From: Markus Valentin mv@denx.de

Signed-off-by: Markus Valentin mv@denx.de [agust: rebased, fixed to build with v2017.05] Signed-off-by: Anatolij Gustschin agust@denx.de --- ...0-qa3-e3845-internal-uart-secure-boot_defconfig | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 77 insertions(+) create mode 100644 configs/conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845-internal-uart-secure-boot_defconfig

diff --git a/configs/conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845-internal-uart-secure-boot_defconfig b/configs/conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845-internal-uart-secure-boot_defconfig new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b78f90e --- /dev/null +++ b/configs/conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845-internal-uart-secure-boot_defconfig @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +CONFIG_X86=y +CONFIG_VENDOR_CONGATEC=y +CONFIG_TARGET_CONGA_QEVAL20_QA3_E3845=y +CONFIG_DEFAULT_DEVICE_TREE="conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845" +CONFIG_INTERNAL_UART=y +CONFIG_HAVE_INTEL_ME=y +CONFIG_BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT=y +CONFIG_ENABLE_MRC_CACHE=y +CONFIG_SMP=y +CONFIG_HAVE_VGA_BIOS=y +CONFIG_VGA_BIOS_ADDR=0xfffa0000 +CONFIG_GENERATE_PIRQ_TABLE=y +CONFIG_GENERATE_MP_TABLE=y +CONFIG_GENERATE_ACPI_TABLE=y +CONFIG_SEABIOS=y +CONFIG_FIT=y +CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE=y +CONFIG_BOOTSTAGE=y +CONFIG_BOOTSTAGE_REPORT=y +CONFIG_SYS_CONSOLE_INFO_QUIET=y +CONFIG_HUSH_PARSER=y +CONFIG_CMD_CPU=y +# CONFIG_CMD_IMLS is not set +# CONFIG_CMD_FLASH is not set +CONFIG_CMD_MMC=y +CONFIG_CMD_SF=y +CONFIG_CMD_SPI=y +CONFIG_CMD_I2C=y +CONFIG_CMD_USB=y +CONFIG_CMD_GPIO=y +# CONFIG_CMD_SETEXPR is not set +CONFIG_CMD_DHCP=y +# CONFIG_CMD_NFS is not set +CONFIG_CMD_PING=y +CONFIG_CMD_TIME=y +CONFIG_CMD_BOOTSTAGE=y +CONFIG_CMD_EXT2=y +CONFIG_CMD_EXT4=y +CONFIG_CMD_EXT4_WRITE=y +CONFIG_CMD_FAT=y +CONFIG_CMD_FS_GENERIC=y +CONFIG_OF_CONTROL=y +CONFIG_REGMAP=y +CONFIG_SYSCON=y +CONFIG_CPU=y +CONFIG_DM_I2C=y +CONFIG_SYS_I2C_INTEL=y +CONFIG_WINBOND_W83627=y +CONFIG_MMC=y +CONFIG_MMC_PCI=y +CONFIG_MMC_SDHCI=y +CONFIG_MMC_SDHCI_SDMA=y +CONFIG_SPI_FLASH=y +CONFIG_SPI_FLASH_GIGADEVICE=y +CONFIG_SPI_FLASH_MACRONIX=y +CONFIG_SPI_FLASH_STMICRO=y +CONFIG_SPI_FLASH_WINBOND=y +CONFIG_DM_ETH=y +CONFIG_E1000=y +CONFIG_DM_PCI=y +CONFIG_DM_RTC=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_UART=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_UART_BASE=0x3f8 +CONFIG_DEBUG_UART_CLOCK=1843200 +CONFIG_SYS_NS16550=y +CONFIG_ICH_SPI=y +CONFIG_TIMER=y +CONFIG_USB=y +CONFIG_DM_USB=y +CONFIG_USB_STORAGE=y +CONFIG_USB_KEYBOARD=y +CONFIG_DM_VIDEO=y +CONFIG_VIDEO_VESA=y +CONFIG_FRAMEBUFFER_SET_VESA_MODE=y +CONFIG_FRAMEBUFFER_VESA_MODE_114=y +CONFIG_CONSOLE_SCROLL_LINES=5 +CONFIG_USE_PRIVATE_LIBGCC=y

From: Markus Valentin mv@denx.de

Introduce a new Kconfig variable for secure boot on baytrail based platforms. If this variable is set the build process tries to use fsp-sb.bin instead of fsp.bin (-sb is the secure boot enabled fsp).

Also check the two fsp headers against each other and print if secure boot is enabled or not.

Signed-off-by: Markus Valentin mv@denx.de --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 13 ++++++++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_support.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 9ead3eb..8cea393 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -348,7 +348,8 @@ config HAVE_FSP config FSP_FILE string "Firmware Support Package binary filename" depends on HAVE_FSP - default "fsp.bin" + default "fsp.bin" if !BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT + default "fsp-sb.bin" if BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT help The filename of the file to use as Firmware Support Package binary in the board directory. @@ -400,6 +401,16 @@ config FSP_BROKEN_HOB do not overwrite the important boot service data which is used by FSP, otherwise the subsequent call to fsp_notify() will fail.

+config BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT + bool "Enable Secure Boot on BayTrail" + depends on HAVE_FSP + default n + help + Use the SecureBoot Features of the BayTrail platform. This switch + enables the usage of the secure-boot enabled fsp.bin(fsp-sb.bin) + for your board you need to provide this yourself. You can reconfigure + your fsp with the Intel BCT tool to enable SecureBoot. + config ENABLE_MRC_CACHE bool "Enable MRC cache" depends on !EFI && !SYS_COREBOOT diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_support.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_support.h index 61d811f..bae17bc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_support.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_support.h @@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ #define FSP_LOWMEM_BASE 0x100000UL #define FSP_HIGHMEM_BASE 0x100000000ULL #define UPD_TERMINATOR 0x55AA +#define FSP_FIRST_HEADER_OFFSET 0x94 +#define FSP_SECOND_HEADER_OFFSET 0x20494

/** diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c b/arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c index a480361..3a537d0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c @@ -119,6 +119,13 @@ void fsp_init(u32 stack_top, u32 boot_mode, void *nvs_buf) /* No valid FSP info header was found */ panic("Invalid FSP header"); } +#ifdef CONFIG_BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT + /* compare primary and secondary header */ + if (memcmp((void *)(CONFIG_FSP_ADDR + FSP_FIRST_HEADER_OFFSET), + (void *)(CONFIG_FSP_ADDR + FSP_SECOND_HEADER_OFFSET), + fsp_hdr->hdr_len)) + panic("SB: first & secondary FSP headers don't match"); +#endif

config_data.common.fsp_hdr = fsp_hdr; config_data.common.stack_top = stack_top; @@ -134,6 +141,15 @@ void fsp_init(u32 stack_top, u32 boot_mode, void *nvs_buf)

fsp_upd = &config_data.fsp_upd;

+#ifdef CONFIG_BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT + /* + * if the enable secure boot flag is not 1, secure boot has not + * been activated in the FSP which results in the TXE-Engine not + * getting loaded + */ + printf("FSP: Secure Boot %sabled\n", + fsp_vpd->enable_secure_boot == 1 ? "en" : "dis"); +#endif /* Copy default data from Flash */ memcpy(fsp_upd, (void *)(fsp_hdr->img_base + fsp_vpd->upd_offset), sizeof(struct upd_region));

From: Markus Valentin mv@denx.de

This script should be used for simple creation of secure bootable images for baytrail platforms

Signed-off-by: Markus Valentin mv@denx.de --- tools/secure_boot_helper.py | 313 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 313 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/secure_boot_helper.py

diff --git a/tools/secure_boot_helper.py b/tools/secure_boot_helper.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..884786e --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/secure_boot_helper.py @@ -0,0 +1,313 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" + Copyright (C) 2017 Markus Valentin mv@denx.de + + SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ + """ + + +import argparse +import binascii + +from hashlib import sha256 +from os.path import basename, isfile, splitext +from os.path import join as pjoin +from struct import pack + +import OpenSSL +from OpenSSL import crypto + +from cryptography import x509 +from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend + + +FSP_FILE_NAME = "fsp-sb.bin" +FSP_STAGE2_FILE_NAME = "fsp_stage2.bin" +U_BOOT_ROM_FILE_NAME = 'u-boot.rom' +U_BOOT_TO_SIGN_FILE_NAME = 'u-boot-to-sign.bin' +IBB_FILE_NAME = 'ibb.bin' +FPF_CONFIG_FILE_NAME = 'fpf_config.txt' +SIGNED_MANIFEST_FILE_NAME = 'signed_manifest.bin' +UNSIGNED_MANIFEST_FILE_NAME = 'un'+SIGNED_MANIFEST_FILE_NAME +OEM_FILE_NAME = 'oemdata.bin' + +OEM_PRIV_KEY_FILE_NAME = 'oemkey.pem' +OEM_PUB_KEY_FILE_NAME = 'pub_oemkey.pem' +OEM_PUBKEY_BIN_FILE_NAME = 'pub_oemkey.bin' +OEM_PUBKEY_AND_SIG_FILE_NAME = 'oem_pub_sig.bin' + +FIT_PUB_KEY_FILE_NAME = "dev.crt" + +FSP_STAGE_2_SIZE = 0x1f400 +IBB_SIZE = 0x1fc00 +MANIFEST_SIZE = 0x400 +OEM_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE = 0x190 +U_BOOT_ROM_SIZE = 0x800000 +ROMFILE_SYS_TEXT_BASE = 0x00700000 +U_BOOT_TO_SIGN_OFFSET = 0x2CA0 + + +MANIFEST_IDENTIFIER = b'$VBM' +VERSION = 1 +SECURE_VERSION_NUMBER = 2 +OEM_DATA_PREAMBLE = '01000200' + +oem_data_hash_files = [] + + +def append_binary_files(first_file, second_file, new_file): + with open(new_file, 'wb') as f: + f.write(bytearray(open(first_file, 'rb').read())) + f.write(bytearray(open(second_file, 'rb').read())) + + +# this function creates a oemdata data block which gets constructed +# as stated in section 3.2 of the document "Secure-Boot for Intel +# Bay Trail based platfomrs with U-Boot" +def assemble_oem_data(file_path): + file_size = 0 + with open(file_path, 'wb') as f: + f.write(binascii.unhexlify(OEM_DATA_PREAMBLE)) + file_size += 4 + for hash_file in oem_data_hash_files: + f.write(open(hash_file, 'rb').read()) + file_size += 32 + pad_file_with_zeros(f, OEM_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE-file_size) + + +# this function creates the final u-boot-verified.rom from +# the original u-boot.rom and the signed Initial Boot Block +# which contains the secure boot manifest +def assemble_secure_boot_image(u_boot_rom, signed_ibb): + data = bytearray(open(u_boot_rom, 'rb').read()) + ibb = bytearray(open(signed_ibb, 'rb').read()) + data[-(MANIFEST_SIZE+IBB_SIZE):] = ibb + open("u-boot-verified.rom", 'wb').write(data) + + +# when calling this function it constructs a complete secure-boot manifest +# which is just missing oem-publickey and the manifest-signature (see +# section 3.1) +def create_unsigned_secure_boot_manifest(unsigned_manifest, + oem_file='oemdata.bin', + ibb='ibb.bin'): + with open(unsigned_manifest, 'wb') as f: + f.write(MANIFEST_IDENTIFIER) + f.write(pack('i', VERSION)) + f.write(pack('i', MANIFEST_SIZE)) + f.write(pack('i', SECURE_VERSION_NUMBER)) + pad_file_with_zeros(f, 4) + hash_function = sha256() + hash_function.update(bytearray(open(ibb, 'rb').read())) + f.write(hash_function.digest()[::-1]) + pad_file_with_zeros(f, 36) + f.write(bytearray(open(oem_file, 'rb').read())) + pad_file_with_zeros(f, 20) + + +# fetch a subpart of a binary from byte to byte and write this part to a +# secondary file +def extract_binary_part(binary_to_extract_from, to_file, from_byte, to_byte): + data = open(binary_to_extract_from, 'rb').read() + open(to_file, 'wb').write(data[from_byte:to_byte]) + + +# calculate a sha256 checksum over a file and write a file with it to a +# file next to the original file, if given change endianness (sometimes needed +# because the txe engine wants a other byteorder) +def sha256_to_file(binary_dir, file_to_hash, change_endianess=False): + # we collect the hashes in a list(in the correct order) to be able + # to put them later to the oem section + if not oem_data_hash_files.__contains__(hashfile_path(binary_dir, + file_to_hash)): + oem_data_hash_files.append(hashfile_path(binary_dir, file_to_hash)) + with open(file_to_hash, 'rb') as f: + hash_function = sha256() + hash_function.update(f.read()) + # write as little to file + if change_endianess: + open(hashfile_path(binary_dir, file_to_hash), + 'wb').write(hash_function.digest()) + else: + open(hashfile_path(binary_dir, file_to_hash), + 'wb').write(hash_function.digest()[::-1]) + + +# create hashfile name using the file-to-hash name +def hashfile_path(binary_dir, file_to_hash): + hash_file_name = splitext( + basename(file_to_hash))[0].__add__('.sha256') + return pjoin(binary_dir, hash_file_name) + + +# pad the given files with a given byte number of zeros +# byte count must be dividable by 4 +def pad_file_with_zeros(file_handle, byte_count): + if byte_count % 4 != 0: + print("Given byte count is not 4-divideable exiting") + exit() + pad_count = 0 + while pad_count < byte_count: + file_handle.write(pack('i', 0)) + pad_count += 4 + + +# extract the modulus of a public key the txe-engine gets the publickey +# split in modulus and exponent (for this reason we need to extract it) +def get_modulus_from_pubkey(public_key_path): + public_key = open(public_key_path, 'rb').read() + cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(public_key, default_backend()) + return ("%X" % (cert.public_key().public_numbers().n)) + + +# save a given modulus and exponent to a file as binary for use within +# the manifest +def save_binary_public_key(pub_key_file_path, modulus, exponent=0x10001): + with open(pub_key_file_path, 'wb') as f: + f.write(binascii.unhexlify(modulus)[::-1]) + f.write(pack('i', exponent)) + + +# replace the public key hash in the fuse configuration text file +# and set the lock bit +def replace_oem_pubkey_hash(pubkey_hash, fpf_config_path, lock_fuses): + data = binascii.hexlify(pubkey_hash) + + new_line_hash = "FUSE_FILE_OEM_KEY_HASH_1:{:s}:{}\n"\ + .format(data.upper().decode('ascii'), + str(lock_fuses).upper()) + new_line_sb_enabled = "FUSE_FILE_SECURE_BOOT_EN:01:{}\n"\ + .format(str(lock_fuses).upper()) + + with open(fpf_config_path, 'w') as f: + f.write(new_line_sb_enabled) + f.write(new_line_hash) + + +# for the txe engine one needs to change the endianness +def reverse_endianess(file_to_reverse): + data = open(file_to_reverse, 'rb').read() + open(file_to_reverse, 'wb').write(data[::-1]) + + +# sign the given file with the given private key and +# write it to the signature_file using openssl +def sign_file(unsigned_file, private_key, signature_file): + key = open(private_key, 'r').read() + pkey_obj = crypto.load_privatekey(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, key) + data = open(unsigned_file, 'rb').read() + signature = OpenSSL.crypto.sign(pkey_obj, data, "sha256") + open(signature_file, 'wb').write(signature) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="This script assembles a " + + "verified boot enabled u-boot using " + + "openssl") + parser.add_argument("-c", "--fpf-config", default="./fpf_config.txt", + help="Path to the fpf-config file defaults to" + + " ./fpf_config.txt", + required=True) + parser.add_argument("-I", "--board-dir", help="set directory to get the " + + " fsp and other board related files from.") + parser.add_argument("-b", "--binary_dir", default=".", + help="directory to fetch binaries from and " + + "save created binaries to.") + parser.add_argument("-k", "--key-dir", default="./mykeys", + help="directory to fetch keys from") + parser.add_argument('--lock-fuses', action='store_true', + help="Set this flag to configure fuses to " + + "lock the values") + + args = parser.parse_args() + + # assemble correct paths + fsp = pjoin(args.board_dir, FSP_FILE_NAME) + fsp_stage2 = pjoin(args.board_dir, FSP_STAGE2_FILE_NAME) + + fit_public_key = pjoin(args.key_dir, FIT_PUB_KEY_FILE_NAME) + fit_public_key_modulus = pjoin(args.key_dir, FIT_PUB_KEY_FILE_NAME+".mod") + + u_boot_rom = pjoin(args.binary_dir, U_BOOT_ROM_FILE_NAME) + u_boot_to_sign = pjoin(args.binary_dir, U_BOOT_TO_SIGN_FILE_NAME) + + ibb = pjoin(args.binary_dir, IBB_FILE_NAME) + + signed_ibb = pjoin(args.binary_dir, "signed_"+IBB_FILE_NAME) + unsigned_manifest = pjoin(args.binary_dir, UNSIGNED_MANIFEST_FILE_NAME) + signed_manifest = pjoin(args.binary_dir, SIGNED_MANIFEST_FILE_NAME) + + manifest_signature = pjoin(args.binary_dir, splitext( + basename(UNSIGNED_MANIFEST_FILE_NAME))[0]. + __add__(".signature")) + + oem_file = pjoin(args.binary_dir, OEM_FILE_NAME) + oem_private_key = pjoin(args.key_dir, OEM_PRIV_KEY_FILE_NAME) + oem_public_key = pjoin(args.key_dir, OEM_PUB_KEY_FILE_NAME) + oem_pubkey_binary = pjoin(args.key_dir, OEM_PUBKEY_BIN_FILE_NAME) + oem_pubkey_and_sig = pjoin(args.key_dir, + OEM_PUBKEY_AND_SIG_FILE_NAME) + + # check for needed files to be available + for f in [fsp, u_boot_rom, fit_public_key, oem_private_key]: + if not isfile(f): + print("%s not found ... exiting" % (f)) + exit() + + # get everything from rom-file execept IBB+Manfifest(128k) and write it to + # seperated file and calculate hash + extract_binary_part(u_boot_rom, u_boot_to_sign, + (ROMFILE_SYS_TEXT_BASE+U_BOOT_TO_SIGN_OFFSET), + (U_BOOT_ROM_SIZE-(IBB_SIZE+MANIFEST_SIZE))) + sha256_to_file(args.binary_dir, u_boot_to_sign, True) + + # extract stage2 of the fsp and calculate a hash about + # the file + extract_binary_part(fsp, fsp_stage2, 0, FSP_STAGE_2_SIZE) + sha256_to_file(args.binary_dir, fsp_stage2) + + with open(fit_public_key_modulus, 'wb') as f: + f.write(binascii.unhexlify(get_modulus_from_pubkey(fit_public_key))) + sha256_to_file(args.binary_dir, fit_public_key_modulus, True) + + # assemble oemdata + print("Assembling oem data from %d hashes: \n %s" % + (oem_data_hash_files.__len__(), oem_data_hash_files)) + assemble_oem_data(oem_file) + + print("Extracting last 127K:\n from %s as %s" + % (u_boot_rom, ibb)) + extract_binary_part(u_boot_rom, ibb, + (U_BOOT_ROM_SIZE-IBB_SIZE), U_BOOT_ROM_SIZE) + + print("Creating Secure Boot Manifest") + create_unsigned_secure_boot_manifest(unsigned_manifest, + oem_file, + ibb) + + print("Signing manifest with openssl and private key %s" + % (oem_private_key)) + sign_file(unsigned_manifest, oem_private_key, manifest_signature) + + print("Append public key and signature to unsigned Manifest") + oem_pub_key_modulus = get_modulus_from_pubkey(oem_public_key) + save_binary_public_key(oem_pubkey_binary, oem_pub_key_modulus) + + reverse_endianess(manifest_signature) + append_binary_files(oem_pubkey_binary, manifest_signature, + oem_pubkey_and_sig) + + append_binary_files(unsigned_manifest, oem_pubkey_and_sig, + signed_manifest) + + hash_function = sha256() + hash_function.update(bytearray(open(oem_pubkey_binary, 'rb').read())) + replace_oem_pubkey_hash(hash_function.digest()[::-1], args.fpf_config, + args.lock_fuses) + + print("Append manifest with signature to ibb") + append_binary_files(signed_manifest, ibb, signed_ibb) + + print("Assemble u-boot-verified.rom from:\n %s and %s" + % (u_boot_rom, signed_manifest)) + assemble_secure_boot_image(u_boot_rom, signed_ibb)

From: Markus Valentin mv@denx.de

Signed-off-by: Markus Valentin mv@denx.de [agust: slightly reworded and fixed alignment] Signed-off-by: Anatolij Gustschin agust@denx.de --- doc/README.x86 | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+)

diff --git a/doc/README.x86 b/doc/README.x86 index a38cc1b..8ba64b3 100644 --- a/doc/README.x86 +++ b/doc/README.x86 @@ -1056,6 +1056,45 @@ provides the same EFI run-time services) is not currently supported on x86.

See README.efi for details of EFI support in U-Boot.

+Secure Boot for BayTrail +------------------------ +U-Boot for BayTrail based platforms supports to boot in a verified manner using +the Trusted Execution Enginge(TXE). To enable secure boot you need to enable + the Kconfig parameter CONFIG_BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT. + +The verification of U-Boot happens by a public key appended to the so called +secure boot manifest. The manifest gets created by the secure_boot_helper.py +script which is located in the tools directory. + +To be able to perform a verified boot with U-Boot you need: + * A OEM-keypair which we use to sign U-Boot. Create this yourself like below: + mkdir mykeys && \ + openssl req -batch -x509 -nodes -newkey rsa:2048 \ + -keyout 'mykeys/oemkey.pem' -out 'mykeys/pub_oemkey.pem' + * fpf_config.txt gets created by the helper script. It stores the fuse + register configuration to a text file which can be used by the Intel + FPT tool to write fuses (the FPT is provided in the TXE Firmware Kit). + It contains a hash over the public part of the OEM-keypair. + (To burn fuses run "FPT -writebatch fpf_config.txt" on the target) + * A secure boot enabled FSP[18] which we can assemble with the BCT Tool[19] + (the secure boot enabled fsp should be placed as fsp-sb.bin in the + board directory) + +If these prerequisites are met, you can build u-boot and call the helper script. +The following commands give an example flow for the congatec conga-QA3 SoM: + make conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845-internal-uart-secure-boot_defconfig + make all + make u-boot.rom + python3 ./tools/secure_boot_helper.py \ + -I board/congatec/conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845 \ + -c fpf_config.txt \ + --lock-fuses + +This creates a "u-boot-verified.rom", this file can be used as the normal +u-boot.rom. For enabling the verification you need to configure the fuses +either by burning them or by using the FPF-Mirroring feature for development. +Further authentication can be done with the fit-image mechanism. + 64-bit Support -------------- U-Boot supports booting a 64-bit kernel directly and is able to change to @@ -1098,3 +1137,5 @@ References [15] doc/device-tree-bindings/misc/intel,irq-router.txt [16] http://www.acpi.info [17] https://www.acpica.org/downloads +[18] https://github.com/IntelFsp/FSP.git +[19] https://github.com/IntelFsp/BCT.git