[PATCH v3 0/2] PE/COFF measurement support

This patch series add the PE/COFF measurement support. Extending PCR and Event Log is tested with fTPM running as a OP-TEE TA. Unit test will be added in the separate series.
Masahisa Kojima (2): efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement
include/efi_loader.h | 6 + include/efi_tcg2.h | 9 ++ include/tpm-v2.h | 18 +++ lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 6 + lib/efi_loader/Makefile | 2 +- lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 132 +++++++++++++++---- lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 67 +--------- lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c | 207 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c | 3 + 9 files changed, 351 insertions(+), 99 deletions(-)

This is preparation for PE/COFF measurement support. PE/COFF image hash calculation is same in both UEFI Secure Boot image verification and measurement in measured boot. PE/COFF image parsing functions are gathered into efi_image_loader.c, and exposed even if UEFI Secure Boot is not enabled.
This commit also adds the EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option to decide if efi_signature.c shall be compiled.
Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima masahisa.kojima@linaro.org ---
Changes in v3: - hide EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option
Changes in v2: - Remove all #ifdef from efi_image_loader.c and efi_signature.c - Add EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option - Explicitly include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h> - Gather PE/COFF parsing functions into efi_image_loader.c - Move efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database in efi_var_common.c
lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 6 +++ lib/efi_loader/Makefile | 2 +- lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 67 +--------------------------- lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c | 3 ++ 5 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig index 0b99d7c774..b76e77180e 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig @@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ config EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER select PKCS7_VERIFY select IMAGE_SIGN_INFO + select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT default n help Select this option if you want to enable capsule @@ -336,6 +337,7 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER select PKCS7_VERIFY + select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT default n help Select this option to enable EFI secure boot support. @@ -343,6 +345,10 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT it is signed with a trusted key. To do that, you need to install, at least, PK, KEK and db.
+config EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT + bool + depends on EFI_SECURE_BOOT || EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE + config EFI_ESRT bool "Enable the UEFI ESRT generation" depends on EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile index 8bd343e258..fd344cea29 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERATE_SMBIOS_TABLE) += efi_smbios.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL) += efi_rng.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL) += efi_tcg2.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_LOAD_FILE2_INITRD) += efi_load_initrd.o -obj-y += efi_signature.o +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT) += efi_signature.o
EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE := $(subst $",,$(CONFIG_EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE)) $(obj)/efi_var_seed.o: $(srctree)/$(EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE) diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c index f53ef367ec..b8a790bcb9 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c @@ -213,7 +213,68 @@ static void efi_set_code_and_data_type( } }
-#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT +/** + * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region + * @regs: Pointer to array of regions + * @start: Start address of region (included) + * @end: End address of region (excluded) + * @nocheck: flag against overlapped regions + * + * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list. + * + * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address. + * Overlapping entries will not be allowed. + * + * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence + * of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed. + * + * Return: status code + */ +efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs, + const void *start, const void *end, + int nocheck) +{ + struct image_region *reg; + int i, j; + + if (regs->num >= regs->max) { + EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__); + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } + + if (end < start) + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + + for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) { + reg = ®s->reg[i]; + if (nocheck) + continue; + + /* new data after registered region */ + if (start >= reg->data + reg->size) + continue; + + /* new data preceding registered region */ + if (end <= reg->data) { + for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--) + memcpy(®s->reg[j + 1], ®s->reg[j], + sizeof(*reg)); + break; + } + + /* new data overlapping registered region */ + EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__); + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + reg = ®s->reg[i]; + reg->data = start; + reg->size = end - start; + regs->num++; + + return EFI_SUCCESS; +} + /** * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections * @arg1: pointer to pointer to first section header @@ -504,6 +565,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret);
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) + return true; + if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled()) return true;
@@ -668,13 +732,6 @@ err: EFI_PRINT("%s: Exit, %d\n", __func__, ret); return ret; } -#else -static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) -{ - return true; -} -#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */ -
/** * efi_check_pe() - check if a memory buffer contains a PE-COFF image diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c index c7ec275414..bdd09881fc 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c @@ -15,18 +15,16 @@ #include <crypto/public_key.h> #include <linux/compat.h> #include <linux/oid_registry.h> +#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h> #include <u-boot/rsa.h> #include <u-boot/sha256.h>
-const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database = - EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_sha256 = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_rsa2048 = EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509 = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509_sha256 = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID;
-#if defined(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT) || defined(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE) static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = { /* SEQUENCE */ 0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xc7, @@ -539,68 +537,6 @@ out: return !revoked; }
-/** - * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region - * @regs: Pointer to array of regions - * @start: Start address of region (included) - * @end: End address of region (excluded) - * @nocheck: flag against overlapped regions - * - * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list. - * - * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address. - * Overlapping entries will not be allowed. - * - * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence - * of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed. - * - * Return: status code - */ -efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs, - const void *start, const void *end, - int nocheck) -{ - struct image_region *reg; - int i, j; - - if (regs->num >= regs->max) { - EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__); - return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; - } - - if (end < start) - return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; - - for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) { - reg = ®s->reg[i]; - if (nocheck) - continue; - - /* new data after registered region */ - if (start >= reg->data + reg->size) - continue; - - /* new data preceding registered region */ - if (end <= reg->data) { - for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--) - memcpy(®s->reg[j + 1], ®s->reg[j], - sizeof(*reg)); - break; - } - - /* new data overlapping registered region */ - EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__); - return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; - } - - reg = ®s->reg[i]; - reg->data = start; - reg->size = end - start; - regs->num++; - - return EFI_SUCCESS; -} - /** * efi_sigstore_free - free signature store * @sigstore: Pointer to signature store structure @@ -846,4 +782,3 @@ struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u16 *name)
return efi_build_signature_store(db, db_size); } -#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT || CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE */ diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c index b11ed91a74..83479dd142 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c @@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ struct efi_auth_var_name_type { const enum efi_auth_var_type type; };
+const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database = + EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID; + static const struct efi_auth_var_name_type name_type[] = { {u"PK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_PK}, {u"KEK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_KEK},

On 28.04.21 14:19, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
This is preparation for PE/COFF measurement support. PE/COFF image hash calculation is same in both UEFI Secure Boot image verification and measurement in measured boot. PE/COFF image parsing functions are gathered into efi_image_loader.c, and exposed even if UEFI Secure Boot is not enabled.
This commit also adds the EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option to decide if efi_signature.c shall be compiled.
Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima masahisa.kojima@linaro.org
Changes in v3:
- hide EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option
Changes in v2:
- Remove all #ifdef from efi_image_loader.c and efi_signature.c
- Add EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option
- Explicitly include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h>
- Gather PE/COFF parsing functions into efi_image_loader.c
- Move efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database in efi_var_common.c
lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 6 +++ lib/efi_loader/Makefile | 2 +- lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 67 +--------------------------- lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c | 3 ++ 5 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig index 0b99d7c774..b76e77180e 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig @@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ config EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER select PKCS7_VERIFY select IMAGE_SIGN_INFO
- select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT default n help Select this option if you want to enable capsule
@@ -336,6 +337,7 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER select PKCS7_VERIFY
- select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT default n help Select this option to enable EFI secure boot support.
@@ -343,6 +345,10 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT it is signed with a trusted key. To do that, you need to install, at least, PK, KEK and db.
+config EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT
- bool
- depends on EFI_SECURE_BOOT || EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE
config EFI_ESRT bool "Enable the UEFI ESRT generation" depends on EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile index 8bd343e258..fd344cea29 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERATE_SMBIOS_TABLE) += efi_smbios.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL) += efi_rng.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL) += efi_tcg2.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_LOAD_FILE2_INITRD) += efi_load_initrd.o -obj-y += efi_signature.o +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT) += efi_signature.o
EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE := $(subst $",,$(CONFIG_EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE)) $(obj)/efi_var_seed.o: $(srctree)/$(EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE) diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c index f53ef367ec..b8a790bcb9 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c @@ -213,7 +213,68 @@ static void efi_set_code_and_data_type( } }
-#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT +/**
- efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region
- @regs: Pointer to array of regions
- @start: Start address of region (included)
- @end: End address of region (excluded)
- @nocheck: flag against overlapped regions
- Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list.
- If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address.
- Overlapping entries will not be allowed.
- If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence
- of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed.
- Return: status code
- */
+efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
const void *start, const void *end,
int nocheck)
+{
- struct image_region *reg;
- int i, j;
- if (regs->num >= regs->max) {
EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__);
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
- }
- if (end < start)
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) {
reg = ®s->reg[i];
if (nocheck)
continue;
/* new data after registered region */
if (start >= reg->data + reg->size)
continue;
/* new data preceding registered region */
if (end <= reg->data) {
for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--)
memcpy(®s->reg[j + 1], ®s->reg[j],
sizeof(*reg));
break;
}
/* new data overlapping registered region */
EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__);
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
- reg = ®s->reg[i];
- reg->data = start;
- reg->size = end - start;
- regs->num++;
- return EFI_SUCCESS;
+}
/**
- cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections
- @arg1: pointer to pointer to first section header
@@ -504,6 +565,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret);
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
return true;
Why is this needed? Doesn't efi_secure_boot_enabled() return false in this case?
Best regards
Heinrich
if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled()) return true;
@@ -668,13 +732,6 @@ err: EFI_PRINT("%s: Exit, %d\n", __func__, ret); return ret; } -#else -static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) -{
- return true;
-} -#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */
/**
- efi_check_pe() - check if a memory buffer contains a PE-COFF image
diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c index c7ec275414..bdd09881fc 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c @@ -15,18 +15,16 @@ #include <crypto/public_key.h> #include <linux/compat.h> #include <linux/oid_registry.h> +#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h> #include <u-boot/rsa.h> #include <u-boot/sha256.h>
-const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database =
EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
const efi_guid_t efi_guid_sha256 = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_rsa2048 = EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509 = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509_sha256 = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID;
-#if defined(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT) || defined(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE) static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = { /* SEQUENCE */ 0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xc7, @@ -539,68 +537,6 @@ out: return !revoked; }
-/**
- efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region
- @regs: Pointer to array of regions
- @start: Start address of region (included)
- @end: End address of region (excluded)
- @nocheck: flag against overlapped regions
- Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list.
- If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address.
- Overlapping entries will not be allowed.
- If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence
- of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed.
- Return: status code
- */
-efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
const void *start, const void *end,
int nocheck)
-{
- struct image_region *reg;
- int i, j;
- if (regs->num >= regs->max) {
EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__);
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
- }
- if (end < start)
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) {
reg = ®s->reg[i];
if (nocheck)
continue;
/* new data after registered region */
if (start >= reg->data + reg->size)
continue;
/* new data preceding registered region */
if (end <= reg->data) {
for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--)
memcpy(®s->reg[j + 1], ®s->reg[j],
sizeof(*reg));
break;
}
/* new data overlapping registered region */
EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__);
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
- reg = ®s->reg[i];
- reg->data = start;
- reg->size = end - start;
- regs->num++;
- return EFI_SUCCESS;
-}
/**
- efi_sigstore_free - free signature store
- @sigstore: Pointer to signature store structure
@@ -846,4 +782,3 @@ struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u16 *name)
return efi_build_signature_store(db, db_size); } -#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT || CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE */ diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c index b11ed91a74..83479dd142 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c @@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ struct efi_auth_var_name_type { const enum efi_auth_var_type type; };
+const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database =
EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID;
static const struct efi_auth_var_name_type name_type[] = { {u"PK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_PK}, {u"KEK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_KEK},

On 4/28/21 3:16 PM, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:
On 28.04.21 14:19, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
<snip />
/**
- cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections
- @arg1: pointer to pointer to first section header
@@ -504,6 +565,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret);
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
return true;
Why is this needed? Doesn't efi_secure_boot_enabled() return false in this case?
Hello Masahisa,
I did not see any reply yet. Was a mail lost?
Best regards
Heinrich

Hi Heinrich,
Sorry for the late reply.
On Sat, 8 May 2021 at 23:08, Heinrich Schuchardt xypron.glpk@gmx.de wrote:
On 4/28/21 3:16 PM, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:
On 28.04.21 14:19, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
<snip /> >> /** >> * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections >> * @arg1: pointer to pointer to first section header >> @@ -504,6 +565,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) >> >> EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret); >> >> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) >> + return true; >> + > > Why is this needed? Doesn't efi_secure_boot_enabled() return false in > this case?
The original code is as follows.
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) {
< snip >
} #else static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) { return true; } #endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */
The purpose of this commit is removing #if compilation switch, so I keep the original implementation, always return true if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT is disabled.
Thanks, Masahisa
Hello Masahisa,
I did not see any reply yet. Was a mail lost?
Best regards
Heinrich

On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 09:49:03AM +0900, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
Hi Heinrich,
Sorry for the late reply.
On Sat, 8 May 2021 at 23:08, Heinrich Schuchardt xypron.glpk@gmx.de wrote:
On 4/28/21 3:16 PM, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:
On 28.04.21 14:19, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
<snip /> >> /** >> * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections >> * @arg1: pointer to pointer to first section header >> @@ -504,6 +565,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) >> >> EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret); >> >> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) >> + return true; >> + > > Why is this needed? Doesn't efi_secure_boot_enabled() return false in > this case?
The original code is as follows.
Heinrich's concern was, I guess, that
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
return true;
and the succeeding check,
if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled()) return true;
are somehow redundant. But in the latter case, I'm afraid that a compiler cannot optimize out the rest of the logic in efi_image_authenticate().
-Takahiro Akashi
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) {
< snip >
} #else static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) { return true; } #endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */
The purpose of this commit is removing #if compilation switch, so I keep the original implementation, always return true if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT is disabled.
Thanks, Masahisa
Hello Masahisa,
I did not see any reply yet. Was a mail lost?
Best regards
Heinrich

On Mon, 10 May 2021 at 11:07, Takahiro Akashi takahiro.akashi@linaro.org wrote:
On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 09:49:03AM +0900, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
Hi Heinrich,
Sorry for the late reply.
On Sat, 8 May 2021 at 23:08, Heinrich Schuchardt xypron.glpk@gmx.de wrote:
On 4/28/21 3:16 PM, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:
On 28.04.21 14:19, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
<snip /> >> /** >> * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections >> * @arg1: pointer to pointer to first section header >> @@ -504,6 +565,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) >> >> EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret); >> >> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) >> + return true; >> + > > Why is this needed? Doesn't efi_secure_boot_enabled() return false in > this case?
The original code is as follows.
Heinrich's concern was, I guess, that
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
return true;
and the succeeding check,
if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled()) return true;
are somehow redundant. But in the latter case, I'm afraid that a compiler cannot optimize out the rest of the logic in efi_image_authenticate().
Hi Heinrich, Takahiro,
Sorry for the late reply. I now understand Takahiro's concern. If I remove following check,
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
return true;
compiler optimization does not work and link error occurs.
lib/built-in.o: In function `efi_image_authenticate': /home/ubuntu/SynQuacer/ledge/u-boot/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c:601: undefined reference to `efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb' /home/ubuntu/SynQuacer/ledge/u-boot/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c:607: undefined reference to `efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb' /home/ubuntu/SynQuacer/ledge/u-boot/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c:613: undefined reference to `efi_signature_lookup_digest'
I would like to propose two resolution.
1) keep if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) condition 2) remove if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) condition and always include efi_signature.c as compilation target.
Please advise.
Thanks, Masahisa
-Takahiro Akashi
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) {
< snip >
} #else static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) { return true; } #endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */
The purpose of this commit is removing #if compilation switch, so I keep the original implementation, always return true if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT is disabled.
Thanks, Masahisa
Hello Masahisa,
I did not see any reply yet. Was a mail lost?
Best regards
Heinrich

Hi Heinrich,
I'm about to send v4 patch series.
- keep if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) condition
I chose this option, but I reverted #ifdef statement instead of using "if (IS_ENABLED)" because I think it is better not to rely on compiler optimization.
- remove if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) condition and always include efi_signature.c as compilation target.
In this option, CONFIG_PKCS7_VERIFY is required for EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL just for successful build. To minimize dependency, I did not proceed with 2).
Please kindly review v4.
Thanks, Masahisa
On Tue, 11 May 2021 at 07:06, Masahisa Kojima masahisa.kojima@linaro.org wrote:
On Mon, 10 May 2021 at 11:07, Takahiro Akashi takahiro.akashi@linaro.org wrote:
On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 09:49:03AM +0900, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
Hi Heinrich,
Sorry for the late reply.
On Sat, 8 May 2021 at 23:08, Heinrich Schuchardt xypron.glpk@gmx.de wrote:
On 4/28/21 3:16 PM, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:
On 28.04.21 14:19, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
<snip /> >> /** >> * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections >> * @arg1: pointer to pointer to first section header >> @@ -504,6 +565,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) >> >> EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret); >> >> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) >> + return true; >> + > > Why is this needed? Doesn't efi_secure_boot_enabled() return false in > this case?
The original code is as follows.
Heinrich's concern was, I guess, that
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
return true;
and the succeeding check,
if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled()) return true;
are somehow redundant. But in the latter case, I'm afraid that a compiler cannot optimize out the rest of the logic in efi_image_authenticate().
Hi Heinrich, Takahiro,
Sorry for the late reply. I now understand Takahiro's concern. If I remove following check,
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
return true;
compiler optimization does not work and link error occurs.
lib/built-in.o: In function `efi_image_authenticate': /home/ubuntu/SynQuacer/ledge/u-boot/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c:601: undefined reference to `efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb' /home/ubuntu/SynQuacer/ledge/u-boot/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c:607: undefined reference to `efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb' /home/ubuntu/SynQuacer/ledge/u-boot/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c:613: undefined reference to `efi_signature_lookup_digest'
I would like to propose two resolution.
- keep if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) condition
- remove if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT)) condition and always include efi_signature.c as compilation target.
Please advise.
Thanks, Masahisa
-Takahiro Akashi
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) {
< snip >
} #else static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) { return true; } #endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */
The purpose of this commit is removing #if compilation switch, so I keep the original implementation, always return true if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT is disabled.
Thanks, Masahisa
Hello Masahisa,
I did not see any reply yet. Was a mail lost?
Best regards
Heinrich

"TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification" requires to measure every attempt to load and execute a OS Loader(a UEFI application) into PCR[4]. This commit adds the PE/COFF image measurement, extends PCR, and appends measurement into Event Log.
Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima masahisa.kojima@linaro.org ---
(no changes since v2)
Changes in v2: - Remove duplicate <efi.h> include - Remove unnecessary __packed attribute - Add all EV_EFI_* event definition - Create common function to prepare 8-byte aligned image - Add measurement for EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER and EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER - Use efi_search_protocol() to get device_path - Add function comment
include/efi_loader.h | 6 + include/efi_tcg2.h | 9 ++ include/tpm-v2.h | 18 +++ lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 59 +++++++-- lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c | 207 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 5 files changed, 275 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/efi_loader.h b/include/efi_loader.h index de1a496a97..9f2854a255 100644 --- a/include/efi_loader.h +++ b/include/efi_loader.h @@ -426,6 +426,10 @@ efi_status_t efi_disk_register(void); efi_status_t efi_rng_register(void); /* Called by efi_init_obj_list() to install EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL */ efi_status_t efi_tcg2_register(void); +/* measure the pe-coff image, extend PCR and add Event Log */ +efi_status_t tcg2_measure_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, + struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, + struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image_info); /* Create handles and protocols for the partitions of a block device */ int efi_disk_create_partitions(efi_handle_t parent, struct blk_desc *desc, const char *if_typename, int diskid, @@ -847,6 +851,8 @@ bool efi_secure_boot_enabled(void);
bool efi_capsule_auth_enabled(void);
+void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size, void **new_efi); + bool efi_image_parse(void *efi, size_t len, struct efi_image_regions **regp, WIN_CERTIFICATE **auth, size_t *auth_len);
diff --git a/include/efi_tcg2.h b/include/efi_tcg2.h index 40e241ce31..bcfb98168a 100644 --- a/include/efi_tcg2.h +++ b/include/efi_tcg2.h @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #if !defined _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_ #define _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_
+#include <efi_api.h> #include <tpm-v2.h>
#define EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID \ @@ -53,6 +54,14 @@ struct efi_tcg2_event { u8 event[]; } __packed;
+struct uefi_image_load_event { + efi_physical_addr_t image_location_in_memory; + u64 image_length_in_memory; + u64 image_link_time_address; + u64 length_of_device_path; + struct efi_device_path device_path[]; +}; + struct efi_tcg2_boot_service_capability { u8 size; struct efi_tcg2_version structure_version; diff --git a/include/tpm-v2.h b/include/tpm-v2.h index df67a196cf..6e812c017c 100644 --- a/include/tpm-v2.h +++ b/include/tpm-v2.h @@ -62,6 +62,24 @@ struct udevice; #define EV_CPU_MICROCODE ((u32)0x00000009) #define EV_TABLE_OF_DEVICES ((u32)0x0000000B)
+/* + * event types, cf. + * "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification", Family "2.0" + * rev 1.04, June 3, 2019 + */ +#define EV_EFI_EVENT_BASE ((u32)0x80000000) +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG ((u32)0x80000001) +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT ((u32)0x80000002) +#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION ((u32)0x80000003) +#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000004) +#define EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000005) +#define EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT ((u32)0x80000006) +#define EV_EFI_ACTION ((u32)0x80000007) +#define EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB ((u32)0x80000008) +#define EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES ((u32)0x80000009) +#define EV_EFI_HCRTM_EVENT ((u32)0x80000010) +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY ((u32)0x800000E0) + /* TPMS_TAGGED_PROPERTY Structure */ struct tpms_tagged_property { u32 property; diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c index b8a790bcb9..cc548e1b88 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c @@ -302,6 +302,40 @@ static int cmp_pe_section(const void *arg1, const void *arg2) return 1; }
+/** + * efi_prepare_aligned_image() - prepare 8-byte aligned image + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary + * @new_efi: pointer to the newly allocated image + * + * If @efi is not 8-byte aligned, this function newly allocates + * the image buffer and updates @efi_size. + * + * Return: valid pointer to a image, return NULL if allocation fails. + */ +void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size, void **new_efi) +{ + size_t new_efi_size; + void *p; + + /* + * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be + * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect. + */ + if (!IS_ALIGNED(*efi_size, 8)) { + new_efi_size = ALIGN(*efi_size, 8); + p = calloc(new_efi_size, 1); + if (!p) + return NULL; + memcpy(p, efi, *efi_size); + *efi_size = new_efi_size; + *new_efi = p; + return p; + } else { + return efi; + } +} + /** * efi_image_parse() - parse a PE image * @efi: Pointer to image @@ -560,7 +594,7 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) struct efi_signature_store *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL; void *new_efi = NULL; u8 *auth, *wincerts_end; - size_t new_efi_size, auth_size; + size_t auth_size; bool ret = false;
EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret); @@ -571,19 +605,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled()) return true;
- /* - * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be - * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect. - */ - if (efi_size & 0x7) { - new_efi_size = (efi_size + 0x7) & ~0x7ULL; - new_efi = calloc(new_efi_size, 1); - if (!new_efi) - return false; - memcpy(new_efi, efi, efi_size); - efi = new_efi; - efi_size = new_efi_size; - } + efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, (u64 *)&efi_size, &new_efi); + if (!efi) + return false;
if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts, &wincerts_len)) { @@ -886,6 +910,13 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, goto err; }
+#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL) + /* Measure an PE/COFF image */ + if (tcg2_measure_pe_image(efi, efi_size, handle, + loaded_image_info)) + log_err("PE image measurement failed\n"); +#endif + /* Copy PE headers */ memcpy(efi_reloc, efi, sizeof(*dos) diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c index 94e8f22bbb..7ad9cb2b89 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c @@ -13,8 +13,10 @@ #include <efi_loader.h> #include <efi_tcg2.h> #include <log.h> +#include <malloc.h> #include <version.h> #include <tpm-v2.h> +#include <u-boot/rsa.h> #include <u-boot/sha1.h> #include <u-boot/sha256.h> #include <u-boot/sha512.h> @@ -706,6 +708,183 @@ out: return EFI_EXIT(ret); }
+/** + * tcg2_hash_pe_image() - calculate PE/COFF image hash + * + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary + * @digest_list: list of digest algorithms to extend + * + * Return: status code + */ +static efi_status_t tcg2_hash_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, + struct tpml_digest_values *digest_list) +{ + WIN_CERTIFICATE *wincerts = NULL; + size_t wincerts_len; + struct efi_image_regions *regs = NULL; + void *new_efi = NULL; + u8 hash[TPM2_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; + efi_status_t ret; + u32 active; + int i; + + efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, &efi_size, &new_efi); + if (!efi) + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + + if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts, + &wincerts_len)) { + log_err("Parsing PE executable image failed\n"); + ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto out; + } + + ret = __get_active_pcr_banks(&active); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) { + ret = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto out; + } + + digest_list->count = 0; + for (i = 0; i < MAX_HASH_COUNT; i++) { + u16 hash_alg = hash_algo_list[i].hash_alg; + + if (!(active & alg_to_mask(hash_alg))) + continue; + switch (hash_alg) { + case TPM2_ALG_SHA1: + hash_calculate("sha1", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); + break; + case TPM2_ALG_SHA256: + hash_calculate("sha256", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); + break; + case TPM2_ALG_SHA384: + hash_calculate("sha384", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); + break; + case TPM2_ALG_SHA512: + hash_calculate("sha512", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); + break; + default: + EFI_PRINT("Unsupported algorithm %x\n", hash_alg); + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + digest_list->digests[i].hash_alg = hash_alg; + memcpy(&digest_list->digests[i].digest, hash, (u32)alg_to_len(hash_alg)); + digest_list->count++; + } + +out: + free(new_efi); + free(regs); + + return ret; +} + +/** + * tcg2_measure_pe_image() - measure PE/COFF image + * + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary + * @handle: loaded image handle + * @loaded_image: loaded image protocol + * + * Return: status code + */ +efi_status_t tcg2_measure_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, + struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, + struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image) +{ + struct tpml_digest_values digest_list; + efi_status_t ret; + struct udevice *dev; + u32 pcr_index, event_type, event_size; + struct uefi_image_load_event *image_load_event; + struct efi_device_path *device_path; + u32 device_path_length; + IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *dos; + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt; + struct efi_handler *handler; + + ret = platform_get_tpm2_device(&dev); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + switch (handle->image_type) { + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION: + pcr_index = 4; + event_type = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION; + break; + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_DRIVER: + pcr_index = 2; + event_type = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER; + break; + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_RUNTIME_DRIVER: + pcr_index = 2; + event_type = EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER; + break; + default: + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + + ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image(efi, efi_size, &digest_list); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + ret = tcg2_pcr_extend(dev, pcr_index, &digest_list); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + ret = EFI_CALL(efi_search_protocol(&handle->header, + &efi_guid_loaded_image_device_path, + &handler)); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + device_path = EFI_CALL(handler->protocol_interface); + device_path_length = efi_dp_size(device_path); + if (device_path_length > 0) { + /* add end node size */ + device_path_length += sizeof(struct efi_device_path); + } + event_size = sizeof(struct uefi_image_load_event) + device_path_length; + image_load_event = (struct uefi_image_load_event *)malloc(event_size); + if (!image_load_event) + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + + image_load_event->image_location_in_memory = (efi_physical_addr_t)efi; + image_load_event->image_length_in_memory = efi_size; + image_load_event->length_of_device_path = device_path_length; + + dos = (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *)efi; + nt = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *)(efi + dos->e_lfanew); + if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) { + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *nt64 = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *)nt; + + image_load_event->image_link_time_address = + nt64->OptionalHeader.ImageBase; + } else if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) { + image_load_event->image_link_time_address = + nt->OptionalHeader.ImageBase; + } else { + ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto out; + } + + if (device_path_length > 0) { + memcpy(image_load_event->device_path, device_path, + device_path_length); + } + + ret = tcg2_agile_log_append(pcr_index, event_type, &digest_list, + event_size, (u8 *)image_load_event); + +out: + free(image_load_event); + + return ret; +} + /** * efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event() - extend and optionally log events * @@ -758,24 +937,32 @@ efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event(struct efi_tcg2_protocol *this, u64 flags, /* * if PE_COFF_IMAGE is set we need to make sure the image is not * corrupted, verify it and hash the PE/COFF image in accordance with - * the procedure specified in "Calculating the PE Image Hash" - * section of the "Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature + * the procedure specified in "Calculating the PE Image Hash" + * section of the "Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature * Format" - * Not supported for now */ if (flags & PE_COFF_IMAGE) { - ret = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; - goto out; - } + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt;
- pcr_index = efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index; - event_type = efi_tcg_event->header.event_type; + ret = efi_check_pe((void *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, + (void **)&nt); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) { + log_err("Not a valid PE-COFF file\n"); + goto out; + }
- ret = tcg2_create_digest((u8 *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, - &digest_list); + ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image((void *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, + &digest_list); + } else { + ret = tcg2_create_digest((u8 *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, + &digest_list); + } if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) goto out;
+ pcr_index = efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index; + event_type = efi_tcg_event->header.event_type; + ret = tcg2_pcr_extend(dev, pcr_index, &digest_list); if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) goto out;
participants (3)
-
Heinrich Schuchardt
-
Masahisa Kojima
-
Takahiro Akashi