[PATCH v6 0/8] ATF and OP-TEE Firewalling for K3 devices.
K3 devices have firewalls that are used to prevent illegal accesses to memory regions that are deemed secure. The series prevents the illegal accesses to ATF and OP-TEE regions that are present in different K3 devices.
AM62X, AM62AX and AM64X are currently in hold due to some firewall configurations that our System Controller (TIFS) needs to handle. The devices that are not configured with the firewalling nodes will not be affected and can continue to work fine until the firewall nodes are added so will be a non-blocking merge.
Test Logs: https://gist.github.com/manorit2001/c929e6ccab03f55b3828896fbd04184b CICD Run: https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/pull/442
Signed-off-by: Manorit Chawdhry m-chawdhry@ti.com --- Changes in v6: - Rebase on -next - Link to v5: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231113-binman-firewalling-v5-0-b3ba6f839606@ti.c...
--- Manorit Chawdhry (8): binman: ti-secure: Add support for firewalling entities binman: ftest: Add test for ti-secure firewall node binman: k3: Add k3-security.h and include it in k3-binman.dtsi binman: j721e: Add firewall configurations binman: j721s2: Add firewall configurations binman: j7200: Add firewall configurations docs: k3: Cleanup FIT signature documentation docs: k3: Add secure booting documentation
arch/arm/dts/k3-binman.dtsi | 2 + arch/arm/dts/k3-j7200-binman.dtsi | 152 ++++++++++ arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi | 196 +++++++++++++ arch/arm/dts/k3-j721s2-binman.dtsi | 217 ++++++++++++++ arch/arm/dts/k3-security.h | 58 ++++ doc/board/ti/k3.rst | 315 ++++++++++++++------- tools/binman/btool/openssl.py | 16 +- tools/binman/etype/ti_secure.py | 95 +++++++ tools/binman/etype/x509_cert.py | 4 +- tools/binman/ftest.py | 23 ++ tools/binman/test/324_ti_secure_firewall.dts | 28 ++ .../325_ti_secure_firewall_missing_property.dts | 28 ++ 12 files changed, 1032 insertions(+), 102 deletions(-) --- base-commit: d379150621a5dbe7929b43d184cb51bb8c3ec4cb change-id: 20230724-binman-firewalling-65ecdb23ec0a
Best regards,
We can now firewall entities while loading them through our secure entity TIFS, the required information should be present in the certificate that is being parsed by TIFS.
The following commit adds the support to enable the certificates to be generated if the firewall configurations are present in the binman dtsi nodes.
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Manorit Chawdhry m-chawdhry@ti.com --- tools/binman/btool/openssl.py | 16 ++++++- tools/binman/etype/ti_secure.py | 95 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/binman/etype/x509_cert.py | 4 +- 3 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/binman/btool/openssl.py b/tools/binman/btool/openssl.py index 7ee2683ab236..fe81a1f51b1e 100644 --- a/tools/binman/btool/openssl.py +++ b/tools/binman/btool/openssl.py @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ imageSize = INTEGER:{len(indata)} return self.run_cmd(*args)
def x509_cert_sysfw(self, cert_fname, input_fname, key_fname, sw_rev, - config_fname, req_dist_name_dict): + config_fname, req_dist_name_dict, firewall_cert_data): """Create a certificate to be booted by system firmware
Args: @@ -94,6 +94,13 @@ imageSize = INTEGER:{len(indata)} req_dist_name_dict (dict): Dictionary containing key-value pairs of req_distinguished_name section extensions, must contain extensions for C, ST, L, O, OU, CN and emailAddress + firewall_cert_data (dict): + - auth_in_place (int): The Priv ID for copying as the + specific host in firewall protected region + - num_firewalls (int): The number of firewalls in the + extended certificate + - certificate (str): Extended firewall certificate with + the information for the firewall configurations.
Returns: str: Tool output @@ -121,6 +128,7 @@ basicConstraints = CA:true 1.3.6.1.4.1.294.1.3 = ASN1:SEQUENCE:swrv 1.3.6.1.4.1.294.1.34 = ASN1:SEQUENCE:sysfw_image_integrity 1.3.6.1.4.1.294.1.35 = ASN1:SEQUENCE:sysfw_image_load +1.3.6.1.4.1.294.1.37 = ASN1:SEQUENCE:firewall
[ swrv ] swrv = INTEGER:{sw_rev} @@ -132,7 +140,11 @@ imageSize = INTEGER:{len(indata)}
[ sysfw_image_load ] destAddr = FORMAT:HEX,OCT:00000000 -authInPlace = INTEGER:2 +authInPlace = INTEGER:{hex(firewall_cert_data['auth_in_place'])} + +[ firewall ] +numFirewallRegions = INTEGER:{firewall_cert_data['num_firewalls']} +{firewall_cert_data['certificate']} ''', file=outf) args = ['req', '-new', '-x509', '-key', key_fname, '-nodes', '-outform', 'DER', '-out', cert_fname, '-config', config_fname, diff --git a/tools/binman/etype/ti_secure.py b/tools/binman/etype/ti_secure.py index d939dce57139..ba36257d86a1 100644 --- a/tools/binman/etype/ti_secure.py +++ b/tools/binman/etype/ti_secure.py @@ -7,9 +7,44 @@
from binman.entry import EntryArg from binman.etype.x509_cert import Entry_x509_cert +from dataclasses import dataclass
from dtoc import fdt_util
+@dataclass +class Firewall(): + id: int + region: int + control : int + permissions: list[hex] + start_address: str + end_address: str + + def ensure_props(self, etype, name): + missing_props = [] + for key, val in self.__dict__.items(): + if val is None: + missing_props += [key] + + if len(missing_props): + etype.Raise(f"Subnode '{name}' is missing properties: {','.join(missing_props)}") + + def get_certificate(self) -> str: + unique_identifier = f"{self.id}{self.region}" + cert = f""" +firewallID{unique_identifier} = INTEGER:{self.id} +region{unique_identifier} = INTEGER:{self.region} +control{unique_identifier} = INTEGER:{hex(self.control)} +nPermissionRegs{unique_identifier} = INTEGER:{len(self.permissions)} +""" + for index, permission in enumerate(self.permissions): + cert += f"""permissions{unique_identifier}{index} = INTEGER:{hex(permission)} +""" + cert += f"""startAddress{unique_identifier} = FORMAT:HEX,OCT:{self.start_address:02x} +endAddress{unique_identifier} = FORMAT:HEX,OCT:{self.end_address:02x} +""" + return cert + class Entry_ti_secure(Entry_x509_cert): """Entry containing a TI x509 certificate binary
@@ -17,6 +52,11 @@ class Entry_ti_secure(Entry_x509_cert): - content: List of phandles to entries to sign - keyfile: Filename of file containing key to sign binary with - sha: Hash function to be used for signing + - auth-in-place: This is an integer field that contains two pieces + of information + Lower Byte - Remains 0x02 as per our use case + ( 0x02: Move the authenticated binary back to the header ) + Upper Byte - The Host ID of the core owning the firewall
Output files: - input.<unique_name> - input file passed to openssl @@ -25,6 +65,35 @@ class Entry_ti_secure(Entry_x509_cert): - cert.<unique_name> - output file generated by openssl (which is used as the entry contents)
+ Depending on auth-in-place information in the inputs, we read the + firewall nodes that describe the configurations of firewall that TIFS + will be doing after reading the certificate. + + The syntax of the firewall nodes are as such: + + firewall-257-0 { + id = <257>; /* The ID of the firewall being configured */ + region = <0>; /* Region number to configure */ + + control = /* The control register */ + <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | FWCTRL_BG | FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + + permissions = /* The permission registers */ + <((FWPRIVID_ALL << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + + /* More defines can be found in k3-security.h */ + + start_address = /* The Start Address of the firewall */ + <0x0 0x0>; + end_address = /* The End Address of the firewall */ + <0xff 0xffffffff>; + }; + + openssl signs the provided data, using the TI templated config file and writes the signature in this entry. This allows verification that the data is genuine. @@ -32,11 +101,20 @@ class Entry_ti_secure(Entry_x509_cert): def __init__(self, section, etype, node): super().__init__(section, etype, node) self.openssl = None + self.firewall_cert_data: dict = { + 'auth_in_place': 0x02, + 'num_firewalls': 0, + 'certificate': '', + }
def ReadNode(self): super().ReadNode() self.key_fname = self.GetEntryArgsOrProps([ EntryArg('keyfile', str)], required=True)[0] + auth_in_place = fdt_util.GetInt(self._node, 'auth-in-place') + if auth_in_place: + self.firewall_cert_data['auth_in_place'] = auth_in_place + self.ReadFirewallNode() self.sha = fdt_util.GetInt(self._node, 'sha', 512) self.req_dist_name = {'C': 'US', 'ST': 'TX', @@ -46,6 +124,23 @@ class Entry_ti_secure(Entry_x509_cert): 'CN': 'TI Support', 'emailAddress': 'support@ti.com'}
+ def ReadFirewallNode(self): + self.firewall_cert_data['certificate'] = "" + self.firewall_cert_data['num_firewalls'] = 0 + for node in self._node.subnodes: + if 'firewall' in node.name: + firewall = Firewall( + fdt_util.GetInt(node, 'id'), + fdt_util.GetInt(node, 'region'), + fdt_util.GetInt(node, 'control'), + fdt_util.GetPhandleList(node, 'permissions'), + fdt_util.GetInt64(node, 'start_address'), + fdt_util.GetInt64(node, 'end_address'), + ) + firewall.ensure_props(self, node.name) + self.firewall_cert_data['num_firewalls'] += 1 + self.firewall_cert_data['certificate'] += firewall.get_certificate() + def GetCertificate(self, required): """Get the contents of this entry
diff --git a/tools/binman/etype/x509_cert.py b/tools/binman/etype/x509_cert.py index fc0bb1227867..29630d1b86c8 100644 --- a/tools/binman/etype/x509_cert.py +++ b/tools/binman/etype/x509_cert.py @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ class Entry_x509_cert(Entry_collection): self.hashval_sysfw_data = None self.sysfw_inner_cert_ext_boot_block = None self.dm_data_ext_boot_block = None + self.firewall_cert_data = None
def ReadNode(self): super().ReadNode() @@ -98,7 +99,8 @@ class Entry_x509_cert(Entry_collection): key_fname=self.key_fname, config_fname=config_fname, sw_rev=self.sw_rev, - req_dist_name_dict=self.req_dist_name) + req_dist_name_dict=self.req_dist_name, + firewall_cert_data=self.firewall_cert_data) elif type == 'rom': stdout = self.openssl.x509_cert_rom( cert_fname=output_fname,
Add test for TI firewalling node in ti-secure.
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Manorit Chawdhry m-chawdhry@ti.com --- tools/binman/ftest.py | 23 ++++++++++++++++++ tools/binman/test/324_ti_secure_firewall.dts | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++ .../325_ti_secure_firewall_missing_property.dts | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/binman/ftest.py b/tools/binman/ftest.py index 5ace2a825dc5..d526ef705a13 100644 --- a/tools/binman/ftest.py +++ b/tools/binman/ftest.py @@ -7035,6 +7035,29 @@ fdt fdtmap Extract the devicetree blob from the fdtmap entry_args=entry_args)[0] self.assertGreater(len(data), len(TI_UNSECURE_DATA))
+ def testPackTiSecureFirewall(self): + """Test that an image with a TI secured binary can be created""" + keyfile = self.TestFile('key.key') + entry_args = { + 'keyfile': keyfile, + } + data_no_firewall = self._DoReadFileDtb('296_ti_secure.dts', + entry_args=entry_args)[0] + data_firewall = self._DoReadFileDtb('324_ti_secure_firewall.dts', + entry_args=entry_args)[0] + self.assertGreater(len(data_firewall),len(data_no_firewall)) + + def testPackTiSecureFirewallMissingProperty(self): + """Test that an image with a TI secured binary can be created""" + keyfile = self.TestFile('key.key') + entry_args = { + 'keyfile': keyfile, + } + with self.assertRaises(ValueError) as e: + data_firewall = self._DoReadFileDtb('325_ti_secure_firewall_missing_property.dts', + entry_args=entry_args)[0] + self.assertRegex(str(e.exception), "Node '/binman/ti-secure': Subnode 'firewall-0-2' is missing properties: id,region") + def testPackTiSecureMissingTool(self): """Test that an image with a TI secured binary (non-functional) can be created when openssl is missing""" diff --git a/tools/binman/test/324_ti_secure_firewall.dts b/tools/binman/test/324_ti_secure_firewall.dts new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7ec407fa67ba --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/binman/test/324_ti_secure_firewall.dts @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ + +/dts-v1/; + +/ { + #address-cells = <1>; + #size-cells = <1>; + + binman { + ti-secure { + content = <&unsecure_binary>; + auth-in-place = <0xa02>; + + firewall-0-2 { + id = <0>; + region = <2>; + control = <0x31a>; + permissions = <0xc3ffff>; + start_address = <0x0 0x9e800000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x9fffffff>; + }; + + }; + unsecure_binary: blob-ext { + filename = "ti_unsecure.bin"; + }; + }; +}; diff --git a/tools/binman/test/325_ti_secure_firewall_missing_property.dts b/tools/binman/test/325_ti_secure_firewall_missing_property.dts new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..24a0a9962503 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/binman/test/325_ti_secure_firewall_missing_property.dts @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ + +/dts-v1/; + +/ { + #address-cells = <1>; + #size-cells = <1>; + + binman { + ti-secure { + content = <&unsecure_binary>; + auth-in-place = <0xa02>; + + firewall-0-2 { + // id = <0>; + // region = <2>; + control = <0x31a>; + permissions = <0xc3ffff>; + start_address = <0x0 0x9e800000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x9fffffff>; + }; + + }; + unsecure_binary: blob-ext { + filename = "ti_unsecure.bin"; + }; + }; +};
For readability during configuring firewalls, adding k3-security.h file and including it in k3-binman.dtsi to be accessible across K3 SoCs
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Manorit Chawdhry m-chawdhry@ti.com --- arch/arm/dts/k3-binman.dtsi | 2 ++ arch/arm/dts/k3-security.h | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/dts/k3-binman.dtsi b/arch/arm/dts/k3-binman.dtsi index c7513e1a5dd7..b160192d18bf 100644 --- a/arch/arm/dts/k3-binman.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/dts/k3-binman.dtsi @@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ * Copyright (C) 2022-2023 Texas Instruments Incorporated - https://www.ti.com/ */
+#include "k3-security.h" + / { binman: binman { multiple-images; diff --git a/arch/arm/dts/k3-security.h b/arch/arm/dts/k3-security.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..33609caa8fb5 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm/dts/k3-security.h @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2023 Texas Instruments Incorporated - https://www.ti.com/ + */ + +#ifndef DTS_ARM64_TI_K3_FIREWALL_H +#define DTS_ARM64_TI_K3_FIREWALL_H + +#define FWPRIVID_ALL 0xc3 +#define FWPRIVID_ARMV8 1 +#define FWPRIVID_SHIFT 16 + +#define FWCTRL_EN 0xA +#define FWCTRL_LOCK (1 << 4) +#define FWCTRL_BG (1 << 8) +#define FWCTRL_CACHE (1 << 9) + +#define FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_WRITE (1 << 0) +#define FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_READ (1 << 1) +#define FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_CACHEABLE (1 << 2) +#define FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_DEBUG (1 << 3) + +#define FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD (FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_READ | \ + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_WRITE | \ + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_CACHEABLE | \ + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_DEBUG) + +#define FWPERM_SECURE_USER_WRITE (1 << 4) +#define FWPERM_SECURE_USER_READ (1 << 5) +#define FWPERM_SECURE_USER_CACHEABLE (1 << 6) +#define FWPERM_SECURE_USER_DEBUG (1 << 7) + +#define FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD (FWPERM_SECURE_USER_READ | \ + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_WRITE | \ + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_CACHEABLE | \ + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_DEBUG) + +#define FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_WRITE (1 << 8) +#define FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_READ (1 << 9) +#define FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_CACHEABLE (1 << 10) +#define FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_DEBUG (1 << 11) + +#define FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD (FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_READ | \ + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_WRITE | \ + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_CACHEABLE | \ + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_DEBUG) + +#define FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_WRITE (1 << 12) +#define FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_READ (1 << 13) +#define FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_CACHEABLE (1 << 14) +#define FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_DEBUG (1 << 15) + +#define FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_RWCD (FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_READ | \ + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_WRITE | \ + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_CACHEABLE | \ + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_DEBUG) + +#endif
The following commits adds the configuration of firewalls required to protect ATF and OP-TEE memory region from non-secure reads and writes using master and slave firewalls present in our K3 SOCs.
Signed-off-by: Manorit Chawdhry m-chawdhry@ti.com --- arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi | 196 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 196 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi b/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi index 5ddb474e3a41..f428aa81a6c1 100644 --- a/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi @@ -146,6 +146,202 @@
fit { images { + atf { + ti-secure { + auth-in-place = <0xa02>; + + firewall-257-0 { + /* cpu_0_cpu_0_msmc Background Firewall */ + id = <257>; + region = <0>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_BG | FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ALL << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x0>; + end_address = <0xff 0xffffffff>; + }; + + firewall-257-1 { + /* cpu_0_cpu_0_msmc Foreground Firewall */ + id = <257>; + region = <1>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x70000000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x7001ffff>; + }; + + firewall-284-0 { + /* dru_0_msmc Background Firewall */ + id = <284>; + region = <0>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_BG | FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ALL << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x0>; + end_address = <0xff 0xffffffff>; + }; + + firewall-284-1 { + /* dru_0_msmc Foreground Firewall */ + id = <284>; + region = <1>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x70000000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x7001ffff>; + }; + + /* firewall-4760-0 { + * nb_slv0__mem0 Background Firewall + * Already configured by the secure entity + * }; + */ + + firewall-4760-1 { + /* nb_slv0__mem0 Foreground Firewall */ + id = <4760>; + region = <1>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x70000000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x7001ffff>; + }; + + /* firewall-4761-0 { + * nb_slv1__mem0 Background Firewall + * Already configured by the secure entity + * }; + */ + + firewall-4761-1 { + /* nb_slv1__mem0 Foreground Firewall */ + id = <4761>; + region = <1>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x70000000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x7001ffff>; + }; + + }; + }; + + tee { + ti-secure { + auth-in-place = <0xa02>; + + /* cpu_0_cpu_0_msmc region 0 and 1 configured + * during ATF Firewalling + */ + + firewall-257-2 { + /* cpu_0_cpu_0_msmc Foreground Firewall */ + id = <257>; + region = <2>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x9e800000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x9fffffff>; + }; + + /* dru_0_msmc region 0 and 1 configured + * during ATF Firewalling + */ + + firewall-284-2 { + /* dru_0_msmc Foreground Firewall */ + id = <284>; + region = <2>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x9e800000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x9fffffff>; + }; + + firewall-4762-0 { + /* nb_slv2__mem0 Background Firewall */ + id = <4762>; + region = <0>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_BG | FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ALL << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x0>; + end_address = <0xff 0xffffffff>; + }; + + firewall-4762-1 { + /* nb_slv2__mem0 Foreground Firewall */ + id = <4762>; + region = <1>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x9e800000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x9fffffff>; + }; + + firewall-4763-0 { + /* nb_slv3__mem0 Background Firewall */ + id = <4763>; + region = <0>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_BG | FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ALL << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x0>; + end_address = <0xff 0xffffffff>; + }; + + firewall-4763-1 { + /* nb_slv3__mem0 Foreground Firewall */ + id = <4763>; + region = <1>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x9e800000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x9fffffff>; + }; + }; + }; dm { ti-secure { content = <&dm>;
On 12/6/23 3:51 AM, Manorit Chawdhry wrote:
The following commits adds the configuration of firewalls required to protect ATF and OP-TEE memory region from non-secure reads and writes using master and slave firewalls present in our K3 SOCs.
Signed-off-by: Manorit Chawdhry m-chawdhry@ti.com
arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi | 196 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 196 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi b/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi index 5ddb474e3a41..f428aa81a6c1 100644 --- a/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi @@ -146,6 +146,202 @@
fit { images {
atf {ti-secure {auth-in-place = <0xa02>;firewall-257-0 {/* cpu_0_cpu_0_msmc Background Firewall */id = <257>;region = <0>;control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK |FWCTRL_BG | FWCTRL_CACHE)>;permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ALL << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) |FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD |FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD |FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD |FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>;start_address = <0x0 0x0>;end_address = <0xff 0xffffffff>;};firewall-257-1 {/* cpu_0_cpu_0_msmc Foreground Firewall */id = <257>;region = <1>;control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK |FWCTRL_CACHE)>;permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) |FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD |FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>;start_address = <0x0 0x70000000>;
7 levels of indentation, impressive :)
This start address should always match CONFIG_K3_ATF_LOAD_ADDR, any way you can just use that here?
Also this seems like a lot to add for each SoC, and much of it looks similar (at least for Jacinto class devices), could be an opportunity for templating.
Andrew
end_address = <0x0 0x7001ffff>;};
Hi Andrew,
On 10:23-20231206, Andrew Davis wrote:
On 12/6/23 3:51 AM, Manorit Chawdhry wrote:
The following commits adds the configuration of firewalls required to protect ATF and OP-TEE memory region from non-secure reads and writes using master and slave firewalls present in our K3 SOCs.
Signed-off-by: Manorit Chawdhry m-chawdhry@ti.com
arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi | 196 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 196 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi b/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi index 5ddb474e3a41..f428aa81a6c1 100644 --- a/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi @@ -146,6 +146,202 @@ fit { images {
atf {ti-secure {auth-in-place = <0xa02>;firewall-257-0 {/* cpu_0_cpu_0_msmc Background Firewall */id = <257>;region = <0>;control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK |FWCTRL_BG | FWCTRL_CACHE)>;permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ALL << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) |FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD |FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD |FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD |FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>;start_address = <0x0 0x0>;end_address = <0xff 0xffffffff>;};firewall-257-1 {/* cpu_0_cpu_0_msmc Foreground Firewall */id = <257>;region = <1>;control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK |FWCTRL_CACHE)>;permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) |FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD |FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>;start_address = <0x0 0x70000000>;7 levels of indentation, impressive :)
Couldn't figure out a better way..
This start address should always match CONFIG_K3_ATF_LOAD_ADDR, any way you can just use that here?
I am hesitant to use that tbh... slave firewalls are also being configured and changing the ATF address just directly and thinking everything can work as is is not the way firewalling is going forward with, any other better suggestion as to how I can handle that?
Also this seems like a lot to add for each SoC, and much of it looks similar (at least for Jacinto class devices), could be an opportunity for templating.
Just talked to Neha about this, have some insights and will try them for next revision if they work well. Thanks!
Regards, Manorit
Andrew
end_address = <0x0 0x7001ffff>;};
The following commits adds the configuration of firewalls required to protect ATF and OP-TEE memory region from non-secure reads and writes using master and slave firewalls present in our K3 SOCs.
Signed-off-by: Manorit Chawdhry m-chawdhry@ti.com --- arch/arm/dts/k3-j721s2-binman.dtsi | 217 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 217 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721s2-binman.dtsi b/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721s2-binman.dtsi index 3922007b3b7a..72d54635f4e1 100644 --- a/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721s2-binman.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721s2-binman.dtsi @@ -159,6 +159,223 @@
fit { images { + atf { + ti-secure { + auth-in-place = <0xa02>; + + firewall-257-0 { + /* cpu_0_cpu_0_msmc Background Firewall */ + id = <257>; + region = <0>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_BG | FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ALL << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x0>; + end_address = <0xff 0xffffffff>; + }; + + firewall-257-1 { + /* cpu_0_cpu_0_msmc Foreground Firewall */ + id = <257>; + region = <1>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x70000000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x7001ffff>; + }; + + firewall-284-0 { + /* dru_0_msmc Background Firewall */ + id = <284>; + region = <0>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_BG | FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ALL << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x0>; + end_address = <0xff 0xffffffff>; + }; + + firewall-284-1 { + /* dru_0_msmc Foreground Firewall */ + id = <284>; + region = <1>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x70000000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x7001ffff>; + }; + + /* firewall-5140-0 { + * nb_slv0__mem0 Background Firewall + * Already configured by the secure entity + * }; + */ + + firewall-5140-1 { + /* nb_slv0__mem0 Foreground Firewall */ + id = <5140>; + region = <1>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x70000000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x7001ffff>; + }; + + /* firewall-5140-0 { + * nb_slv1__mem0 Background Firewall + * Already configured by the secure entity + * }; + */ + + firewall-5141-1 { + /* nb_slv1__mem0 Foreground Firewall */ + id = <5141>; + region = <1>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x70000000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x7001ffff>; + }; + + }; + }; + + tee { + ti-secure { + auth-in-place = <0xa02>; + + firewall-257-2 { + /* cpu_0_cpu_0_msmc Foreground Firewall */ + id = <257>; + region = <2>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x9e800000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x9fffffff>; + }; + + firewall-284-2 { + /* dru_0_msmc Foreground Firewall */ + id = <284>; + region = <2>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x9e800000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x9fffffff>; + }; + + firewall-5142-0 { + /* nb_slv2__mem0 Background Firewall - 0 */ + id = <5142>; + region = <0>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_BG | FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ALL << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x0>; + end_address = <0xff 0xffffffff>; + }; + + firewall-5142-1 { + /* nb_slv2__mem0 Foreground Firewall */ + id = <5142>; + region = <1>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x9e800000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x9fffffff>; + }; + + firewall-5143-0 { + /* nb_slv3__mem0 Background Firewall - 0 */ + id = <5143>; + region = <0>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_BG | FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ALL << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x0>; + end_address = <0xff 0xffffffff>; + }; + + firewall-5143-1 { + /* nb_slv3__mem0 Foreground Firewall */ + id = <5143>; + region = <1>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x9e800000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x9fffffff>; + }; + + firewall-5144-0 { + /* nb_slv4__mem0 Background Firewall - 0 */ + id = <5144>; + region = <0>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_BG | FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ALL << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x0>; + end_address = <0xff 0xffffffff>; + }; + + firewall-5144-1 { + /* nb_slv4__mem0 Foreground Firewall */ + id = <5144>; + region = <1>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x9e800000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x9fffffff>; + }; + + }; + }; dm { ti-secure { content = <&dm>;
Hi Manorit,
On Wed, Dec 6, 2023 at 9:51 AM Manorit Chawdhry m-chawdhry@ti.com wrote:
The following commits adds the configuration of firewalls required to protect ATF and OP-TEE memory region from non-secure reads and writes using master and slave firewalls present in our K3 SOCs.
Signed-off-by: Manorit Chawdhry m-chawdhry@ti.com
arch/arm/dts/k3-j721s2-binman.dtsi | 217 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 217 insertions(+)
Just a minor point, but could you please reserve the 'binman' tag for patches in tools/binman ?
Thanks, Simon
Hi Simon,
On 09:50-20231226, Simon Glass wrote:
Hi Manorit,
On Wed, Dec 6, 2023 at 9:51 AM Manorit Chawdhry m-chawdhry@ti.com wrote:
The following commits adds the configuration of firewalls required to protect ATF and OP-TEE memory region from non-secure reads and writes using master and slave firewalls present in our K3 SOCs.
Signed-off-by: Manorit Chawdhry m-chawdhry@ti.com
arch/arm/dts/k3-j721s2-binman.dtsi | 217 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 217 insertions(+)
Just a minor point, but could you please reserve the 'binman' tag for patches in tools/binman ?
Sure, would do the needful!
Thanks and regards, Manorit
Thanks, Simon
The following commits adds the configuration of firewalls required to protect ATF and OP-TEE memory region from non-secure reads and writes using master and slave firewalls present in our K3 SOCs.
Signed-off-by: Manorit Chawdhry m-chawdhry@ti.com --- arch/arm/dts/k3-j7200-binman.dtsi | 152 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 152 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/dts/k3-j7200-binman.dtsi b/arch/arm/dts/k3-j7200-binman.dtsi index 10c9d6cba7aa..efd7dd33b9ac 100644 --- a/arch/arm/dts/k3-j7200-binman.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/dts/k3-j7200-binman.dtsi @@ -195,6 +195,158 @@
fit { images { + atf { + ti-secure { + auth-in-place = <0xa02>; + + firewall-257-0 { + /* cpu_0_cpu_0_msmc Background Firewall */ + id = <257>; + region = <0>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_BG | FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ALL << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x0>; + end_address = <0xff 0xffffffff>; + }; + + firewall-257-1 { + /* cpu_0_cpu_0_msmc Foreground Firewall */ + id = <257>; + region = <1>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x70000000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x7001ffff>; + }; + + /* firewall-4760-0 { + * nb_slv0__mem0 Background Firewall + * Already configured by the secure entity + * }; + */ + + firewall-4760-1 { + /* nb_slv0__mem0 Foreground Firewall */ + id = <4760>; + region = <1>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x70000000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x7001ffff>; + }; + + /* firewall-4761-0 { + * nb_slv1__mem0 Background Firewall + * Already configured by the secure entity + * }; + */ + + firewall-4761-1 { + /* nb_slv1__mem0 Foreground Firewall */ + id = <4761>; + region = <1>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x70000000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x7001ffff>; + }; + + }; + }; + + tee { + ti-secure { + auth-in-place = <0xa02>; + + /* cpu_0_cpu_0_msmc region 0 and 1 configured + * during ATF Firewalling + */ + + firewall-257-2 { + /* cpu_0_cpu_0_msmc Foreground Firewall */ + id = <257>; + region = <2>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x9e800000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x9fffffff>; + }; + + firewall-4762-0 { + /* nb_slv2__mem0 Background Firewall - 0 */ + id = <4762>; + region = <0>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_BG | FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ALL << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x0>; + end_address = <0xff 0xffffffff>; + }; + + firewall-4762-1 { + /* nb_slv2__mem0 Foreground Firewall */ + id = <4762>; + region = <1>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x9e800000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x9fffffff>; + }; + + firewall-4763-0 { + /* nb_slv3__mem0 Background Firewall - 0 */ + id = <4763>; + region = <0>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_BG | FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ALL << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_NON_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x0>; + end_address = <0xff 0xffffffff>; + }; + + firewall-4763-1 { + /* nb_slv3__mem0 Foreground Firewall */ + id = <4763>; + region = <1>; + control = <(FWCTRL_EN | FWCTRL_LOCK | + FWCTRL_CACHE)>; + permissions = <((FWPRIVID_ARMV8 << FWPRIVID_SHIFT) | + FWPERM_SECURE_PRIV_RWCD | + FWPERM_SECURE_USER_RWCD)>; + start_address = <0x0 0x9e800000>; + end_address = <0x0 0x9fffffff>; + }; + + }; + }; dm { ti-secure { content = <&dm>;
The previous documentation had been very crude so refactor it to make it cleaner and concise.
Signed-off-by: Manorit Chawdhry m-chawdhry@ti.com --- doc/board/ti/k3.rst | 270 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 171 insertions(+), 99 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/board/ti/k3.rst b/doc/board/ti/k3.rst index a127215ce539..947b86ba8292 100644 --- a/doc/board/ti/k3.rst +++ b/doc/board/ti/k3.rst @@ -248,6 +248,8 @@ Building tiboot3.bin the final `tiboot3.bin` binary. (or the `sysfw.itb` if your device uses the split binary flow)
+.. _k3_rst_include_start_build_steps_spl_r5: + .. k3_rst_include_start_build_steps_spl_r5 .. prompt:: bash $
@@ -312,6 +314,8 @@ use the `lite` option. finished, we can jump back into U-Boot again, this time running on a 64bit core in the main domain.
+.. _k3_rst_include_start_build_steps_uboot: + .. k3_rst_include_start_build_steps_uboot .. prompt:: bash $
@@ -330,144 +334,212 @@ wakeup and main domain and to boot to the U-Boot prompt | `tispl.bin` for HS devices or `tispl.bin_unsigned` for GP devices | `u-boot.img` for HS devices or `u-boot.img_unsigned` for GP devices
-Fit Signature Signing +FIT signature signing ---------------------
-K3 Platforms have fit signature signing enabled by default on their primary -platforms. Here we'll take an example for creating fit image for J721e platform +K3 platforms have FIT signature signing enabled by default on their primary +platforms. Here we'll take an example for creating FIT Image for J721E platform and the same can be extended to other platforms
-1. Describing FIT source +Pre-requisites: + +* U-boot build (:ref:`U-boot build <k3_rst_include_start_build_steps_spl_r5>`) +* Linux Image and Linux DTB prebuilt + +Describing FIT source +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
- .. code-block:: bash +FIT Image is a packed structure containing binary blobs and configurations. +The Kernel FIT Image that we have has Kernel Image, DTB and the DTBOs. It +supports packing multiple images and configurations that allow you to +choose any configuration at runtime to boot from. + +.. code-block::
/dts-v1/;
/ { - description = "Kernel fitImage for j721e-hs-evm"; - #address-cells = <1>; - - images { - kernel-1 { - description = "Linux kernel"; - data = /incbin/("Image"); - type = "kernel"; - arch = "arm64"; - os = "linux"; - compression = "none"; - load = <0x80080000>; - entry = <0x80080000>; - hash-1 { - algo = "sha512"; - }; - - }; - fdt-ti_k3-j721e-common-proc-board.dtb { - description = "Flattened Device Tree blob"; - data = /incbin/("k3-j721e-common-proc-board.dtb"); - type = "flat_dt"; - arch = "arm64"; - compression = "none"; - load = <0x83000000>; - hash-1 { - algo = "sha512"; - }; - - }; + description = "FIT Image description"; + #address-cells = <1>; + + images { + [image-1] + [image-2] + [fdt-1] + [fdt-2] + } + + configurations { + default = <conf-1> + [conf-1: image-1,fdt-1] + [conf-2: image-2,fdt-1] + } + } + +* Sample Images + +.. code-block:: + + kernel-1 { + description = "Linux kernel"; + data = /incbin/("linux.bin"); + type = "kernel"; + arch = "arm64"; + os = "linux"; + compression = "gzip"; + load = <0x81000000>; + entry = <0x81000000>; + hash-1 { + algo = "sha512"; }; - - configurations { - default = "conf-ti_k3-j721e-common-proc-board.dtb"; - conf-ti_k3-j721e-common-proc-board.dtb { - description = "Linux kernel, FDT blob"; - fdt = "fdt-ti_k3-j721e-common-proc-board.dtb"; - kernel = "kernel-1"; - signature-1 { - algo = "sha512,rsa4096"; - key-name-hint = "custMpk"; - sign-images = "kernel", "fdt"; - }; - }; + }; + fdt-ti_k3-j721e-common-proc-board.dtb { + description = "Flattened Device Tree blob"; + data = /incbin/("arch/arm64/boot/dts/ti/k3-j721e-common-proc-board.dtb"); + type = "flat_dt"; + arch = "arm64"; + compression = "none"; + load = <0x83000000>; + hash-1 { + algo = "sha512"; }; }; + # Optional images + fdt-ti_k3-j721e-evm-virt-mac-client.dtbo { + description = "Flattened Device Tree blob"; + data = /incbin/("arch/arm64/boot/dts/ti/k3-j721e-evm-virt-mac-client.dtbo"); + type = "flat_dt"; + arch = "arm64"; + compression = "none"; + load = <0x83080000>; + hash-1 { + algo = "sha512"; + }; + }; + +.. note:: + + Change the path in data variables to point to the respective files in your + local machine. For e.g change "linux.bin" to "<path-to-kernel-image>".
- You would require to change the '/incbin/' lines to point to the respective - files in your local machine and the key-name-hint also needs to be changed - if you are using some other key other than the TI dummy key that we are - using for this example. +For enabling usage of FIT signature, add the signature node to the +corresponding configuration node as follows.
-2. Compile U-boot for the respective board +* Sample Configurations
-.. include:: k3.rst - :start-after: .. k3_rst_include_start_build_steps_uboot - :end-before: .. k3_rst_include_end_build_steps_uboot +.. code-block:: + + conf-ti_k3-j721e-common-proc-board.dtb { + description = "Linux kernel, FDT blob"; + fdt = "fdt-ti_k3-j721e-common-proc-board.dtb"; + kernel = "kernel-1"; + signature-1 { + algo = "sha512,rsa4096"; + key-name-hint = "custMpk"; + sign-images = "kernel", "fdt"; + }; + }; + # Optional configurations + conf-ti_k3-j721e-evm-virt-mac-client.dtbo { + description = "FDTO blob"; + fdt = "fdt-ti_k3-j721e-evm-virt-mac-client.dtbo"; + + signature-1 { + algo = "sha512,rsa4096"; + key-name-hint = "custMpk"; + sign-images = "fdt"; + }; + }; + +Specify all images you need the signature to authenticate as a part of +sign-images. The key-name-hint needs to be changed if you are using some +other key other than the TI dummy key that we are using for this example. +It should be the name of the file containing the keys.
.. note::
- The changes only affect a72 binaries so the example just builds that + Generating new set of keys: + + .. prompt:: bash $
-3. Sign the fit image and embed the dtb in uboot + mkdir keys + openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out keys/dev.key \ + -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:4096 -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_pubexp:65537 + openssl req -batch -new -x509 -key keys/dev.key -out keys/dev.crt
- Now once the build is done, you'll have a dtb for your board that you'll - be passing to mkimage for signing the fitImage and embedding the key in - the u-boot dtb. +Generating the fitImage +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
- .. prompt:: bash $ +.. note:: + + For signing a secondary platform like SK boards, you'll require + additional steps + + - Change the CONFIG_DEFAULT_DEVICE_TREE
- mkimage -r -f fitImage.its -k $UBOOT_PATH/board/ti/keys -K - $UBOOT_PATH/build/a72/dts/dt.dtb + For e.g
- For signing a secondary platform, pass the -K parameter to that DTB + .. code-block::
- .. prompt:: bash $ + diff --git a/configs/j721e_evm_a72_defconfig b/configs/j721e_evm_a72_defconfig + index a5c1df7e0054..6d0126d955ef 100644 + --- a/configs/j721e_evm_a72_defconfig + +++ b/configs/j721e_evm_a72_defconfig + @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ CONFIG_CUSTOM_SYS_INIT_SP_ADDR=0x80480000 + CONFIG_ENV_SIZE=0x20000 + CONFIG_DM_GPIO=y + CONFIG_SPL_DM_SPI=y + -CONFIG_DEFAULT_DEVICE_TREE="k3-j721e-common-proc-board" + +CONFIG_DEFAULT_DEVICE_TREE="k3-j721e-sk" + CONFIG_SPL_TEXT_BASE=0x80080000 + CONFIG_DM_RESET=y + CONFIG_SPL_MMC=y
- mkimage -f fitImage.its -k $UBOOT_PATH/board/ti/keys -K - $UBOOT_PATH/build/a72/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-sk.dtb + - Change the binman nodes to package u-boot.dtb for the correct set of platform
- .. note:: + For e.g
- If changing `CONFIG_DEFAULT_DEVICE_TREE` to the secondary platform, - binman changes would also be required so that correct dtb gets packaged. + .. code-block::
- .. code-block:: bash + diff --git a/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi b/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi + index 673be646b1e3..752fa805fe8d 100644 + --- a/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi + +++ b/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi + @@ -299,8 +299,8 @@ + #define SPL_J721E_SK_DTB "spl/dts/k3-j721e-sk.dtb"
- diff --git a/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi b/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi - index 673be646b1e3..752fa805fe8d 100644 - --- a/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi - +++ b/arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-binman.dtsi - @@ -299,8 +299,8 @@ - #define SPL_J721E_SK_DTB "spl/dts/k3-j721e-sk.dtb" + #define UBOOT_NODTB "u-boot-nodtb.bin" + -#define J721E_EVM_DTB "u-boot.dtb" + -#define J721E_SK_DTB "arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-sk.dtb" + +#define J721E_EVM_DTB "arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-common-proc-board.dtb" + +#define J721E_SK_DTB "u-boot.dtb"
- #define UBOOT_NODTB "u-boot-nodtb.bin" - -#define J721E_EVM_DTB "u-boot.dtb" - -#define J721E_SK_DTB "arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-sk.dtb" - +#define J721E_EVM_DTB "arch/arm/dts/k3-j721e-common-proc-board.dtb" - +#define J721E_SK_DTB "u-boot.dtb" +This step will embed the public key in the u-boot.dtb file that was already +built during the initial u-boot build.
-5. Rebuilt u-boot +.. prompt:: bash $
- This is required so that the modified dtb gets updated in u-boot.img + mkimage -r -f fitImage.its -k $UBOOT_PATH/board/ti/keys -K $UBOOT_PATH/build/$ARMV8/dts/dt.dtb fitImage
-.. include:: k3.rst - :start-after: .. k3_rst_include_start_build_steps_uboot - :end-before: .. k3_rst_include_end_build_steps_uboot +.. note::
-6. (Optional) Enabled FIT_SIGNATURE_ENFORCED + If you have another set of keys then change the -k argument to point to + the folder where your keys are present, the build requires the presence + of both .key and .crt file.
- By default u-boot will boot up the fit image without any authentication as - such if the public key is not embedded properly, to check if the public key - nodes are proper you can enable FIT_SIGNATURE_ENFORCED that would not rely - on the dtb for anything else then the signature node for checking the fit - image, rest other things will be enforced such as the property of - required-keys. This is not an extensive check so do manual checks also +Build u-boot again +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
- This is by default enabled for devices with TI_SECURE_DEVICE enabled. +The updated u-boot.dtb needs to be packed in u-boot.img for authentication +so rebuild U-boot ARMV8 without changing any parameters. +Refer (:ref:`U-boot ARMV8 build <k3_rst_include_start_build_steps_uboot>`)
.. note::
- The devices now also have distroboot enabled so if the fit image doesn't - work then the fallback to normal distroboot will be there on hs devices, - this will need to be explicitly disabled by changing the boot_targets. + The devices now also have distroboot enabled so if the FIT image doesn't + work then the fallback to normal distroboot will be there on HS devices. + This will need to be explicitly disabled by changing the boot_targets to + disallow fallback during testing.
Saving environment ------------------
This commit adds a general flow to explain the usage of firewalls and the chain of trust in K3 devices.
Signed-off-by: Manorit Chawdhry m-chawdhry@ti.com --- doc/board/ti/k3.rst | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+)
diff --git a/doc/board/ti/k3.rst b/doc/board/ti/k3.rst index 947b86ba8292..60d04c5708be 100644 --- a/doc/board/ti/k3.rst +++ b/doc/board/ti/k3.rst @@ -104,6 +104,51 @@ firmware can be loaded on the now free core in the wakeup domain. For more information on the bootup process of your SoC, consult the device specific boot flow documentation.
+Secure Boot +^^^^^^^^^^^ + +K3 HS-SE devices are used for authenticated boot flow with secure boot. +HS-FS devices have optional authentication in the flow and doesn't "require" +authentication unless converted to HS-SE devices. + +Chain of trust +"""""""""""""" + +1) SMS starts up and loads the authenticated ROM code in Wakeup Domain +2) ROM code starts up and loads the authenticated tiboot3.bin in Wakeup + Domain +3) Wakeup SPL (tiboot3.bin) would authenticate the next set of binaries + (ATF,OP-TEE,DM,SPL,etc.) +4) After ATF and OP-TEE load, ARMV8 U-boot authenticates the next set of + binaries (Linux and DTBs) if using FIT Image authentication and having a + signature node in U-boot. + +Steps 1-3 are all authenticated by either the ROM code or TIFS as the +authenticating entity and step 4 uses U-boot standard mechanism for +authenticating. + +All the authentication that are done for ROM/TIFS are done through x509 +certificates that are signed. + +Firewalls +""""""""" + +1) ROM comes up and sets up firewalls that are needed by itself +2) TIFS (in multicertificate will setup it's own firewalls) +3) R5 SPL comes along and opens up other firewalls ( that are not owned by + anyone - essentially firewalls that were setup by ROM but are not needed + anymore) +4) Each stage beyond this: such as tispl.bin containing TFA/OPTEE uses OIDs to + set up firewalls to protect themselves (enforced by TIFS) +5) TFA/OP-TEE can configure other firewalls at runtime if required as they + are already authenticated and firewalled off from illegal access. +6) A53 SPL and U-boot itself startups but has no ability to change the + protection firewalls enforced by x509 OIDs or any other firewalls + configured by ROM/TIFS in the beginning. + +Futhur, firewalls have a lockdown bit in hardware that enforces the setting +(and cannot be over-ridden) till the full system is resetted. + Software Sources ----------------
On 12/6/23 3:51 AM, Manorit Chawdhry wrote:
This commit adds a general flow to explain the usage of firewalls and the chain of trust in K3 devices.
Signed-off-by: Manorit Chawdhry m-chawdhry@ti.com
doc/board/ti/k3.rst | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+)
diff --git a/doc/board/ti/k3.rst b/doc/board/ti/k3.rst index 947b86ba8292..60d04c5708be 100644 --- a/doc/board/ti/k3.rst +++ b/doc/board/ti/k3.rst @@ -104,6 +104,51 @@ firmware can be loaded on the now free core in the wakeup domain. For more information on the bootup process of your SoC, consult the device specific boot flow documentation.
+Secure Boot +^^^^^^^^^^^
+K3 HS-SE devices are used for authenticated boot flow with secure boot.
How about:
K3 HS-SE devices enforce an authenticated boot flow for secure boot.
+HS-FS devices have optional authentication in the flow and doesn't "require" +authentication unless converted to HS-SE devices.
HS-FS is the state of a K3 device before it has been eFused with customer security keys. In the HS-FS state the authentication still can function as in HS-SE but as there are no customer keys to verify the signatures against the authentication will pass for certificates signed with any key.
+Chain of trust +""""""""""""""
+1) SMS starts up and loads the authenticated ROM code in Wakeup Domain +2) ROM code starts up and loads the authenticated tiboot3.bin in Wakeup
- Domain
+3) Wakeup SPL (tiboot3.bin) would authenticate the next set of binaries
- (ATF,OP-TEE,DM,SPL,etc.)
+4) After ATF and OP-TEE load, ARMV8 U-boot authenticates the next set of
- binaries (Linux and DTBs) if using FIT Image authentication and having a
- signature node in U-boot.
This might be better said like this:
1) Public ROM loads the tiboot3.bin (R5 SPL, TIFS) 2) R5 SPL loads tispl.bin (ATF, OP-TEE, DM, SPL) 3) SPL loads u-boot.img (U-Boot) 4) U-Boot loads fitImage (Linux and DTBs)
Each stage authenticating (and optionally decrypting) while loading is implied by the following sentences below, no need to repeat each time.
Plus the use of "ROM" is confusing, we have two ROMs in K3 (Secure ROM and Public ROM), you should always be specific.
+Steps 1-3 are all authenticated by either the ROM code or TIFS as the
s/ROM code/Secure ROM
+authenticating entity and step 4 uses U-boot standard mechanism for +authenticating.
+All the authentication that are done for ROM/TIFS are done through x509 +certificates that are signed.
+Firewalls +"""""""""
+1) ROM comes up and sets up firewalls that are needed by itself
Secure ROM
+2) TIFS (in multicertificate will setup it's own firewalls)
TIFS sets up it's own firewalls in either case.
+3) R5 SPL comes along and opens up other firewalls ( that are not owned by
- anyone - essentially firewalls that were setup by ROM but are not needed
- anymore)
How about:
3) R5 SPL will remove any firewalls that are leftover from the Secure ROM stage that are no longer required.
+4) Each stage beyond this: such as tispl.bin containing TFA/OPTEE uses OIDs to
- set up firewalls to protect themselves (enforced by TIFS)
+5) TFA/OP-TEE can configure other firewalls at runtime if required as they
- are already authenticated and firewalled off from illegal access.
+6) A53 SPL and U-boot itself startups but has no ability to change the
- protection firewalls enforced by x509 OIDs or any other firewalls
- configured by ROM/TIFS in the beginning.
6) All later stages can setup or remove firewalls that have not been already configured by previous stages, such as those created by TIFS, TFA, and OP-TEE.
+Futhur, firewalls have a lockdown bit in hardware that enforces the setting +(and cannot be over-ridden) till the full system is resetted.
s/till/until s/resetted/reset
Andrew
Software Sources
Hi Andrew,
On 10:41-20231206, Andrew Davis wrote:
On 12/6/23 3:51 AM, Manorit Chawdhry wrote:
This commit adds a general flow to explain the usage of firewalls and the chain of trust in K3 devices.
Signed-off-by: Manorit Chawdhry m-chawdhry@ti.com
doc/board/ti/k3.rst | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+)
diff --git a/doc/board/ti/k3.rst b/doc/board/ti/k3.rst index 947b86ba8292..60d04c5708be 100644 --- a/doc/board/ti/k3.rst +++ b/doc/board/ti/k3.rst @@ -104,6 +104,51 @@ firmware can be loaded on the now free core in the wakeup domain. For more information on the bootup process of your SoC, consult the device specific boot flow documentation. +Secure Boot +^^^^^^^^^^^
+K3 HS-SE devices are used for authenticated boot flow with secure boot.
How about:
K3 HS-SE devices enforce an authenticated boot flow for secure boot.
+HS-FS devices have optional authentication in the flow and doesn't "require" +authentication unless converted to HS-SE devices.
HS-FS is the state of a K3 device before it has been eFused with customer security keys. In the HS-FS state the authentication still can function as in HS-SE but as there are no customer keys to verify the signatures against the authentication will pass for certificates signed with any key.
+Chain of trust +""""""""""""""
+1) SMS starts up and loads the authenticated ROM code in Wakeup Domain +2) ROM code starts up and loads the authenticated tiboot3.bin in Wakeup
- Domain
+3) Wakeup SPL (tiboot3.bin) would authenticate the next set of binaries
- (ATF,OP-TEE,DM,SPL,etc.)
+4) After ATF and OP-TEE load, ARMV8 U-boot authenticates the next set of
- binaries (Linux and DTBs) if using FIT Image authentication and having a
- signature node in U-boot.
This might be better said like this:
- Public ROM loads the tiboot3.bin (R5 SPL, TIFS)
- R5 SPL loads tispl.bin (ATF, OP-TEE, DM, SPL)
- SPL loads u-boot.img (U-Boot)
- U-Boot loads fitImage (Linux and DTBs)
Each stage authenticating (and optionally decrypting) while loading is implied by the following sentences below, no need to repeat each time.
Plus the use of "ROM" is confusing, we have two ROMs in K3 (Secure ROM and Public ROM), you should always be specific.
+Steps 1-3 are all authenticated by either the ROM code or TIFS as the
s/ROM code/Secure ROM
+authenticating entity and step 4 uses U-boot standard mechanism for +authenticating.
+All the authentication that are done for ROM/TIFS are done through x509 +certificates that are signed.
+Firewalls +"""""""""
+1) ROM comes up and sets up firewalls that are needed by itself
Secure ROM
+2) TIFS (in multicertificate will setup it's own firewalls)
TIFS sets up it's own firewalls in either case.
+3) R5 SPL comes along and opens up other firewalls ( that are not owned by
- anyone - essentially firewalls that were setup by ROM but are not needed
- anymore)
How about:
- R5 SPL will remove any firewalls that are leftover from the Secure ROM stage
that are no longer required.
+4) Each stage beyond this: such as tispl.bin containing TFA/OPTEE uses OIDs to
- set up firewalls to protect themselves (enforced by TIFS)
+5) TFA/OP-TEE can configure other firewalls at runtime if required as they
- are already authenticated and firewalled off from illegal access.
+6) A53 SPL and U-boot itself startups but has no ability to change the
- protection firewalls enforced by x509 OIDs or any other firewalls
- configured by ROM/TIFS in the beginning.
- All later stages can setup or remove firewalls that have not been already
configured by previous stages, such as those created by TIFS, TFA, and OP-TEE.
+Futhur, firewalls have a lockdown bit in hardware that enforces the setting +(and cannot be over-ridden) till the full system is resetted.
s/till/until s/resetted/reset
Have incorporated the suggested changes, Thanks!
Regards, Manorit
Andrew
Software Sources
participants (3)
-
Andrew Davis -
Manorit Chawdhry -
Simon Glass