On 2/9/22 11:10, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:

With this enhancement, mkeficapsule will be able to sign a capsule file when it is created. A signature added will be used later in the verification at FMP's SetImage() call.

To do that, we need specify additional command parameters: -monotonic-cout <count> : monotonic count -private-key <private key file> : private key file -certificate <certificate file> : certificate file Only when all of those parameters are given, a signature will be added to a capsule file.

Users are expected to maintain and increment the monotonic count at every time of the update for each firmware image.

Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro takahiro.akashi@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org

---

.azure-pipelines.yml | 2 +- tools/Makefile | 1 + tools/eficapsule.h | 115 +++++++++++++ tools/mkeficapsule.c | 380 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 4 files changed, 463 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/eficapsule.h

diff --git a/.azure-pipelines.yml b/.azure-pipelines.yml index f2aa332be5cc..aecc9cb88441 100644 --- a/.azure-pipelines.yml +++ b/.azure-pipelines.yml @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ stages: %CD:~0,2%\msys64\usr\bin\bash -lc "pacman --noconfirm -Syyuu" displayName: 'Update MSYS2' - script: |

•      %CD:~0,2%\msys64\usr\bin\bash -lc "pacman --noconfirm --needed -Sy make gcc bison flex diffutils openssl-devel"
  

•      %CD:~0,2%\msys64\usr\bin\bash -lc "pacman --noconfirm --needed -Sy make gcc bison flex diffutils openssl-devel libgnutls-devel"
      displayName: 'Install Toolchain'
    - script: |
        echo make tools-only_defconfig tools-only NO_SDL=1 > build-tools.sh
  

diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile index 766c0674f4a0..8da07d60a755 100644 --- a/tools/Makefile +++ b/tools/Makefile @@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MIPS) += mips-relocs hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1_COMPILER) += asn1_compiler HOSTCFLAGS_asn1_compiler.o = -idirafter $(srctree)/include

+HOSTLDLIBS_mkeficapsule += -lgnutls hostprogs-$(CONFIG_TOOLS_MKEFICAPSULE) += mkeficapsule

# We build some files with extra pedantic flags to try to minimize things diff --git a/tools/eficapsule.h b/tools/eficapsule.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8c1560bb0671 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/eficapsule.h @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/*

• • Copyright 2021 Linaro Limited

• • Author: AKASHI Takahiro
    

• • derived from efi.h and efi_api.h to make the file POSIX-compliant
• */

+#ifndef _EFI_CAPSULE_H +#define _EFI_CAPSULE_H

+#include <stdint.h> +#include <pe.h> /* WIN_CERTIFICATE */

+/*

• • Gcc's predefined attributes are not recognized by clang.
• */

+#ifndef __packed +#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__)) +#endif

+#ifndef __aligned +#define __aligned(x) __attribute__((__aligned__(x))) +#endif

+typedef struct {

• uint8_t b[16];

+} efi_guid_t __aligned(8);

+#define EFI_GUID(a, b, c, d0, d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, d6, d7) \

• {{ (a) & 0xff, ((a) >> 8) & 0xff, ((a) >> 16) & 0xff, \

• ((a) >> 24) & 0xff, \
  

• (b) & 0xff, ((b) >> 8) & 0xff, \
  

• (c) & 0xff, ((c) >> 8) & 0xff, \
  

• (d0), (d1), (d2), (d3), (d4), (d5), (d6), (d7) } }
  

+#define EFI_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT_CAPSULE_ID_GUID \

• EFI_GUID(0x6dcbd5ed, 0xe82d, 0x4c44, 0xbd, 0xa1, \

•  0x71, 0x94, 0x19, 0x9a, 0xd9, 0x2a)
  

+#define EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_FIT_GUID \

• EFI_GUID(0xae13ff2d, 0x9ad4, 0x4e25, 0x9a, 0xc8, \

•  0x6d, 0x80, 0xb3, 0xb2, 0x21, 0x47)
  

+#define EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_RAW_GUID \

• EFI_GUID(0xe2bb9c06, 0x70e9, 0x4b14, 0x97, 0xa3, \

•  0x5a, 0x79, 0x13, 0x17, 0x6e, 0x3f)
  

+#define EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID \

• EFI_GUID(0x4aafd29d, 0x68df, 0x49ee, 0x8a, 0xa9, \

•  0x34, 0x7d, 0x37, 0x56, 0x65, 0xa7)
  

+/* flags */ +#define CAPSULE_FLAGS_PERSIST_ACROSS_RESET 0x00010000

+struct efi_capsule_header {

• efi_guid_t capsule_guid;
• uint32_t header_size;
• uint32_t flags;
• uint32_t capsule_image_size;

+} __packed;

+struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_header {

• uint32_t version;
• uint16_t embedded_driver_count;
• uint16_t payload_item_count;
• uint32_t item_offset_list[];

+} __packed;

+/* image_capsule_support */ +#define CAPSULE_SUPPORT_AUTHENTICATION 0x0000000000000001

+struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_image_header {

• uint32_t version;
• efi_guid_t update_image_type_id;
• uint8_t update_image_index;
• uint8_t reserved[3];
• uint32_t update_image_size;
• uint32_t update_vendor_code_size;
• uint64_t update_hardware_instance;
• uint64_t image_capsule_support;

+} __packed;

+/**

• • win_certificate_uefi_guid - A certificate that encapsulates
• • a GUID-specific signature
• • @hdr: Windows certificate header
• • @cert_type: Certificate type
• • @cert_data: Certificate data
• */

+struct win_certificate_uefi_guid {

• WIN_CERTIFICATE hdr;
• efi_guid_t cert_type;
• uint8_t cert_data[];

+} __packed;

+/**

• • efi_firmware_image_authentication - Capsule authentication method
• • descriptor
• • This structure describes an authentication information for
• • a capsule with IMAGE_ATTRIBUTE_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED set
• • and should be included as part of the capsule.
• • Only EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID is accepted.
• • @monotonic_count: Count to prevent replay
• • @auth_info: Authentication info
• */

+struct efi_firmware_image_authentication {

• uint64_t monotonic_count;
• struct win_certificate_uefi_guid auth_info;

+} __packed;

+#endif /* _EFI_CAPSULE_H */ diff --git a/tools/mkeficapsule.c b/tools/mkeficapsule.c index 243fd6e48370..b996c66ad26a 100644 --- a/tools/mkeficapsule.c +++ b/tools/mkeficapsule.c @@ -16,21 +16,13 @@ #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/types.h>

-typedef __u8 u8; -typedef __u16 u16; -typedef __u32 u32; -typedef __u64 u64; -typedef __s16 s16; -typedef __s32 s32; +#include <linux/kconfig.h>

-#define aligned_u64 __aligned_u64 +#include <gnutls/gnutls.h> +#include <gnutls/pkcs7.h> +#include <gnutls/abstract.h>

-#ifndef __packed -#define __packed __attribute__((packed)) -#endif

-#include <efi.h> -#include <efi_api.h> +#include "eficapsule.h"

static const char *tool_name = "mkeficapsule";

@@ -39,12 +31,19 @@ efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_type_uboot_fit = EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_FIT_GUID; efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_type_uboot_raw = EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_RAW_GUID; +efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID;

+static const char *opts_short = "f:r:i:I:v:p:c:m:dh";

static struct option options[] = { {"fit", required_argument, NULL, 'f'}, {"raw", required_argument, NULL, 'r'}, {"index", required_argument, NULL, 'i'}, {"instance", required_argument, NULL, 'I'},

• {"private-key", required_argument, NULL, 'p'},
• {"certificate", required_argument, NULL, 'c'},
• {"monotonic-count", required_argument, NULL, 'm'},
• {"dump-sig", no_argument, NULL, 'd'}, {"help", no_argument, NULL, 'h'}, {NULL, 0, NULL, 0}, };

@@ -58,10 +57,40 @@ static void print_usage(void) "\t-r, --raw <raw image> new raw image file\n" "\t-i, --index <index> update image index\n" "\t-I, --instance <instance> update hardware instance\n"

• "\t-p, --private-key <privkey file>  private key file\n"
  

• "\t-c, --certificate <cert file>     signer's certificate file\n"
  

• "\t-m, --monotonic-count <count>     monotonic count\n"
  

• "\t-d, --dump_sig              dump signature (*.p7)\n"
  

  "\t-h, --help print a help message\n", tool_name); }

+/**

• • auth_context - authentication context
• • @key_file: Path to a private key file
• • @cert_file: Path to a certificate file
• • @image_data: Pointer to firmware data
• • @image_size: Size of firmware data
• • @auth: Authentication header
• • @sig_data: Signature data
• • @sig_size: Size of signature data
• • Data structure used in create_auth_data(). @key_file through
• • @image_size are input parameters. @auth, @sig_data and @sig_size
• • are filled in by create_auth_data().
• */

+struct auth_context {

• char *key_file;
• char *cert_file;
• uint8_t *image_data;
• size_t image_size;
• struct efi_firmware_image_authentication auth;
• uint8_t *sig_data;
• size_t sig_size;

+};

+static int dump_sig;

• /**
  • read_bin_file - read a firmware binary file
  • @bin: Path to a firmware binary file

@@ -75,7 +104,7 @@ static void print_usage(void)

• • 0 - on success
• • -1 - on failure

*/ -static int read_bin_file(char *bin, void **data, off_t *bin_size) +static int read_bin_file(char *bin, uint8_t **data, off_t *bin_size) { FILE *g; struct stat bin_stat; @@ -147,6 +176,205 @@ static int write_capsule_file(FILE *f, void *data, size_t size, const char *msg) return 0; }

+/**

• • create_auth_data - compose authentication data in capsule
• • @auth_context: Pointer to authentication context
• • Fill up an authentication header (.auth) and signature data (.sig_data)
• • in @auth_context, using library functions from openssl.
• • All the parameters in @auth_context must be filled in by a caller.
• • Return:
• • • 0 - on success
• • • -1 - on failure
• */

+static int create_auth_data(struct auth_context *ctx) +{

• gnutls_datum_t cert;
• gnutls_datum_t key;
• off_t file_size;
• gnutls_privkey_t pkey;
• gnutls_x509_crt_t x509;
• gnutls_pkcs7_t pkcs7;
• gnutls_datum_t data;
• gnutls_datum_t signature;
• int ret;
• ret = read_bin_file(ctx->cert_file, &cert.data, &file_size);
• if (ret < 0)

• return -1;
  

• if (file_size > UINT_MAX)

• return -1;
  

• cert.size = file_size;
• ret = read_bin_file(ctx->key_file, &key.data, &file_size);
• if (ret < 0)

• return -1;
  

• if (ret < 0)

• return -1;
  

• if (file_size > UINT_MAX)

• return -1;
  

• key.size = file_size;
• /*

• * For debugging,
  

• * gnutls_global_set_time_function(mytime);
  

• * gnutls_global_set_log_function(tls_log_func);
  

• * gnutls_global_set_log_level(6);
  

• */
  

• ret = gnutls_privkey_init(&pkey);
• if (ret < 0) {

• fprintf(stderr, "error in gnutls_privkey_init(): %s\n",
  

• 	gnutls_strerror(ret));
  

• return -1;
  

• }
• ret = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&x509);
• if (ret < 0) {

• fprintf(stderr, "error in gnutls_x509_crt_init(): %s\n",
  

• 	gnutls_strerror(ret));
  

• return -1;
  

• }
• /* load a private key */
• ret = gnutls_privkey_import_x509_raw(pkey, &key, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM,

• 			     0, 0);
  

• if (ret < 0) {

• fprintf(stderr,
  

• 	"error in gnutls_privkey_import_x509_raw(): %s\n",
  

• 	gnutls_strerror(ret));
  

• return -1;
  

• }
• /* load x509 certificate */
• ret = gnutls_x509_crt_import(x509, &cert, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
• if (ret < 0) {

• fprintf(stderr, "error in gnutls_x509_crt_import(): %s\n",
  

• 	gnutls_strerror(ret));
  

• return -1;
  

• }
• /* generate a PKCS #7 structure */
• ret = gnutls_pkcs7_init(&pkcs7);
• if (ret < 0) {

• fprintf(stderr, "error in gnutls_pkcs7_init(): %s\n",
  

• 	gnutls_strerror(ret));
  

• return -1;
  

• }
• /* sign */
• /*

• * Data should have
  

• *  * firmware image
  

• *  * monotonic count
  

• * in this order!
  

• * See EDK2's FmpAuthenticatedHandlerRsa2048Sha256()
  

• */
  

• data.size = ctx->image_size + sizeof(ctx->auth.monotonic_count);
• data.data = malloc(data.size);
• if (!data.data) {

• fprintf(stderr, "allocating memory (0x%x) failed\n", data.size);
  

• return -1;
  

• }
• memcpy(data.data, ctx->image_data, ctx->image_size);
• memcpy(data.data + ctx->image_size, &ctx->auth.monotonic_count,

•       sizeof(ctx->auth.monotonic_count));
  

• ret = gnutls_pkcs7_sign(pkcs7, x509, pkey, &data, NULL, NULL,

• 		GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256,
  

• 		/* GNUTLS_PKCS7_EMBED_DATA? */
  

• 		GNUTLS_PKCS7_INCLUDE_CERT |
  

• 		GNUTLS_PKCS7_INCLUDE_TIME);
  

• if (ret < 0) {

• fprintf(stderr, "error in gnutls_pkcs7)sign(): %s\n",
  

• 	gnutls_strerror(ret));
  

• return -1;
  

• }
• /* export */
• ret = gnutls_pkcs7_export2(pkcs7, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER, &signature);
• if (ret < 0) {

• fprintf(stderr, "error in gnutls_pkcs7_export2: %s\n",
  

• 	gnutls_strerror(ret));
  

• return -1;
  

• }
• ctx->sig_data = signature.data;
• ctx->sig_size = signature.size;
• /* fill auth_info */
• ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.dwLength = sizeof(ctx->auth.auth_info)

• 				+ ctx->sig_size;
  

• ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.wRevision = WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0;
• ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.wCertificateType = WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID;
• memcpy(&ctx->auth.auth_info.cert_type, &efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7,

•       sizeof(efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7));
  

• /*

• * For better clean-ups,
  

• * gnutls_pkcs7_deinit(pkcs7);
  

• * gnutls_privkey_deinit(pkey);
  

• * gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(x509);
  

• * free(cert.data);
  

• * free(key.data);
  

• * if error
  

• *   gnutls_free(signature.data);
  

• */
  

• return 0;

+}

+/**

• • dump_signature - dump out a signature
• • @path: Path to a capsule file
• • @signature: Signature data
• • @sig_size: Size of signature data
• • Signature data pointed to by @signature will be saved into
• • a file whose file name is @path with ".p7" suffix.
• • Return:
• • • 0 - on success
• • • -1 - on failure
• */

+static int dump_signature(const char *path, uint8_t *signature, size_t sig_size) +{

• char *sig_path;
• FILE *f;
• size_t size;
• int ret = -1;
• sig_path = malloc(strlen(path) + 3 + 1);
• if (!sig_path)

• return ret;
  

• sprintf(sig_path, "%s.p7", path);
• f = fopen(sig_path, "w");
• if (!f)

• goto err;
  

• size = fwrite(signature, 1, sig_size, f);
• if (size == sig_size)

• ret = 0;
  

• fclose(f);

+err:

• free(sig_path);
• return ret;

+}

+/**

• • free_sig_data - free out signature data
• • @ctx: Pointer to authentication context
• • Free signature data allocated in create_auth_data().
• */

+static void free_sig_data(struct auth_context *ctx) +{

• if (ctx->sig_size)

• gnutls_free(ctx->sig_data);
  

+}

• /**
  • create_fwbin - create an uefi capsule file
  • @path: Path to a created capsule file

@@ -168,23 +396,25 @@ static int write_capsule_file(FILE *f, void *data, size_t size, const char *msg)

• • -1 - on failure

*/ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid,

• 	unsigned long index, unsigned long instance)
  

• 	unsigned long index, unsigned long instance,
  

• 	uint64_t mcount, char *privkey_file, char *cert_file)
  

  { struct efi_capsule_header header; struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_header capsule; struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_image_header image;
• struct auth_context auth_context; FILE *f;

• void *data;

• uint8_t *data; off_t bin_size;

• u64 offset;

• uint64_t offset; int ret;

  #ifdef DEBUG

• printf("For output: %s\n", path);
• printf("\tbin: %s\n\ttype: %pUl\n", bin, guid);
• printf("\tindex: %ld\n\tinstance: %ld\n", index, instance);

• fprintf(stderr, "For output: %s\n", path);
• fprintf(stderr, "\tbin: %s\n\ttype: %pUl\n", bin, guid);
• fprintf(stderr, "\tindex: %lu\n\tinstance: %lu\n", index, instance); #endif

• auth_context.sig_size = 0; f = NULL; data = NULL; ret = -1;

@@ -195,6 +425,27 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid, if (read_bin_file(bin, &data, &bin_size)) goto err;

• /* first, calculate signature to determine its size */
• if (privkey_file && cert_file) {

• auth_context.key_file = privkey_file;
  

• auth_context.cert_file = cert_file;
  

• auth_context.auth.monotonic_count = mcount;
  

• auth_context.image_data = data;
  

• auth_context.image_size = bin_size;
  

• if (create_auth_data(&auth_context)) {
  

• 	fprintf(stderr, "Signing firmware image failed\n");
  

• 	goto err;
  

• }
  

• if (dump_sig &&
  

•     dump_signature(path, auth_context.sig_data,
  

• 		   auth_context.sig_size)) {
  

• 	fprintf(stderr, "Creating signature file failed\n");
  

• 	goto err;
  

• }
  

• }
• /*
  • write a capsule file
  */

@@ -212,9 +463,12 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid, /* TODO: The current implementation ignores flags */ header.flags = CAPSULE_FLAGS_PERSIST_ACROSS_RESET; header.capsule_image_size = sizeof(header)

• 			+ sizeof(capsule) + sizeof(u64)
  

• 			+ sizeof(capsule) + sizeof(uint64_t)
  		+ sizeof(image)
  		+ bin_size;
  

• if (auth_context.sig_size)

• header.capsule_image_size += sizeof(auth_context.auth)
  

• 		+ auth_context.sig_size;
  

  if (write_capsule_file(f, &header, sizeof(header), "Capsule header")) goto err;

@@ -230,7 +484,7 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid, "Firmware capsule header")) goto err;

• offset = sizeof(capsule) + sizeof(u64);

• offset = sizeof(capsule) + sizeof(uint64_t); if (write_capsule_file(f, &offset, sizeof(offset), "Offset to capsule image")) goto err;

@@ -245,13 +499,32 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid, image.reserved[1] = 0; image.reserved[2] = 0; image.update_image_size = bin_size;

• if (auth_context.sig_size)

• image.update_image_size += sizeof(auth_context.auth)
  

• 		+ auth_context.sig_size;
  

  image.update_vendor_code_size = 0; /* none */ image.update_hardware_instance = instance; image.image_capsule_support = 0;

• if (auth_context.sig_size)

• image.image_capsule_support |= CAPSULE_SUPPORT_AUTHENTICATION;
  

  if (write_capsule_file(f, &image, sizeof(image), "Firmware capsule image header")) goto err;

• /*

• * signature
  

• */
  

• if (auth_context.sig_size) {

• if (write_capsule_file(f, &auth_context.auth,
  

• 		       sizeof(auth_context.auth),
  

• 		       "Authentication header"))
  

• 	goto err;
  

• if (write_capsule_file(f, auth_context.sig_data,
  

• 		       auth_context.sig_size, "Signature"))
  

• 	goto err;
  

• }

• /*

  • firmware binary

  */

@@ -262,28 +535,43 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid, err: if (f) fclose(f);

• free_sig_data(&auth_context); free(data);

  return ret; }

-/*

• • Usage:
• • $ mkeficapsule -f <firmware binary> <output file>

+/**

• • main - main entry function of mkeficapsule
• • @argc: Number of arguments
• • @argv: Array of pointers to arguments
• • Create an uefi capsule file, optionally signing it.
• • Parse all the arguments and pass them on to create_fwbin().
• • Return:
• • • 0 - on success
• • • -1 - on failure

  */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { char *file; efi_guid_t *guid; unsigned long index, instance;

• uint64_t mcount;

• char *privkey_file, *cert_file; int c, idx;

  file = NULL; guid = NULL; index = 0; instance = 0;

• mcount = 0;

• privkey_file = NULL;

• cert_file = NULL;

• dump_sig = 0; for (;;) {

• c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "f:r:i:I:v:h", options, &idx);
  

• c = getopt_long(argc, argv, opts_short, options, &idx);
  

  if (c == -1) break;

@@ -291,7 +579,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) case 'f': if (file) { fprintf(stderr, "Image already specified\n");

• 		return -1;
  

• 		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
  }
  file = optarg;
  guid = &efi_guid_image_type_uboot_fit;
  

@@ -299,7 +587,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) case 'r': if (file) { fprintf(stderr, "Image already specified\n");

• 		return -1;
  

• 		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
  }
  file = optarg;
  guid = &efi_guid_image_type_uboot_raw;
  

@@ -310,14 +598,38 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) case 'I': instance = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 0); break;

• case 'p':
  

• 	if (privkey_file) {
  

• 		fprintf(stderr,
  

• 			"Private Key already specified\n");
  

• 		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
  

• 	}
  

• 	privkey_file = optarg;
  

• 	break;
  

• case 'c':
  

• 	if (cert_file) {
  

• 		fprintf(stderr,
  

• 			"Certificate file already specified\n");
  

• 		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
  

• 	}
  

• 	cert_file = optarg;
  

• 	break;
  

• case 'm':
  

• 	mcount = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 0);
  

• 	break;
  

• case 'd':
  

• 	dump_sig = 1;
  

• 	break;
  

  case 'h': print_usage();

• 	return 0;
  

• 	exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
  

  } }

• /* need an output file */
• if (argc != optind + 1) {

• /* check necessary parameters */
• if ((argc != optind + 1) || !file ||

•    ((privkey_file && !cert_file) ||
  

•     (!privkey_file && cert_file))) {
  

  print_usage(); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); }

@@ -328,8 +640,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); }

• if (create_fwbin(argv[optind], file, guid, index, instance)

• 	< 0) {
  

• if (create_fwbin(argv[optind], file, guid, index, instance,

• 	 mcount, privkey_file, cert_file) < 0) {
  

  fprintf(stderr, "Creating firmware capsule failed\n"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); }

Tom just caught the following warnings when building sandobox_defconfig with clang. Unfortunately -Werror is not enabled for tools yet.

In file included from tools/mkeficapsule.c:24: ./tools/eficapsule.h:93:18: warning: field 'hdr' with variable sized type 'WIN_CERTIFICATE' (aka 'struct _WIN_CERTIFICATE') not at the end of a struct or class is a GNU extension [-Wgnu-variable-sized-type-not-at-end] WIN_CERTIFICATE hdr; ^ tools/mkeficapsule.c:88:43: warning: field 'auth' with variable sized type 'struct efi_firmware_image_authentication' not at the end of a struct or class is a GNU extension [-Wgnu-variable-sized-type-not-at-end] struct efi_firmware_image_authentication auth; ^

As the zero sized members are not referenced we can remove them. The following diff seems to fix the problem:

diff --git a/tools/eficapsule.h b/tools/eficapsule.h index 8c1560bb06..69c9c58c2f 100644 --- a/tools/eficapsule.h +++ b/tools/eficapsule.h @@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ #define _EFI_CAPSULE_H

#include <stdint.h> -#include <pe.h> /* WIN_CERTIFICATE */

/* * Gcc's predefined attributes are not recognized by clang. @@ -85,14 +84,16 @@ struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_image_header { * win_certificate_uefi_guid - A certificate that encapsulates * a GUID-specific signature * - * @hdr: Windows certificate header + * @hdr: Windows certificate header, cf. WIN_CERTIFICATE * @cert_type: Certificate type - * @cert_data: Certificate data */ struct win_certificate_uefi_guid { - WIN_CERTIFICATE hdr; + struct { + uint32_t dwLength; + uint16_t wRevision; + uint16_t wCertificateType; + } hdr; efi_guid_t cert_type; - uint8_t cert_data[]; } __packed;

/** diff --git a/tools/mkeficapsule.c b/tools/mkeficapsule.c index 550f5f88e3..f7590e482f 100644 --- a/tools/mkeficapsule.c +++ b/tools/mkeficapsule.c @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ */

#include <getopt.h> +#include <pe.h> #include <stdbool.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <stdio.h>

Best regards

Heinrich

Heinrich,

On Fri, Feb 11, 2022 at 08:25:15PM +0100, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:

On 2/9/22 11:10, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:

...

Add a couple of test cases against capsule image authentication for capsule-on-disk, where only a signed capsule file with the verified signature will be applied to the system.

Due to the difficulty of embedding a public key (esl file) in U-Boot binary during pytest setup time, all the keys/certificates are pre-created.

Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro takahiro.akashi@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org

The test is not executed on Gitlab:

test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware_signed.py sss

SKIPPED [3] /builds/u-boot/custodians/u-boot-efi/test/py/conftest.py:490: .config feature "efi_capsule_authenticate" not enabled

Please, provide a defconfig with CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE=y in a follow-up patch.

This is somehow intentional. I don't remember quite well, but when I tried to add another defconfig file for sandbox to initiate some test in the past, you or Simon (sorry if I remember incorrectly here) opposed it.

Please also note that adding CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE to sandbox_defconfig doesn't make sense as it makes non-signed capsule tests (test_capsule_firmware.py) meaningless.

-Takahiro Akashi

Best regards

Heinrich

...

---

.../py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py | 5 + test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py | 52 +++- test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts | 10 + .../test_capsule_firmware_signed.py | 254 ++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 318 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware_signed.py

diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py index 4fd6353c2040..59b40f11bd1d 100644 --- a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py +++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/capsule_defs.py @@ -3,3 +3,8 @@ # Directories CAPSULE_DATA_DIR = '/EFI/CapsuleTestData' CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR = '/EFI/UpdateCapsule'

+# v1.5.1 or earlier of efitools has a bug in sha256 calculation, and +# you need build a newer version on your own. +# The path must terminate with '/' if it is not null. +EFITOOLS_PATH = '' diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py index 6ad5608cd71c..27c05971ca32 100644 --- a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py +++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/conftest.py @@ -10,13 +10,13 @@ import pytest from capsule_defs import *

# -# Fixture for UEFI secure boot test +# Fixture for UEFI capsule test #

• @pytest.fixture(scope='session') def efi_capsule_data(request, u_boot_config):
• """Set up a file system to be used in UEFI capsule test.

• """Set up a file system to be used in UEFI capsule and

•   authentication test.
  
  Args:
      request: Pytest request object.
  

@@ -40,6 +40,36 @@ def efi_capsule_data(request, u_boot_config): check_call('mkdir -p %s' % data_dir, shell=True) check_call('mkdir -p %s' % install_dir, shell=True)

•    capsule_auth_enabled = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get(
  

•                'config_efi_capsule_authenticate')
  

•    if capsule_auth_enabled:
  

•        # Create private key (SIGNER.key) and certificate (SIGNER.crt)
  

•        check_call('cd %s; '
  

•                   'openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey rsa:2048 '
  

•                        '-subj /CN=TEST_SIGNER/ -keyout SIGNER.key '
  

•                        '-out SIGNER.crt -nodes -days 365'
  

•                   % data_dir, shell=True)
  

•        check_call('cd %s; %scert-to-efi-sig-list SIGNER.crt SIGNER.esl'
  

•                   % (data_dir, EFITOOLS_PATH), shell=True)
  

•        # Update dtb adding capsule certificate
  

•        check_call('cd %s; '
  

•                   'cp %s/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts .'
  

•                   % (data_dir, u_boot_config.source_dir), shell=True)
  

•        check_call('cd %s; '
  

•                   'dtc -@ -I dts -O dtb -o signature.dtbo signature.dts; '
  

•                   'fdtoverlay -i %s/arch/sandbox/dts/test.dtb '
  

•                        '-o test_sig.dtb signature.dtbo'
  

•                   % (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir), shell=True)
  

•        # Create *malicious* private key (SIGNER2.key) and certificate
  

•        # (SIGNER2.crt)
  

•        check_call('cd %s; '
  

•                   'openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey rsa:2048 '
  

•                        '-subj /CN=TEST_SIGNER/ -keyout SIGNER2.key '
  

•                        '-out SIGNER2.crt -nodes -days 365'
  

•                   % data_dir, shell=True)
  

•     # Create capsule files
      # two regions: one for u-boot.bin and the other for u-boot.env
      check_call('cd %s; echo -n u-boot:Old > u-boot.bin.old; echo -n u-boot:New > u-boot.bin.new; echo -n u-boot-env:Old -> u-boot.env.old; echo -n u-boot-env:New > u-boot.env.new' % data_dir,
  

@@ -56,6 +86,22 @@ def efi_capsule_data(request, u_boot_config): check_call('cd %s; %s/tools/mkeficapsule --raw u-boot.bin.new --index 1 Test02' % (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir), shell=True)

•    if capsule_auth_enabled:
  

•        # firmware signed with proper key
  

•        check_call('cd %s; '
  

•                   '%s/tools/mkeficapsule --index 1 --monotonic-count 1 '
  

•                        '--private-key SIGNER.key --certificate SIGNER.crt '
  

•                        '--raw u-boot.bin.new Test11'
  

•                   % (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir),
  

•                   shell=True)
  

•        # firmware signed with *mal* key
  

•        check_call('cd %s; '
  

•                   '%s/tools/mkeficapsule --index 1 --monotonic-count 1 '
  

•                        '--private-key SIGNER2.key '
  

•                        '--certificate SIGNER2.crt '
  

•                        '--raw u-boot.bin.new Test12'
  

•                   % (data_dir, u_boot_config.build_dir),
  

•                   shell=True)
  
      # Create a disk image with EFI system partition
      check_call('virt-make-fs --partition=gpt --size=+1M --type=vfat %s %s' %
  

diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..078cfc76c93c --- /dev/null +++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/signature.dts @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+

+/dts-v1/; +/plugin/;

+&{/} {

• signature {

• capsule-key = /incbin/("SIGNER.esl");
  

• };

+}; diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware_signed.py b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware_signed.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..593b032e9015 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/py/tests/test_efi_capsule/test_capsule_firmware_signed.py @@ -0,0 +1,254 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +# Copyright (c) 2021, Linaro Limited +# Author: AKASHI Takahiro takahiro.akashi@linaro.org +# +# U-Boot UEFI: Firmware Update (Signed capsule) Test

+""" +This test verifies capsule-on-disk firmware update +with signed capsule files +"""

+import pytest +from capsule_defs import CAPSULE_DATA_DIR, CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR

+@pytest.mark.boardspec('sandbox') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('efi_capsule_firmware_raw') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('efi_capsule_authenticate') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('dfu') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('dfu_sf') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_efidebug') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_fat') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_memory') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_nvedit_efi') +@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_sf') +@pytest.mark.slow +class TestEfiCapsuleFirmwareSigned(object):

• def test_efi_capsule_auth1(

•        self, u_boot_config, u_boot_console, efi_capsule_data):
  

•    """
  

•    Test Case 1 - Update U-Boot on SPI Flash, raw image format
  

•                  0x100000-0x150000: U-Boot binary (but dummy)
  

•                  If the capsule is properly signed, the authentication
  

•                  should pass and the firmware be updated.
  

•    """
  

•    disk_img = efi_capsule_data
  

•    with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 1-a, before reboot'):
  

•        output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
  

•            'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
  

•            'efidebug boot add -b 1 TEST host 0:1 /helloworld.efi',
  

•            'efidebug boot order 1',
  

•            'env set -e -nv -bs -rt OsIndications =0x0000000000000004',
  

•            'env set dfu_alt_info '
  

•                    '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 '
  

•                    '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"',
  

•            'env save'])
  

•        # initialize content
  

•        output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
  

•            'sf probe 0:0',
  

•            'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/u-boot.bin.old'
  

•                    % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR,
  

•            'sf write 4000000 100000 10',
  

•            'sf read 5000000 100000 10',
  

•            'md.b 5000000 10'])
  

•        assert 'Old' in ''.join(output)
  

•        # place a capsule file
  

•        output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
  

•            'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test11' % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR,
  

•            'fatwrite host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test11 $filesize'
  

•                    % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR,
  

•            'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR])
  

•        assert 'Test11' in ''.join(output)
  

•    # reboot
  

•    mnt_point = u_boot_config.persistent_data_dir + '/test_efi_capsule'
  

•    u_boot_console.config.dtb = mnt_point + CAPSULE_DATA_DIR \
  

•                                + '/test_sig.dtb'
  

•    u_boot_console.restart_uboot()
  

•    capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get(
  

•        'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early')
  

•    with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 1-b, after reboot'):
  

•        if not capsule_early:
  

•            # make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables
  

•            # are not available.
  

•            output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
  

•                'env set dfu_alt_info '
  

•                        '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 '
  

•                        '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"',
  

•                'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
  

•                'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR])
  

•            assert 'Test11' in ''.join(output)
  

•            # need to run uefi command to initiate capsule handling
  

•            output = u_boot_console.run_command(
  

•                'env print -e Capsule0000')
  

•        output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
  

•            'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
  

•            'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR])
  

•        assert 'Test11' not in ''.join(output)
  

•        output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
  

•            'sf probe 0:0',
  

•            'sf read 4000000 100000 10',
  

•            'md.b 4000000 10'])
  

•        assert 'u-boot:New' in ''.join(output)
  

• def test_efi_capsule_auth2(

•        self, u_boot_config, u_boot_console, efi_capsule_data):
  

•    """
  

•    Test Case 2 - Update U-Boot on SPI Flash, raw image format
  

•                  0x100000-0x150000: U-Boot binary (but dummy)
  

•                  If the capsule is signed but with an invalid key,
  

•                  the authentication should fail and the firmware
  

•                  not be updated.
  

•    """
  

•    disk_img = efi_capsule_data
  

•    with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 2-a, before reboot'):
  

•        output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
  

•            'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
  

•            'efidebug boot add -b 1 TEST host 0:1 /helloworld.efi',
  

•            'efidebug boot order 1',
  

•            'env set -e -nv -bs -rt OsIndications =0x0000000000000004',
  

•            'env set dfu_alt_info '
  

•                    '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 '
  

•                    '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"',
  

•            'env save'])
  

•        # initialize content
  

•        output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
  

•            'sf probe 0:0',
  

•            'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/u-boot.bin.old'
  

•                    % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR,
  

•            'sf write 4000000 100000 10',
  

•            'sf read 5000000 100000 10',
  

•            'md.b 5000000 10'])
  

•        assert 'Old' in ''.join(output)
  

•        # place a capsule file
  

•        output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
  

•            'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test12' % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR,
  

•            'fatwrite host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test12 $filesize'
  

•                            % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR,
  

•            'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR])
  

•        assert 'Test12' in ''.join(output)
  

•    # reboot
  

•    mnt_point = u_boot_config.persistent_data_dir + '/test_efi_capsule'
  

•    u_boot_console.config.dtb = mnt_point + CAPSULE_DATA_DIR \
  

•                                + '/test_sig.dtb'
  

•    u_boot_console.restart_uboot()
  

•    capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get(
  

•        'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early')
  

•    with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 2-b, after reboot'):
  

•        if not capsule_early:
  

•            # make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables
  

•            # are not available.
  

•            output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
  

•                'env set dfu_alt_info '
  

•                    '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 '
  

•                    '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"',
  

•                'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
  

•                'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR])
  

•            assert 'Test12' in ''.join(output)
  

•            # need to run uefi command to initiate capsule handling
  

•            output = u_boot_console.run_command(
  

•                'env print -e Capsule0000')
  

•        # deleted any way
  

•        output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
  

•            'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
  

•            'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR])
  

•        assert 'Test12' not in ''.join(output)
  

•        # TODO: check CapsuleStatus in CapsuleXXXX
  

•        output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
  

•            'sf probe 0:0',
  

•            'sf read 4000000 100000 10',
  

•            'md.b 4000000 10'])
  

•        assert 'u-boot:Old' in ''.join(output)
  

• def test_efi_capsule_auth3(

•        self, u_boot_config, u_boot_console, efi_capsule_data):
  

•    """
  

•    Test Case 3 - Update U-Boot on SPI Flash, raw image format
  

•                  0x100000-0x150000: U-Boot binary (but dummy)
  

•                  If the capsule is not signed, the authentication
  

•                  should fail and the firmware not be updated.
  

•    """
  

•    disk_img = efi_capsule_data
  

•    with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 3-a, before reboot'):
  

•        output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
  

•            'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
  

•            'efidebug boot add -b 1 TEST host 0:1 /helloworld.efi',
  

•            'efidebug boot order 1',
  

•            'env set -e -nv -bs -rt OsIndications =0x0000000000000004',
  

•            'env set dfu_alt_info '
  

•                    '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 '
  

•                    '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"',
  

•            'env save'])
  

•        # initialize content
  

•        output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
  

•            'sf probe 0:0',
  

•            'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/u-boot.bin.old'
  

•                    % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR,
  

•            'sf write 4000000 100000 10',
  

•            'sf read 5000000 100000 10',
  

•            'md.b 5000000 10'])
  

•        assert 'Old' in ''.join(output)
  

•        # place a capsule file
  

•        output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
  

•            'fatload host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test02' % CAPSULE_DATA_DIR,
  

•            'fatwrite host 0:1 4000000 %s/Test02 $filesize'
  

•                        % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR,
  

•            'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR])
  

•        assert 'Test02' in ''.join(output)
  

•    # reboot
  

•    mnt_point = u_boot_config.persistent_data_dir + '/test_efi_capsule'
  

•    u_boot_console.config.dtb = mnt_point + CAPSULE_DATA_DIR \
  

•                                + '/test_sig.dtb'
  

•    u_boot_console.restart_uboot()
  

•    capsule_early = u_boot_config.buildconfig.get(
  

•        'config_efi_capsule_on_disk_early')
  

•    with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 3-b, after reboot'):
  

•        if not capsule_early:
  

•            # make sure that dfu_alt_info exists even persistent variables
  

•            # are not available.
  

•            output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
  

•                'env set dfu_alt_info '
  

•                        '"sf 0:0=u-boot-bin raw 0x100000 '
  

•                        '0x50000;u-boot-env raw 0x150000 0x200000"',
  

•                'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
  

•                'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR])
  

•            assert 'Test02' in ''.join(output)
  

•            # need to run uefi command to initiate capsule handling
  

•            output = u_boot_console.run_command(
  

•                'env print -e Capsule0000')
  

•        # deleted any way
  

•        output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
  

•            'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
  

•            'fatls host 0:1 %s' % CAPSULE_INSTALL_DIR])
  

•        assert 'Test02' not in ''.join(output)
  

•        # TODO: check CapsuleStatus in CapsuleXXXX
  

•        output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
  

•            'sf probe 0:0',
  

•            'sf read 4000000 100000 10',
  

•            'md.b 4000000 10'])
  

•        assert 'u-boot:Old' in ''.join(output)