[U-Boot] [RESEND PATCH] core: ofnode: Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index
Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index function to fetch the address and size of the reg space based on index.
Signed-off-by: Keerthy j-keerthy@ti.com ---
Previous discussion can be found here:
* https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/999659/
drivers/core/ofnode.c | 13 ++++++++++--- include/dm/ofnode.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/core/ofnode.c b/drivers/core/ofnode.c index 785f5c3acf..5bb06d3b00 100644 --- a/drivers/core/ofnode.c +++ b/drivers/core/ofnode.c @@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ int ofnode_read_size(ofnode node, const char *propname) return -EINVAL; }
-fdt_addr_t ofnode_get_addr_index(ofnode node, int index) +fdt_addr_t ofnode_get_addr_size_index(ofnode node, int index, fdt_size_t *size) { int na, ns;
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ fdt_addr_t ofnode_get_addr_index(ofnode node, int index) uint flags;
prop_val = of_get_address(ofnode_to_np(node), index, - NULL, &flags); + (u64 *)size, &flags); if (!prop_val) return FDT_ADDR_T_NONE;
@@ -277,12 +277,19 @@ fdt_addr_t ofnode_get_addr_index(ofnode node, int index) ns = ofnode_read_simple_size_cells(ofnode_get_parent(node)); return fdtdec_get_addr_size_fixed(gd->fdt_blob, ofnode_to_offset(node), "reg", - index, na, ns, NULL, true); + index, na, ns, size, true); }
return FDT_ADDR_T_NONE; }
+fdt_addr_t ofnode_get_addr_index(ofnode node, int index) +{ + fdt_size_t size; + + return ofnode_get_addr_size_index(node, index, &size); +} + fdt_addr_t ofnode_get_addr(ofnode node) { return ofnode_get_addr_index(node, 0); diff --git a/include/dm/ofnode.h b/include/dm/ofnode.h index d206ee2caa..1be5ba4b45 100644 --- a/include/dm/ofnode.h +++ b/include/dm/ofnode.h @@ -354,6 +354,20 @@ ofnode ofnode_get_by_phandle(uint phandle); */ int ofnode_read_size(ofnode node, const char *propname);
+/** + * ofnode_get_addr_size_index() - get an address/size from a node + * based on index + * + * This reads the register address/size from a node based on index + * + * @node: node to read from + * @index: Index of address to read (0 for first) + * @size: Pointer to size of the address + * @return address, or FDT_ADDR_T_NONE if not present or invalid + */ +phys_addr_t ofnode_get_addr_size_index(ofnode node, int index, + fdt_size_t *size); + /** * ofnode_get_addr_index() - get an address from a node *
On Wed, 24 Apr 2019 at 05:49, Keerthy j-keerthy@ti.com wrote:
Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index function to fetch the address and size of the reg space based on index.
Signed-off-by: Keerthy j-keerthy@ti.com
Previous discussion can be found here:
drivers/core/ofnode.c | 13 ++++++++++--- include/dm/ofnode.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org
On Wed, 24 Apr 2019 at 17:59, Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org wrote:
On Wed, 24 Apr 2019 at 05:49, Keerthy j-keerthy@ti.com wrote:
Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index function to fetch the address and size of the reg space based on index.
Signed-off-by: Keerthy j-keerthy@ti.com
Previous discussion can be found here:
drivers/core/ofnode.c | 13 ++++++++++--- include/dm/ofnode.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org
Applied to u-boot-dm, thanks!
Hi All,
On Wed, Apr 24, 2019 at 05:19:53PM +0530, Keerthy wrote:
Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index function to fetch the address and size of the reg space based on index.
Signed-off-by: Keerthy j-keerthy@ti.com Reviewed-by: Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org
Previous discussion can be found here:
drivers/core/ofnode.c | 13 ++++++++++--- include/dm/ofnode.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
jFYI/FWIW, this patch, present in U-Boot/master as commit [1], revives the issue fixed in [2]. More precisely, when compiling the sandbox U-Boot with -fsanitize=address and linking it against -lasan, the following backtrace pops up during boot [3].
[1] https://gitlab.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/commit/e679d03b08fb ("core: ofnode: Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index") [2] https://gitlab.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/commit/9bfacf249b10 ("core: ofnode: Fix ASAN-reported stack-buffer-overflow in of_get_address") [3] The same issue as fixed in [2], now reproduced on v2019.07
==5996==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffc65f869a0 at pc 0x564834c6cd89 bp 0x7ffc65f867b0 sp 0x7ffc65f867a0 WRITE of size 8 at 0x7ffc65f869a0 thread T0 #0 0x564834c6cd88 in of_get_address drivers/core/of_addr.c:154 #1 0x564834c74fac in ofnode_get_addr_size_index drivers/core/ofnode.c:262 #2 0x564834c75232 in ofnode_get_addr_index drivers/core/ofnode.c:290 #3 0x564834d35a4f in sb_eth_ofdata_to_platdata drivers/net/sandbox.c:422 #4 0x564834c5ad22 in device_probe drivers/core/device.c:407 #5 0x564834f2f1c4 in eth_initialize net/eth-uclass.c:399 #6 0x564834bf9c34 in initr_net common/board_r.c:565 #7 0x564834bfa580 in initcall_run_list include/initcall.h:38 #8 0x564834bfa580 in board_init_r common/board_r.c:867 #9 0x564834b8156d in main arch/sandbox/cpu/start.c:362 #10 0x7f2fe7912b6a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x26b6a) #11 0x564834b85b29 in _start (/srv/R/u-boot-master/u-boot+0x792b29)
Address 0x7ffc65f869a0 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame #0 0x564834c751c4 in ofnode_get_addr_index drivers/core/ofnode.c:287
This frame has 1 object(s): [32, 36) 'size' (line 288) <== Memory access at offset 32 partially overflows this variable HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow drivers/core/of_addr.c:154 in of_get_address Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x10000cbe8ce0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8cf0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8d00: 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 04 f2 04 f3 f3 f3 00 00 0x10000cbe8d10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 0x10000cbe8d20: 04 f2 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x10000cbe8d30: f1 f1 f1 f1[04]f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8d40: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 0x10000cbe8d50: f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8d60: f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8d70: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==5996==ABORTING
Hi Keethy,
On Tue, 9 Jul 2019 at 13:38, Eugeniu Rosca roscaeugeniu@gmail.com wrote:
Hi All,
On Wed, Apr 24, 2019 at 05:19:53PM +0530, Keerthy wrote:
Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index function to fetch the address and size of the reg space based on index.
Signed-off-by: Keerthy j-keerthy@ti.com Reviewed-by: Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org
Previous discussion can be found here:
drivers/core/ofnode.c | 13 ++++++++++--- include/dm/ofnode.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
jFYI/FWIW, this patch, present in U-Boot/master as commit [1], revives the issue fixed in [2]. More precisely, when compiling the sandbox U-Boot with -fsanitize=address and linking it against -lasan, the following backtrace pops up during boot [3].
[1] https://gitlab.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/commit/e679d03b08fb ("core: ofnode: Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index") [2] https://gitlab.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/commit/9bfacf249b10 ("core: ofnode: Fix ASAN-reported stack-buffer-overflow in of_get_address") [3] The same issue as fixed in [2], now reproduced on v2019.07
==5996==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffc65f869a0 at pc 0x564834c6cd89 bp 0x7ffc65f867b0 sp 0x7ffc65f867a0 WRITE of size 8 at 0x7ffc65f869a0 thread T0 #0 0x564834c6cd88 in of_get_address drivers/core/of_addr.c:154 #1 0x564834c74fac in ofnode_get_addr_size_index drivers/core/ofnode.c:262 #2 0x564834c75232 in ofnode_get_addr_index drivers/core/ofnode.c:290 #3 0x564834d35a4f in sb_eth_ofdata_to_platdata drivers/net/sandbox.c:422 #4 0x564834c5ad22 in device_probe drivers/core/device.c:407 #5 0x564834f2f1c4 in eth_initialize net/eth-uclass.c:399 #6 0x564834bf9c34 in initr_net common/board_r.c:565 #7 0x564834bfa580 in initcall_run_list include/initcall.h:38 #8 0x564834bfa580 in board_init_r common/board_r.c:867 #9 0x564834b8156d in main arch/sandbox/cpu/start.c:362 #10 0x7f2fe7912b6a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x26b6a) #11 0x564834b85b29 in _start (/srv/R/u-boot-master/u-boot+0x792b29)
Address 0x7ffc65f869a0 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame #0 0x564834c751c4 in ofnode_get_addr_index drivers/core/ofnode.c:287
This frame has 1 object(s): [32, 36) 'size' (line 288) <== Memory access at offset 32 partially overflows this variable HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow drivers/core/of_addr.c:154 in of_get_address Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x10000cbe8ce0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8cf0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8d00: 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 04 f2 04 f3 f3 f3 00 00 0x10000cbe8d10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 0x10000cbe8d20: 04 f2 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x10000cbe8d30: f1 f1 f1 f1[04]f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8d40: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 0x10000cbe8d50: f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8d60: f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8d70: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==5996==ABORTING
Can you please take a look?
Regards, Simon
On 13/08/19 3:03 PM, Simon Glass wrote:
Hi Keethy,
On Tue, 9 Jul 2019 at 13:38, Eugeniu Rosca roscaeugeniu@gmail.com wrote:
Hi All,
On Wed, Apr 24, 2019 at 05:19:53PM +0530, Keerthy wrote:
Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index function to fetch the address and size of the reg space based on index.
Signed-off-by: Keerthy j-keerthy@ti.com Reviewed-by: Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org
Previous discussion can be found here:
drivers/core/ofnode.c | 13 ++++++++++--- include/dm/ofnode.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
jFYI/FWIW, this patch, present in U-Boot/master as commit [1], revives the issue fixed in [2]. More precisely, when compiling the sandbox U-Boot with -fsanitize=address and linking it against -lasan, the following backtrace pops up during boot [3].
[1] https://gitlab.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/commit/e679d03b08fb ("core: ofnode: Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index") [2] https://gitlab.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/commit/9bfacf249b10 ("core: ofnode: Fix ASAN-reported stack-buffer-overflow in of_get_address") [3] The same issue as fixed in [2], now reproduced on v2019.07
==5996==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffc65f869a0 at pc 0x564834c6cd89 bp 0x7ffc65f867b0 sp 0x7ffc65f867a0 WRITE of size 8 at 0x7ffc65f869a0 thread T0 #0 0x564834c6cd88 in of_get_address drivers/core/of_addr.c:154 #1 0x564834c74fac in ofnode_get_addr_size_index drivers/core/ofnode.c:262 #2 0x564834c75232 in ofnode_get_addr_index drivers/core/ofnode.c:290 #3 0x564834d35a4f in sb_eth_ofdata_to_platdata drivers/net/sandbox.c:422 #4 0x564834c5ad22 in device_probe drivers/core/device.c:407 #5 0x564834f2f1c4 in eth_initialize net/eth-uclass.c:399 #6 0x564834bf9c34 in initr_net common/board_r.c:565 #7 0x564834bfa580 in initcall_run_list include/initcall.h:38 #8 0x564834bfa580 in board_init_r common/board_r.c:867 #9 0x564834b8156d in main arch/sandbox/cpu/start.c:362 #10 0x7f2fe7912b6a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x26b6a) #11 0x564834b85b29 in _start (/srv/R/u-boot-master/u-boot+0x792b29)
Address 0x7ffc65f869a0 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame #0 0x564834c751c4 in ofnode_get_addr_index drivers/core/ofnode.c:287
This frame has 1 object(s): [32, 36) 'size' (line 288) <== Memory access at offset 32 partially overflows this variable HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow drivers/core/of_addr.c:154 in of_get_address Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x10000cbe8ce0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8cf0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8d00: 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 04 f2 04 f3 f3 f3 00 00 0x10000cbe8d10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 0x10000cbe8d20: 04 f2 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x10000cbe8d30: f1 f1 f1 f1[04]f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8d40: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 0x10000cbe8d50: f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8d60: f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8d70: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==5996==ABORTING
Can you please take a look?
Sure.
Regards, Simon
On 13/08/19 3:25 PM, Keerthy wrote:
On 13/08/19 3:03 PM, Simon Glass wrote:
Hi Keethy,
On Tue, 9 Jul 2019 at 13:38, Eugeniu Rosca roscaeugeniu@gmail.com wrote:
Hi All,
On Wed, Apr 24, 2019 at 05:19:53PM +0530, Keerthy wrote:
Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index function to fetch the address and size of the reg space based on index.
Signed-off-by: Keerthy j-keerthy@ti.com Reviewed-by: Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org
Previous discussion can be found here:
* https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/999659/
drivers/core/ofnode.c | 13 ++++++++++--- include/dm/ofnode.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
jFYI/FWIW, this patch, present in U-Boot/master as commit [1], revives the issue fixed in [2]. More precisely, when compiling the sandbox U-Boot with -fsanitize=address and linking it against -lasan, the following backtrace pops up during boot [3].
[1] https://gitlab.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/commit/e679d03b08fb ("core: ofnode: Add ofnode_get_addr_size_index") [2] https://gitlab.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/commit/9bfacf249b10 ("core: ofnode: Fix ASAN-reported stack-buffer-overflow in of_get_address") [3] The same issue as fixed in [2], now reproduced on v2019.07
==5996==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffc65f869a0 at pc 0x564834c6cd89 bp 0x7ffc65f867b0 sp 0x7ffc65f867a0 WRITE of size 8 at 0x7ffc65f869a0 thread T0 #0 0x564834c6cd88 in of_get_address drivers/core/of_addr.c:154 #1 0x564834c74fac in ofnode_get_addr_size_index drivers/core/ofnode.c:262 #2 0x564834c75232 in ofnode_get_addr_index drivers/core/ofnode.c:290 #3 0x564834d35a4f in sb_eth_ofdata_to_platdata drivers/net/sandbox.c:422 #4 0x564834c5ad22 in device_probe drivers/core/device.c:407 #5 0x564834f2f1c4 in eth_initialize net/eth-uclass.c:399 #6 0x564834bf9c34 in initr_net common/board_r.c:565 #7 0x564834bfa580 in initcall_run_list include/initcall.h:38 #8 0x564834bfa580 in board_init_r common/board_r.c:867 #9 0x564834b8156d in main arch/sandbox/cpu/start.c:362 #10 0x7f2fe7912b6a in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x26b6a) #11 0x564834b85b29 in _start (/srv/R/u-boot-master/u-boot+0x792b29)
Address 0x7ffc65f869a0 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame #0 0x564834c751c4 in ofnode_get_addr_index drivers/core/ofnode.c:287
This frame has 1 object(s): [32, 36) 'size' (line 288) <== Memory access at offset 32 partially overflows this variable HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow drivers/core/of_addr.c:154 in of_get_address Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x10000cbe8ce0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8cf0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8d00: 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 04 f2 04 f3 f3 f3 00 00 0x10000cbe8d10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 0x10000cbe8d20: 04 f2 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x10000cbe8d30: f1 f1 f1 f1[04]f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8d40: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 0x10000cbe8d50: f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8d60: f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8d70: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x10000cbe8d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==5996==ABORTING
Can you please take a look?
Sure.
Eugeniu,
Could you kindly help me with the steps to reproduce the issue?
I am sending out a fix patch to convert all the size instances to fdt_size_t type.
I have posted: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1146830/
I believe the above should fix the size mismatch.
Regards, Keerthy
Regards, Simon
U-Boot mailing list U-Boot@lists.denx.de https://lists.denx.de/listinfo/u-boot
Hi Keerthy,
On Wed, Aug 14, 2019 at 01:53:50PM +0530, Keerthy wrote:
Eugeniu,
Could you kindly help me with the steps to reproduce the issue?
Sure. My pleasure. See [0].
I am sending out a fix patch to convert all the size instances to fdt_size_t type.
I have posted: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1146830/
I believe the above should fix the size mismatch.
The patch appears to fix the problem. Thanks!
[0] Steps to reproduce the issue reported in https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1090094/#2212555
* Apply patch [1] to u-boot/master * u-boot (master) gcc --version gcc (Ubuntu 7.4.0-1ubuntu1~16.04~ppa1) 7.4.0 * u-boot (master) make defconfig all -j12 * u-boot (master) ./u-boot -d arch/sandbox/dts/test.dtb
[1] Dirty patch to enable ASAN in sandbox U-Boot (v2019.10-rc2):
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 3b0864ae8eaa..b8ef4f267ed5 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ KBUILD_CPPFLAGS := -D__KERNEL__ -D__UBOOT__
KBUILD_CFLAGS := -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes \ -Wno-format-security \ - -fno-builtin -ffreestanding $(CSTD_FLAG) + -fno-builtin -ffreestanding $(CSTD_FLAG) -fsanitize=address KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar -fno-strict-aliasing KBUILD_AFLAGS := -D__ASSEMBLY__
@@ -768,6 +768,7 @@ PLATFORM_LIBGCC = arch/$(ARCH)/lib/lib.a else PLATFORM_LIBGCC := -L $(shell dirname `$(CC) $(c_flags) -print-libgcc-file-name`) -lgcc endif +PLATFORM_LIBS := -lasan $(PLATFORM_LIBS) PLATFORM_LIBS += $(PLATFORM_LIBGCC)
ifdef CONFIG_CC_COVERAGE
On 14/08/19 3:17 PM, Eugeniu Rosca wrote:
Hi Keerthy,
On Wed, Aug 14, 2019 at 01:53:50PM +0530, Keerthy wrote:
Eugeniu,
Could you kindly help me with the steps to reproduce the issue?
Sure. My pleasure. See [0].
I am sending out a fix patch to convert all the size instances to fdt_size_t type.
I have posted: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1146830/
I believe the above should fix the size mismatch.
The patch appears to fix the problem. Thanks!
Thanks for testing it. If all your tests have passed please post your Tested-by on that patch.
[0] Steps to reproduce the issue reported in https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1090094/#2212555
Thanks for the instructions. I will make sure i test this before posting any patch related to drivers/core/of
Best Regards, Keerthy
- Apply patch [1] to u-boot/master
- u-boot (master) gcc --version
gcc (Ubuntu 7.4.0-1ubuntu1~16.04~ppa1) 7.4.0
- u-boot (master) make defconfig all -j12
- u-boot (master) ./u-boot -d arch/sandbox/dts/test.dtb
[1] Dirty patch to enable ASAN in sandbox U-Boot (v2019.10-rc2):
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 3b0864ae8eaa..b8ef4f267ed5 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ KBUILD_CPPFLAGS := -D__KERNEL__ -D__UBOOT__
KBUILD_CFLAGS := -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes \ -Wno-format-security \
-fno-builtin -ffreestanding $(CSTD_FLAG)
-fno-builtin -ffreestanding $(CSTD_FLAG) -fsanitize=address@@ -768,6 +768,7 @@ PLATFORM_LIBGCC = arch/$(ARCH)/lib/lib.a else PLATFORM_LIBGCC := -L $(shell dirname `$(CC) $(c_flags) -print-libgcc-file-name`) -lgcc endif +PLATFORM_LIBS := -lasan $(PLATFORM_LIBS) PLATFORM_LIBS += $(PLATFORM_LIBGCC)
ifdef CONFIG_CC_COVERAGE
participants (4)
-
Eugeniu Rosca -
Eugeniu Rosca -
Keerthy -
Simon Glass