Hello Simon,

On 30-07-14 18:00, Simon Glass wrote:

1. Failure to set the return code correctly
2. Failure to detect the loop end condition when the value is equal to

the modulus.

Reported-by: Jeroen Hofstee jeroen@myspectrum.nl Signed-off-by: Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org

---

lib/rsa/rsa-sign.c | 1 + lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/rsa/rsa-sign.c b/lib/rsa/rsa-sign.c index 83f5e87..6905131 100644 --- a/lib/rsa/rsa-sign.c +++ b/lib/rsa/rsa-sign.c @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ static int rsa_get_pub_key(const char *keydir, const char *name, RSA **rsap) rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(key); if (!rsa) { rsa_err("Couldn't convert to a RSA style key");

• ret = -EINVAL;
  

  goto err_rsa; } fclose(f);

diff --git a/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c b/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c index bcb9063..02e3eeb 100644 --- a/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c +++ b/lib/rsa/rsa-verify.c @@ -54,9 +54,9 @@ static void subtract_modulus(const struct rsa_public_key *key, uint32_t num[]) static int greater_equal_modulus(const struct rsa_public_key *key, uint32_t num[]) {

• uint32_t i;

• int i;

• for (i = key->len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {

• for (i = (int)key->len - 1; i >= 0; i--) { if (num[i] < key->modulus[i]) return 0; if (num[i] > key->modulus[i])

I did indeed not post a patch, since I do not know how this code is used and how critical it is. And I still haven't bothered to look it up.

So just a general comment, which might not make any sense at all for the actual usage. If num can somehow be controlled by an evil source, passing a large enough value or 0 now causes this function to return equal. I have no idea if this causes any practical issue.

Warnings / error wise, this seems fine, thanks!

Regards, Jeroen