dh"; +#else +static const char *opts_short = "f:r:i:I:v:h"; +#endif

static struct option options[] = { {"fit", required_argument, NULL, 'f'}, {"raw", required_argument, NULL, 'r'}, {"index", required_argument, NULL, 'i'}, {"instance", required_argument, NULL, 'I'}, +#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO + {"private-key", required_argument, NULL, 'p'}, + {"certificate", required_argument, NULL, 'c'}, + {"monotonic-count", required_argument, NULL, 'm'}, + {"dump-sig", no_argument, NULL, 'd'}, +#endif {"help", no_argument, NULL, 'h'}, {NULL, 0, NULL, 0}, }; @@ -57,10 +66,252 @@ static void print_usage(void) "\t-r, --raw <raw image> new raw image file\n" "\t-i, --index <index> update image index\n" "\t-I, --instance <instance> update hardware instance\n" +#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO + "\t-p, --private-key <privkey file> private key file\n" + "\t-c, --certificate <cert file> signer's certificate file\n" + "\t-m, --monotonic-count <count> monotonic count\n" + "\t-d, --dump_sig dump signature (*.p7)\n" +#endif "\t-h, --help print a help message\n", tool_name); }

+/** + * auth_context - authentication context + * @key_file: Path to a private key file + * @cert_file: Path to a certificate file + * @image_data: Pointer to firmware data + * @image_size: Size of firmware data + * @auth: Authentication header + * @sig_data: Signature data + * @sig_size: Size of signature data + * + * Data structure used in create_auth_data(). @key_file through + * @image_size are input parameters. @auth, @sig_data and @sig_size + * are filled in by create_auth_data(). + */ +struct auth_context { + char *key_file; + char *cert_file; + uint8_t *image_data; + size_t image_size; + struct efi_firmware_image_authentication auth; + uint8_t *sig_data; + size_t sig_size; +}; + +static int dump_sig; + +#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO +/** + * fileio-read_pkey - read out a private key + * @filename: Path to a private key file + * + * Read out a private key file and parse it into "EVP_PKEY" structure. + * + * Return: + * * Pointer to private key structure - on success + * * NULL - on failure + */ +static EVP_PKEY *fileio_read_pkey(const char *filename) +{ + EVP_PKEY *key = NULL; + BIO *bio; + + bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r"); + if (!bio) + goto out; + + key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL); + +out: + BIO_free_all(bio); + if (!key) { + printf("Can't load key from file '%s'\n", filename); + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + } + + return key; +} + +/** + * fileio-read_cert - read out a certificate + * @filename: Path to a certificate file + * + * Read out a certificate file and parse it into "X509" structure. + * + * Return: + * * Pointer to certificate structure - on success + * * NULL - on failure + */ +static X509 *fileio_read_cert(const char *filename) +{ + X509 *cert = NULL; + BIO *bio; + + bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r"); + if (!bio) + goto out; + + cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL); + +out: + BIO_free_all(bio); + if (!cert) { + printf("Can't load certificate from file '%s'\n", filename); + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); + } + + return cert; +} + +/** + * create_auth_data - compose authentication data in capsule + * @auth_context: Pointer to authentication context + * + * Fill up an authentication header (.auth) and signature data (.sig_data) + * in @auth_context, using library functions from openssl. + * All the parameters in @auth_context must be filled in by a caller. + * + * Return: + * * 0 - on success + * * -1 - on failure + */ +static int create_auth_data(struct auth_context *ctx) +{ + EVP_PKEY *key = NULL; + X509 *cert = NULL; + BIO *data_bio = NULL; + const EVP_MD *md; + PKCS7 *p7; + int flags, ret = -1; + + OpenSSL_add_all_digests(); + OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers(); + ERR_load_crypto_strings(); + + key = fileio_read_pkey(ctx->key_file); + if (!key) + goto err; + cert = fileio_read_cert(ctx->cert_file); + if (!cert) + goto err; + + /* + * create a BIO, containing: + * * firmware image + * * monotonic count + * in this order! + * See EDK2's FmpAuthenticatedHandlerRsa2048Sha256() + */ + data_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + BIO_write(data_bio, ctx->image_data, ctx->image_size); + BIO_write(data_bio, &ctx->auth.monotonic_count, + sizeof(ctx->auth.monotonic_count)); + + md = EVP_get_digestbyname("SHA256"); + if (!md) + goto err; + + /* create signature */ + /* TODO: maybe add PKCS7_NOATTR and PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP */ + flags = PKCS7_BINARY | PKCS7_DETACHED; + p7 = PKCS7_sign(NULL, NULL, NULL, data_bio, flags | PKCS7_PARTIAL); + if (!p7) + goto err; + if (!PKCS7_sign_add_signer(p7, cert, key, md, flags)) + goto err; + if (!PKCS7_final(p7, data_bio, flags)) + goto err; + + /* convert pkcs7 into DER */ + ctx->sig_data = NULL; + ctx->sig_size = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)p7, &ctx->sig_data, + ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7)); + if (!ctx->sig_size) + goto err; + + /* fill auth_info */ + ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.dwLength = sizeof(ctx->auth.auth_info) + + ctx->sig_size; + ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.wRevision = WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0; + ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.wCertificateType = WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID; + memcpy(&ctx->auth.auth_info.cert_type, &efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7, + sizeof(efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7)); + + ret = 0; +err: + BIO_free_all(data_bio); + EVP_PKEY_free(key); + X509_free(cert); + + return ret; +} + +/** + * dump_signature - dump out a signature + * @path: Path to a capsule file + * @signature: Signature data + * @sig_size: Size of signature data + * + * Signature data pointed to by @signature will be saved into + * a file whose file name is @path with ".p7" suffix. + * + * Return: + * * 0 - on success + * * -1 - on failure + */ +static int dump_signature(const char *path, uint8_t *signature, size_t sig_size) +{ + char *sig_path; + FILE *f; + size_t size; + int ret = -1; + + sig_path = malloc(strlen(path) + 3 + 1); + if (!sig_path) + return ret; + + sprintf(sig_path, "%s.p7", path); + f = fopen(sig_path, "w"); + if (!f) + goto err; + + size = fwrite(signature, 1, sig_size, f); + if (size == sig_size) + ret = 0; + + fclose(f); +err: + free(sig_path); + return ret; +} + +/** + * free_sig_data - free out signature data + * @ctx: Pointer to authentication context + * + * Free signature data allocated in create_auth_data(). + */ +static void free_sig_data(struct auth_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx->sig_size) + OPENSSL_free(ctx->sig_data); +} +#else +static int create_auth_data(struct auth_context *ctx) +{ + return 0; +} + +static int dump_signature(const char *path, uint8_t *signature, size_t sig_size) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void free_sig_data(struct auth_context *ctx) {} +#endif + /** * read_bin_file - read a firmware binary file * @bin: Path to a firmware binary file @@ -167,23 +418,25 @@ static int write_capsule_file(FILE *f, void *data, size_t size, const char *msg) * * -1 - on failure */ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid, - unsigned long index, unsigned long instance) + unsigned long index, unsigned long instance, + uint64_t mcount, char *privkey_file, char *cert_file) { struct efi_capsule_header header; struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_header capsule; struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_image_header image; + struct auth_context auth_context; FILE *f; void *data; off_t bin_size; - u64 offset; + uint64_t offset; int ret;

#ifdef DEBUG printf("For output: %s\n", path); printf("\tbin: %s\n\ttype: %pUl\n", bin, guid); - printf("\tindex: %ld\n\tinstance: %ld\n", index, instance); + printf("\tindex: %lu\n\tinstance: %lu\n", index, instance); #endif - + auth_context.sig_size = 0; f = NULL; data = NULL; ret = -1; @@ -194,6 +447,27 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid, if (read_bin_file(bin, &data, &bin_size)) goto err;

+ /* first, calculate signature to determine its size */ + if (privkey_file && cert_file) { + auth_context.key_file = privkey_file; + auth_context.cert_file = cert_file; + auth_context.auth.monotonic_count = mcount; + auth_context.image_data = data; + auth_context.image_size = bin_size; + + if (create_auth_data(&auth_context)) { + printf("Signing firmware image failed\n"); + goto err; + } + + if (dump_sig && + dump_signature(path, auth_context.sig_data, + auth_context.sig_size)) { + printf("Creating signature file failed\n"); + goto err; + } + } + /* * write a capsule file */ @@ -211,9 +485,12 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid, /* TODO: The current implementation ignores flags */ header.flags = CAPSULE_FLAGS_PERSIST_ACROSS_RESET; header.capsule_image_size = sizeof(header) - + sizeof(capsule) + sizeof(u64) + + sizeof(capsule) + sizeof(uint64_t) + sizeof(image) + bin_size; + if (auth_context.sig_size) + header.capsule_image_size += sizeof(auth_context.auth) + + auth_context.sig_size; if (write_capsule_file(f, &header, sizeof(header), "Capsule header")) goto err; @@ -229,7 +506,7 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid, "Firmware capsule header")) goto err;

- offset = sizeof(capsule) + sizeof(u64); + offset = sizeof(capsule) + sizeof(uint64_t); if (write_capsule_file(f, &offset, sizeof(offset), "Offset to capsule image")) goto err; @@ -244,13 +521,32 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid, image.reserved[1] = 0; image.reserved[2] = 0; image.update_image_size = bin_size; + if (auth_context.sig_size) + image.update_image_size += sizeof(auth_context.auth) + + auth_context.sig_size; image.update_vendor_code_size = 0; /* none */ image.update_hardware_instance = instance; image.image_capsule_support = 0; + if (auth_context.sig_size) + image.image_capsule_support |= CAPSULE_SUPPORT_AUTHENTICATION; if (write_capsule_file(f, &image, sizeof(image), "Firmware capsule image header")) goto err;

+ /* + * signature + */ + if (auth_context.sig_size) { + if (write_capsule_file(f, &auth_context.auth, + sizeof(auth_context.auth), + "Authentication header")) + goto err; + + if (write_capsule_file(f, auth_context.sig_data, + auth_context.sig_size, "Signature")) + goto err; + } + /* * firmware binary */ @@ -261,28 +557,43 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid, err: if (f) fclose(f); + free_sig_data(&auth_context); free(data);

return ret; }

-/* - * Usage: - * $ mkeficapsule -f <firmware binary> <output file> +/** + * main - main entry function of mkeficapsule + * @argc: Number of arguments + * @argv: Array of pointers to arguments + * + * Create an uefi capsule file, optionally signing it. + * Parse all the arguments and pass them on to create_fwbin(). + * + * Return: + * * 0 - on success + * * -1 - on failure */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { char *file; efi_guid_t *guid; unsigned long index, instance; + uint64_t mcount; + char *privkey_file, *cert_file; int c, idx;

file = NULL; guid = NULL; index = 0; instance = 0; + mcount = 0; + privkey_file = NULL; + cert_file = NULL; + dump_sig = 0; for (;;) { - c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "f:r:i:I:v:h", options, &idx); + c = getopt_long(argc, argv, opts_short, options, &idx); if (c == -1) break;

@@ -290,7 +601,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) case 'f': if (file) { printf("Image already specified\n"); - return -1; + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } file = optarg; guid = &efi_guid_image_type_uboot_fit; @@ -298,7 +609,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) case 'r': if (file) { printf("Image already specified\n"); - return -1; + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } file = optarg; guid = &efi_guid_image_type_uboot_raw; @@ -309,26 +620,44 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) case 'I': instance = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 0); break; +#ifdef CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO + case 'p': + if (privkey_file) { + printf("Private Key already specified\n"); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } + privkey_file = optarg; + break; + case 'c': + if (cert_file) { + printf("Certificate file already specified\n"); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } + cert_file = optarg; + break; + case 'm': + mcount = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 0); + break; + case 'd': + dump_sig = 1; + break; +#endif /* CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO */ case 'h': print_usage(); - return 0; + exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } }

- /* need an output file */ - if (argc != optind + 1) { + /* check necessary parameters */ + if ((argc != optind + 1) || !file || + ((privkey_file && !cert_file) || + (!privkey_file && cert_file))) { print_usage(); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); }

- /* need a fit image file or raw image file */ - if (!file) { - print_usage(); - exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); - } - - if (create_fwbin(argv[optind], file, guid, index, instance) - < 0) { + if (create_fwbin(argv[optind], file, guid, index, instance, + mcount, privkey_file, cert_file) < 0) { printf("Creating firmware capsule failed\n"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); }

Add a man page for mkeficapsule command.

Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro takahiro.akashi@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + doc/mkeficapsule.1 | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 96 insertions(+) create mode 100644 doc/mkeficapsule.1

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 6db5354322fe..813674eb2898 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -722,6 +722,7 @@ S: Maintained T: git https://source.denx.de/u-boot/custodians/u-boot-efi.git F: doc/api/efi.rst F: doc/develop/uefi/* +F: doc/mkeficapsule.1 F: doc/usage/bootefi.rst F: drivers/rtc/emul_rtc.c F: include/capitalization.h diff --git a/doc/mkeficapsule.1 b/doc/mkeficapsule.1 new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..837e09ab451e --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/mkeficapsule.1 @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +.TH MAEFICAPSULE 1 "May 2021" + +.SH NAME +mkeficapsule - Generate EFI capsule file for U-Boot + +.SH SYNOPSIS +.B mkeficapsule +.RB [\fIoptions\fP] " \fIcapsule-file\fP" + +.SH "DESCRIPTION" +The +\fBmkeficapsule\fP +command is used to create an EFI capsule file for use with the U-Boot +EFI capsule update. +A capsule file may contain various type of firmware blobs which +are to be applied to the system and must be placed in the specific +directory on the UEFI system partition. An update will be automatically +executed at next reboot. + +Optionally, a capsule file can be signed with a given private key. +In this case, the update will be authenticated by verifying the signature +before applying. + +\fBmkeficapsule\fP supports two different format of image files: +.TP +.I raw image +format is a single binary blob of any type of firmware. + +.TP +.I FIT (Flattened Image Tree) image +format +is the same as used in the new \fIuImage\fP format and allows for +multiple binary blobs in a single capsule file. +This type of image file can be generated by \fBmkimage\fP. + +.SH "OPTIONS" +One of \fB--fit\fP or \fB--raw\fP option must be specified. + +.TP +.BI "-f, --fit \fIfit-image-file\fP" +Specify a FIT image file + +.TP +.BI "-r, --raw \fIraw-image-file\fP" +Specify a raw image file + +.TP +.BI "-i, --index \fIindex\fP" +Specify an image index + +.TP +.BI "-I, --instance \fIinstance\fP" +Specify a hardware instance + +.TP +.BI "-h, --help" +Print a help message + +.TP 0 +.B With signing: + +\fB--private-key\fP, \fB--certificate\fP and \fB--monotonic-count\fP are +all mandatory. + +.TP +.BI "-p, --private-key \fIprivate-key-file\fP" +Specify signer's private key file in PEM + +.TP +.BI "-c, --certificate \fIcertificate-file\fP" +Specify signer's certificate file in EFI certificate list format + +.TP +.BI "-m, --monotonic-count \fIcount\fP" +Specify a monotonic count which is set to be monotonically incremented +at every firmware update. + +.TP +.BI "-d, --dump_sig" +Dump signature data into *.p7 file + +.PP +.SH FILES +.TP +.BI "\fI/EFI/UpdateCapsule\fP" +The directory in which all capsule files be placed + +.SH SEE ALSO +.B mkimage + +.SH AUTHORS +Written by AKASHI Takahiro takahiro.akashi@linaro.org + +.SH HOMEPAGE +http://www.denx.de/wiki/U-Boot/WebHome

Now we can use mkeficapsule command instead of EDK-II's script to create a signed capsule file. So update the instruction for capsule authentication.

Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro takahiro.akashi@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org --- doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst | 143 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 67 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)

diff --git a/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst b/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst index f17138f5c765..864d61734bee 100644 --- a/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst +++ b/doc/develop/uefi/uefi.rst @@ -284,37 +284,52 @@ Support has been added for the UEFI capsule update feature which enables updating the U-Boot image using the UEFI firmware management protocol (FMP). The capsules are not passed to the firmware through the UpdateCapsule runtime service. Instead, capsule-on-disk -functionality is used for fetching the capsule from the EFI System -Partition (ESP) by placing the capsule file under the -\EFI\UpdateCapsule directory. - -The directory \EFI\UpdateCapsule is checked for capsules only within the -EFI system partition on the device specified in the active boot option -determined by reference to BootNext variable or BootOrder variable processing. -The active Boot Variable is the variable with highest priority BootNext or -within BootOrder that refers to a device found to be present. Boot variables -in BootOrder but referring to devices not present are ignored when determining -active boot variable. -Before starting a capsule update make sure your capsules are installed in the -correct ESP partition or set BootNext. +functionality is used for fetching capsules from the EFI System +Partition (ESP) by placing capsule files under the directory:: + + \EFI\UpdateCapsule + +The directory is checked for capsules only within the +EFI system partition on the device specified in the active boot option, +which is determined by BootXXXX variable in BootNext, or if not, the highest +priority one within BootOrder. Any BootXXXX variables referring to devices +not present are ignored when determining the active boot option. + +Please note that capsules will be applied in the alphabetic order of +capsule file names. + +Creating a capsule file +*********************** + +A capsule file can be created by using tools/mkeficapsule. +To build this tool, enable:: + + CONFIG_TOOLS_MKEFICAPSULE=y + CONFIG_TOOLS_LIBCRYPTO=y + +Run the following command:: + + $ mkeficapsule \ + --index 1 --instance 0 \ + [--fit <FIT image> | --raw <raw image>] \ + <capsule_file_name>

Performing the update *********************

-Since U-boot doesn't currently support SetVariable at runtime there's a Kconfig -option (CONFIG_EFI_IGNORE_OSINDICATIONS) to disable the OsIndications variable -check. If that option is enabled just copy your capsule to \EFI\UpdateCapsule. - -If that option is disabled, you'll need to set the OsIndications variable with:: +Put capsule files under the directory mentioned above. +Then, following the UEFI specification, you'll need to set +the EFI_OS_INDICATIONS_FILE_CAPSULE_DELIVERY_SUPPORTED +bit in OsIndications variable with::

=> setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -v OsIndications =0x04

-Finally, the capsule update can be initiated either by rebooting the board, -which is the preferred method, or by issuing the following command:: +Since U-boot doesn't currently support SetVariable at runtime, its value +won't be taken over across the reboot. If this is the case, you can skip +this feature check with the Kconfig option (CONFIG_EFI_IGNORE_OSINDICATIONS) +set.

- => efidebug capsule disk-update - -**The efidebug command is should only be used during debugging/development.** +Finally, the capsule update can be initiated by rebooting the board.

Enabling Capsule Authentication ******************************* @@ -324,82 +339,58 @@ be updated by verifying the capsule signature. The capsule signature is computed and prepended to the capsule payload at the time of capsule generation. This signature is then verified by using the public key stored as part of the X509 certificate. This certificate is -in the form of an efi signature list (esl) file, which is embedded as -part of U-Boot. +in the form of an efi signature list (esl) file, which is embedded in +a device tree.

The capsule authentication feature can be enabled through the following config, in addition to the configs listed above for capsule update::

CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE=y - CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_KEY_PATH=<path to .esl cert>

The public and private keys used for the signing process are generated -and used by the steps highlighted below:: +and used by the steps highlighted below.

- 1. Install utility commands on your host - * OPENSSL +1. Install utility commands on your host + * openssl * efitools

- 2. Create signing keys and certificate files on your host +2. Create signing keys and certificate files on your host::

$ openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey rsa:2048 -subj /CN=CRT/ \ -keyout CRT.key -out CRT.crt -nodes -days 365 $ cert-to-efi-sig-list CRT.crt CRT.esl

- $ openssl x509 -in CRT.crt -out CRT.cer -outform DER - $ openssl x509 -inform DER -in CRT.cer -outform PEM -out CRT.pub.pem - - $ openssl pkcs12 -export -out CRT.pfx -inkey CRT.key -in CRT.crt - $ openssl pkcs12 -in CRT.pfx -nodes -out CRT.pem - -The capsule file can be generated by using the GenerateCapsule.py -script in EDKII:: - - $ ./BaseTools/BinWrappers/PosixLike/GenerateCapsule -e -o \ - <capsule_file_name> --monotonic-count <val> --fw-version \ - <val> --lsv <val> --guid \ - e2bb9c06-70e9-4b14-97a3-5a7913176e3f --verbose \ - --update-image-index <val> --signer-private-cert \ - /path/to/CRT.pem --trusted-public-cert \ - /path/to/CRT.pub.pem --other-public-cert /path/to/CRT.pub.pem \ - <u-boot.bin> - -Place the capsule generated in the above step on the EFI System -Partition under the EFI/UpdateCapsule directory - -Testing on QEMU -*************** +3. Run the following command to create and sign the capsule file::

-Currently, support has been added on the QEMU ARM64 virt platform for -updating the U-Boot binary as a raw image when the platform is booted -in non-secure mode, i.e. with CONFIG_TFABOOT disabled. For this -configuration, the QEMU platform needs to be booted with -'secure=off'. The U-Boot binary placed on the first bank of the NOR -flash at offset 0x0. The U-Boot environment is placed on the second -NOR flash bank at offset 0x4000000. + $ mkeficapsule --monotonic-count 1 \ + --private-key CRT.key \ + --certificate CRT.crt \ + --index 1 --instance 0 \ + [--fit <FIT image> | --raw <raw image>] \ + <capsule_file_name>

-The capsule update feature is enabled with the following configuration -settings:: +4. Insert the signature list into a device tree in the following format::

- CONFIG_MTD=y - CONFIG_FLASH_CFI_MTD=y - CONFIG_CMD_MTDPARTS=y - CONFIG_CMD_DFU=y - CONFIG_DFU_MTD=y - CONFIG_PCI_INIT_R=y - CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_ON_DISK=y - CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT=y - CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE=y - CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_RAW=y + { + signature { + capsule-key = [ <binary of signature list> ]; + } + ... + }

-In addition, the following config needs to be disabled(QEMU ARM specific):: + You can do this manually with::

- CONFIG_TFABOOT + $ dtc -@ -I dts -O dtb -o signature.dtbo signature.dts + $ fdtoverlay -i orig.dtb -o new.dtb -v signature.dtbo

-The capsule file can be generated by using the tools/mkeficapsule:: + where signature.dts looks like::

- $ mkeficapsule --raw <u-boot.bin> --index 1 <capsule_file_name> + &{/} { + signature { + capsule-key = /incbin/("CRT.esl"); + }; + };

Executing the boot manager ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Add a couple of test cases against capsule image authentication for capsule-on-disk, where only a signed capsule file with the verified signature will be applied to the system.

Due to the difficulty of embedding a public key (esl file) in U-Boot binary during pytest setup time, all the keys/certificates are pre-created.

Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro takahiro.akashi@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org --- .../py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py | 5 + test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py | 52 +++- test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts | 10 + .../test_capsule_firmware_signed.py | 254 ++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 318 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware_signed.py

diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py index 4fd6353c2040..aa9bf5eee3aa 100644 --- a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py +++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py @@ -3,3 +3,8 @@ # Directories CAPSULE_DATA_DIR = '/EFI/CapsuleTestData' CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR = '/EFI/UpdateCapsule' + +# v1.5.1 or earlier of efitools has a bug in sha256 calculation, and +# you need build a newer version on your own. +# The path must terminate with '/'. +EFITOOLS_PATH = '' diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py index 6ad5608cd71c..27c05971ca32 100644 --- a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py +++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py @@ -10,13 +10,13 @@ import pytest from capsule_defs import *

# -# Fixture for UEFI secure boot test +# Fixture for UEFI capsule test #

- @pytest.fixture(scope='session') def efi_capsule_data(request, u_boot_config): - """Set up a file system to be used in UEFI capsule test. + """Set up a file system to be used in UEFI capsule and + authentication test.

Args: request: Pytest request object. @@ -40,6 +40,36 @@ def efi_capsule_data(request, u_boot_config): check_call('mkdir -p %s' % data_dir, shell=True) check_call('mkdir -p %s' % install_dir, shell=True)

+ capsule_auth_enabled = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get( + 'config_efi_capsule_authenticate') + if capsule_auth_enabled: + # Create private key (SIGNER.key) and certificate (SIGNER.crt) + check_call('cd %s; ' + 'openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey rsa:2048 ' + '-subj /CN=TEST_SIGNER/ -keyout SIGNER.key ' + '-out SIGNER.crt -nodes -days 365' + % data_dir, shell=True) + check_call('cd %s; %scert-to-efi-sig-list SIGNER.crt SIGNER.esl' + % (data_dir, EFITOOLS_PATH), shell=True) + + # Update dtb adding capsule certificate + check_call('cd %s; ' + 'cp %s/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts .' + % (data_dir, u_boot_config.source_dir), shell=True) + check_call('cd %s; ' + 'dtc -@ -I dts -O dtb -o signature.dtbo signature.dts; ' + 'fdtoverlay -i %s/arch/sandbox/dts/test.dtb ' + '-o test_sig.dtb signature.dtbo' + % (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir), shell=True) + + # Create *malicious* private key (SIGNER2.key) and certificate + # (SIGNER2.crt) + check_call('cd %s; ' + 'openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey rsa:2048 ' + '-subj /CN=TEST_SIGNER/ -keyout SIGNER2.key ' + '-out SIGNER2.crt -nodes -days 365' + % data_dir, shell=True) + # Create capsule files # two regions: one for u-boot.bin and the other for u-boot.env check_call('cd %s; echo -n u-boot:Old > u-boot.bin.old; echo -n u-boot:New > u-boot.bin.new; echo -n u-boot-env:Old -> u-boot.env.old; echo -n u-boot-env:New > u-boot.env.new' % data_dir, @@ -56,6 +86,22 @@ def efi_capsule_data(request, u_boot_config): check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkeficapsule --raw u-boot.bin.new --index 1 Test02' % (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir), shell=True) + if capsule_auth_enabled: + # firmware signed with proper key + check_call('cd %s; ' + '%s/tools/mkeficapsule --index 1 --monotonic-count 1 ' + '--private-key SIGNER.key --certificate SIGNER.crt ' + '--raw u-boot.bin.new Test11' + % (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir), + shell=True) + # firmware signed with *mal* key + check_call('cd %s; ' + '%s/tools/mkeficapsule --index 1 --monotonic-count 1 ' + '--private-key SIGNER2.key ' + '--certificate SIGNER2.crt ' + '--raw u-boot.bin.new Test12' + % (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir), + shell=True)

# Create a disk image with EFI system partition check_call('virt-make-fs --partition=gpt --size=+1M --type=vfat %s %s' % diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..078cfc76c93c --- /dev/null +++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ + +/dts-v1/; +/plugin/; + +&{/} { + signature { + capsule-key = /incbin/("SIGNER.esl"); + }; +}; diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware_signed.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware_signed.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..593b032e9015 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware_signed.py @@ -0,0 +1,254 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +# Copyright (c) 2021, Linaro Limited +# Author: AKASHI Takahiro takahiro.akashi@linaro.org +# +# U-Boot UEFI: Firmware Update (Signed capsule) Test + +""" +This test verifies capsule-on-disk firmware update +with signed capsule files +""" + +import pytest +from capsule_defs import CAPSULE_DATA_DIR, CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR + +@pytest.mark.boardspec('sandbox') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('efi_capsule_firmware_raw') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('efi_capsule_authenticate') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('dfu') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('dfu_sf') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_efidebug') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_fat') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_memory') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_nvedit_efi') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_sf') +@pytest.mark.slow +class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareSigned(object): + def test_efi_capsule_auth1( + self, u_boot_config, u_boot_console, efi_capsule_data): + """ + Test Case 1 - Update U-Boot on SPI Flash, raw image format + 0x100000-0x150000: U-Boot binary (but dummy) + + If the capsule is properly signed, the authentication + should pass and the firmware be updated. + """ + disk_img = efi_capsule_data + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 1-a, before reboot'): + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'efidebug boot add -b 1 TEST host 0:1 /helloworld.efi', + 'efidebug boot order 1', + 'env set -e -nv -bs -rt OsIndications =0x0000000000000004', + 'env set dfu_alt_info ' + '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 ' + '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"', + 'env save']) + + # initialize content + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'sf probe 0:0', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/u-boot.bin.old' + % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR, + 'sf write 4000000 100000 10', + 'sf read 5000000 100000 10', + 'md.b 5000000 10']) + assert 'Old' in ''.join(output) + + # place a capsule file + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test11' % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR, + 'fatwrite host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test11 $filesize' + % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR, + 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR]) + assert 'Test11' in ''.join(output) + + # reboot + mnt_point = u_boot_config.persistent_data_dir + '/test_efi_capsule' + u_boot_console.config.dtb = mnt_point + CAPSULE_DATA_DIR \ + + '/test_sig.dtb' + u_boot_console.restart_uboot() + + capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get( + 'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early') + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 1-b, after reboot'): + if not capsule_early: + # make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables + # are not available. + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'env set dfu_alt_info ' + '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 ' + '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"', + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR]) + assert 'Test11' in ''.join(output) + + # need to run uefi command to initiate capsule handling + output = u_boot_console.run_command( + 'env print -e Capsule0000') + + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR]) + assert 'Test11' not in ''.join(output) + + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'sf probe 0:0', + 'sf read 4000000 100000 10', + 'md.b 4000000 10']) + assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output) + + def test_efi_capsule_auth2( + self, u_boot_config, u_boot_console, efi_capsule_data): + """ + Test Case 2 - Update U-Boot on SPI Flash, raw image format + 0x100000-0x150000: U-Boot binary (but dummy) + + If the capsule is signed but with an invalid key, + the authentication should fail and the firmware + not be updated. + """ + disk_img = efi_capsule_data + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 2-a, before reboot'): + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'efidebug boot add -b 1 TEST host 0:1 /helloworld.efi', + 'efidebug boot order 1', + 'env set -e -nv -bs -rt OsIndications =0x0000000000000004', + 'env set dfu_alt_info ' + '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 ' + '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"', + 'env save']) + + # initialize content + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'sf probe 0:0', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/u-boot.bin.old' + % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR, + 'sf write 4000000 100000 10', + 'sf read 5000000 100000 10', + 'md.b 5000000 10']) + assert 'Old' in ''.join(output) + + # place a capsule file + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test12' % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR, + 'fatwrite host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test12 $filesize' + % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR, + 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR]) + assert 'Test12' in ''.join(output) + + # reboot + mnt_point = u_boot_config.persistent_data_dir + '/test_efi_capsule' + u_boot_console.config.dtb = mnt_point + CAPSULE_DATA_DIR \ + + '/test_sig.dtb' + u_boot_console.restart_uboot() + + capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get( + 'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early') + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 2-b, after reboot'): + if not capsule_early: + # make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables + # are not available. + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'env set dfu_alt_info ' + '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 ' + '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"', + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR]) + assert 'Test12' in ''.join(output) + + # need to run uefi command to initiate capsule handling + output = u_boot_console.run_command( + 'env print -e Capsule0000') + + # deleted any way + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR]) + assert 'Test12' not in ''.join(output) + + # TODO: check CapsuleStatus in CapsuleXXXX + + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'sf probe 0:0', + 'sf read 4000000 100000 10', + 'md.b 4000000 10']) + assert 'u-boot:Old' in ''.join(output) + + def test_efi_capsule_auth3( + self, u_boot_config, u_boot_console, efi_capsule_data): + """ + Test Case 3 - Update U-Boot on SPI Flash, raw image format + 0x100000-0x150000: U-Boot binary (but dummy) + + If the capsule is not signed, the authentication + should fail and the firmware not be updated. + """ + disk_img = efi_capsule_data + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 3-a, before reboot'): + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'efidebug boot add -b 1 TEST host 0:1 /helloworld.efi', + 'efidebug boot order 1', + 'env set -e -nv -bs -rt OsIndications =0x0000000000000004', + 'env set dfu_alt_info ' + '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 ' + '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"', + 'env save']) + + # initialize content + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'sf probe 0:0', + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/u-boot.bin.old' + % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR, + 'sf write 4000000 100000 10', + 'sf read 5000000 100000 10', + 'md.b 5000000 10']) + assert 'Old' in ''.join(output) + + # place a capsule file + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test02' % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR, + 'fatwrite host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test02 $filesize' + % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR, + 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR]) + assert 'Test02' in ''.join(output) + + # reboot + mnt_point = u_boot_config.persistent_data_dir + '/test_efi_capsule' + u_boot_console.config.dtb = mnt_point + CAPSULE_DATA_DIR \ + + '/test_sig.dtb' + u_boot_console.restart_uboot() + + capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get( + 'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early') + with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 3-b, after reboot'): + if not capsule_early: + # make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables + # are not available. + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'env set dfu_alt_info ' + '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 ' + '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"', + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR]) + assert 'Test02' in ''.join(output) + + # need to run uefi command to initiate capsule handling + output = u_boot_console.run_command( + 'env print -e Capsule0000') + + # deleted any way + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img, + 'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR]) + assert 'Test02' not in ''.join(output) + + # TODO: check CapsuleStatus in CapsuleXXXX + + output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ + 'sf probe 0:0', + 'sf read 4000000 100000 10', + 'md.b 4000000 10']) + assert 'u-boot:Old' in ''.join(output)

Since the syntax of mkeficapsule was changed in the previous commit, we need to modify command line arguments in a pytest script.

Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro takahiro.akashi@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org --- test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py index 27c05971ca32..a5a25c53dcb4 100644 --- a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py +++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py @@ -80,10 +80,10 @@ def efi_capsule_data(request, u_boot_config): check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkimage -f uboot_bin_env.its uboot_bin_env.itb' % (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir), shell=True) - check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkeficapsule --fit uboot_bin_env.itb --index 1 Test01' % + check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkeficapsule --index 1 --fit uboot_bin_env.itb Test01' % (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir), shell=True) - check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkeficapsule --raw u-boot.bin.new --index 1 Test02' % + check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkeficapsule --index 1 --raw u-boot.bin.new Test02' % (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir), shell=True) if capsule_auth_enabled:

Before the capsule authentication is supported, this test script works correctly, but with the feature enabled, most tests will fail due to unsigned capsules. So check the results depending on CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE or not.

Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro takahiro.akashi@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org --- .../test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py | 26 ++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py index 9cc973560fa1..6e803f699f2f 100644 --- a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py +++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware.py @@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareFit(object):

capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get( 'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early') + capsule_auth = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get( + 'config_efi_capsule_authenticate') with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 2-b, after reboot'): if not capsule_early: # make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables @@ -171,12 +173,18 @@ class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareFit(object): 'sf probe 0:0', 'sf read 4000000 100000 10', 'md.b 4000000 10']) - assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output) + if capsule_auth: + assert 'u-boot:Old' in ''.join(output) + else: + assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output)

output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([ 'sf read 4000000 150000 10', 'md.b 4000000 10']) - assert 'u-boot-env:New' in ''.join(output) + if capsule_auth: + assert 'u-boot-env:Old' in ''.join(output) + else: + assert 'u-boot-env:New' in ''.join(output)

def test_efi_capsule_fw3( self, u_boot_config, u_boot_console, efi_capsule_data): @@ -215,6 +223,8 @@ class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareFit(object):

capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get( 'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early') + capsule_auth = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get( + 'config_efi_capsule_authenticate') with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 3-b, after reboot'): if not capsule_early: # make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables @@ -246,7 +256,10 @@ class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareFit(object): 'sf probe 0:0', 'sf read 4000000 100000 10', 'md.b 4000000 10']) - assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output) + if capsule_auth: + assert 'u-boot:Old' in ''.join(output) + else: + assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output)

def test_efi_capsule_fw4( self, u_boot_config, u_boot_console, efi_capsule_data): @@ -285,6 +298,8 @@ class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareFit(object):

capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get( 'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early') + capsule_auth = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get( + 'config_efi_capsule_authenticate') with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 4-b, after reboot'): if not capsule_early: # make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables @@ -313,4 +328,7 @@ class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareFit(object): 'sf probe 0:0', 'sf read 4000000 100000 10', 'md.b 4000000 10']) - assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output) + if capsule_auth: + assert 'u-boot:Old' in ''.join(output) + else: + assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output)