Hello,
We are enabling secure boot on Zynqmp with SPL.
The issue however is that during secure boot, the bootrom not only validates the first loader (SPL and PMUFW combo) but it will also expect a signed bitstream during load(FPGA).
Since currently the SPL load of an FPGA image from FIT does not support loading images for authentication (fpga_loads), I'd like to discuss how to best implement such support.
A pretty standard file.its description of the FPGA loadable looks like this:
fpga { description = "FPGA binary"; data = /incbin/("${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/${SPL_FPGA_BINARY}"); type = "fpga"; arch = "${UBOOT_ARCH}"; compression = "none"; load = <${fpgaloadaddr}>; hash-1 { algo = "${FIT_HASH_ALG}"; }; };
We could extend imagetool.h struct image_tool_params to add more params or perhpas just define different 'types' of fpga?
Something like: "fpga" "fpga-auth" : authenticated "fpga-enc" : encrypted "fpga-sec" : encrypted and authenticated
Then it would be a matter of modifying https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/common/spl/spl_fit.c#L572
any thoughts?
TIA Jorge
On 10/4/21 3:32 PM, Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz, Foundries wrote:
Hello,
We are enabling secure boot on Zynqmp with SPL.
The issue however is that during secure boot, the bootrom not only validates the first loader (SPL and PMUFW combo) but it will also expect a signed bitstream during load(FPGA).
Since currently the SPL load of an FPGA image from FIT does not support loading images for authentication (fpga_loads), I'd like to discuss how to best implement such support.
What do you mean by "loading images for authentication" ?
A pretty standard file.its description of the FPGA loadable looks like this:
fpga { description = "FPGA binary"; data = /incbin/("${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/${SPL_FPGA_BINARY}"); type = "fpga"; arch = "${UBOOT_ARCH}"; compression = "none"; load = <${fpgaloadaddr}>; hash-1 { algo = "${FIT_HASH_ALG}"; }; };
We could extend imagetool.h struct image_tool_params to add more params or perhpas just define different 'types' of fpga?
Check "4) '/images' node" in doc/uImage.FIT/source_file_format.txt
The intent is to give either: * loadaddr="$(addr)" : copy image to $(addr), Done * compatible="": Use this driver to upload the FPGA
It seems to me like the right way to go is to make a new compatible="" FPGA loader is for fpga_load():
fpga { description = "FPGA binary"; data = /incbin/("${YOCTO_BS_PATH}"); type = "fpga"; compression = "none"; compatible = "zynqmp-fancy-fpga", hash-1 { algo = "${FIT_HASHISH}"; }; };
Something like: "fpga" "fpga-auth" : authenticated "fpga-enc" : encrypted "fpga-sec" : encrypted and authenticated
Can these properties be inferred from the FPGA image? If not, they could be required when using a new fpga loader. I don't think they should be added to "fpga-legacy".
Alex
Then it would be a matter of modifying https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/common/spl/spl_fit.c#L572
any thoughts?
TIA Jorge
On 04/10/21, Alex G. wrote:
On 10/4/21 3:32 PM, Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz, Foundries wrote:
Hello,
hi Alex,
We are enabling secure boot on Zynqmp with SPL.
The issue however is that during secure boot, the bootrom not only validates the first loader (SPL and PMUFW combo) but it will also expect a signed bitstream during load(FPGA).
Since currently the SPL load of an FPGA image from FIT does not support loading images for authentication (fpga_loads), I'd like to discuss how to best implement such support.
What do you mean by "loading images for authentication" ?
right, it eventually means executing fpga_loads insted of fpga_load ( a function that will provide additional params to the PMUFW.
"loads" will load FPGA bitstreams that are either signed, encrypted or both. When they are only signed, they are first authenticated by the PMUFW and then loaded.
A pretty standard file.its description of the FPGA loadable looks like this:
fpga { description = "FPGA binary"; data = /incbin/("${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/${SPL_FPGA_BINARY}"); type = "fpga"; arch = "${UBOOT_ARCH}"; compression = "none"; load = <${fpgaloadaddr}>; hash-1 { algo = "${FIT_HASH_ALG}"; }; };
We could extend imagetool.h struct image_tool_params to add more params or perhpas just define different 'types' of fpga?
Check "4) '/images' node" in doc/uImage.FIT/source_file_format.txt
The intent is to give either:
- loadaddr="$(addr)" : copy image to $(addr), Done
- compatible="": Use this driver to upload the FPGA
It seems to me like the right way to go is to make a new compatible="" FPGA loader is for fpga_load():
fpga { description = "FPGA binary"; data = /incbin/("${YOCTO_BS_PATH}"); type = "fpga"; compression = "none"; compatible = "zynqmp-fancy-fpga",
so you think we should capture on compatible the characteristics of the FPGA image?
hash-1 { algo = "${FIT_HASHISH}"; };};
Something like: "fpga" "fpga-auth" : authenticated "fpga-enc" : encrypted "fpga-sec" : encrypted and authenticated
Can these properties be inferred from the FPGA image? If not, they could be required when using a new fpga loader. I don't think they should be added to "fpga-legacy".
maybe.. with a bit of boot header parsing... But doing so would deviate from the current approach making it somewhat inconsistent: ie, there is no a common "fpga load" command but instead we have "fpga load" and "fpga loads" as separate commands so perhaps the parsing is not that obvious or it would have been done differently. I'd rather follow the current approach and just explicitly qualify the bitstream.
Alex
Then it would be a matter of modifying https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/common/spl/spl_fit.c#L572
any thoughts?
TIA Jorge
On 05/10/21, Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz, Foundries wrote:
On 04/10/21, Alex G. wrote:
On 10/4/21 3:32 PM, Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz, Foundries wrote:
Hello,
hi Alex,
We are enabling secure boot on Zynqmp with SPL.
The issue however is that during secure boot, the bootrom not only validates the first loader (SPL and PMUFW combo) but it will also expect a signed bitstream during load(FPGA).
Since currently the SPL load of an FPGA image from FIT does not support loading images for authentication (fpga_loads), I'd like to discuss how to best implement such support.
What do you mean by "loading images for authentication" ?
right, it eventually means executing fpga_loads insted of fpga_load ( a function that will provide additional params to the PMUFW.
"loads" will load FPGA bitstreams that are either signed, encrypted or both. When they are only signed, they are first authenticated by the PMUFW and then loaded.
A pretty standard file.its description of the FPGA loadable looks like this:
fpga { description = "FPGA binary"; data = /incbin/("${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/${SPL_FPGA_BINARY}"); type = "fpga"; arch = "${UBOOT_ARCH}"; compression = "none"; load = <${fpgaloadaddr}>; hash-1 { algo = "${FIT_HASH_ALG}"; }; };
We could extend imagetool.h struct image_tool_params to add more params or perhpas just define different 'types' of fpga?
Check "4) '/images' node" in doc/uImage.FIT/source_file_format.txt
The intent is to give either:
- loadaddr="$(addr)" : copy image to $(addr), Done
- compatible="": Use this driver to upload the FPGA
It seems to me like the right way to go is to make a new compatible="" FPGA loader is for fpga_load():
fpga { description = "FPGA binary"; data = /incbin/("${YOCTO_BS_PATH}"); type = "fpga"; compression = "none"; compatible = "zynqmp-fancy-fpga",
so you think we should capture on compatible the characteristics of the FPGA image?
um, right, makes sense then, thanks.
- compatible : compatible method for loading image. Mandatory for types: "fpga", and images that do not specify a load address. To use the generic fpga loading routine, use "u-boot,fpga-legacy"
hash-1 { algo = "${FIT_HASHISH}"; };};
Something like: "fpga" "fpga-auth" : authenticated "fpga-enc" : encrypted "fpga-sec" : encrypted and authenticated
Can these properties be inferred from the FPGA image? If not, they could be required when using a new fpga loader. I don't think they should be added to "fpga-legacy".
maybe.. with a bit of boot header parsing... But doing so would deviate from the current approach making it somewhat inconsistent: ie, there is no a common "fpga load" command but instead we have "fpga load" and "fpga loads" as separate commands so perhaps the parsing is not that obvious or it would have been done differently. I'd rather follow the current approach and just explicitly qualify the bitstream.
Alex
Then it would be a matter of modifying https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/common/spl/spl_fit.c#L572
any thoughts?
TIA Jorge
Hi,
On 10/5/21 8:08 AM, Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz, Foundries wrote:
On 05/10/21, Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz, Foundries wrote:
On 04/10/21, Alex G. wrote:
On 10/4/21 3:32 PM, Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz, Foundries wrote:
Hello,
hi Alex,
We are enabling secure boot on Zynqmp with SPL.
The issue however is that during secure boot, the bootrom not only validates the first loader (SPL and PMUFW combo) but it will also expect a signed bitstream during load(FPGA).
Since currently the SPL load of an FPGA image from FIT does not support loading images for authentication (fpga_loads), I'd like to discuss how to best implement such support.
What do you mean by "loading images for authentication" ?
right, it eventually means executing fpga_loads insted of fpga_load ( a function that will provide additional params to the PMUFW.
"loads" will load FPGA bitstreams that are either signed, encrypted or both. When they are only signed, they are first authenticated by the PMUFW and then loaded.
A pretty standard file.its description of the FPGA loadable looks like this:
fpga { description = "FPGA binary"; data = /incbin/("${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/${SPL_FPGA_BINARY}"); type = "fpga"; arch = "${UBOOT_ARCH}"; compression = "none"; load = <${fpgaloadaddr}>; hash-1 { algo = "${FIT_HASH_ALG}"; }; };
We could extend imagetool.h struct image_tool_params to add more params or perhpas just define different 'types' of fpga?
Check "4) '/images' node" in doc/uImage.FIT/source_file_format.txt
The intent is to give either:
- loadaddr="$(addr)" : copy image to $(addr), Done
- compatible="": Use this driver to upload the FPGA
It seems to me like the right way to go is to make a new compatible="" FPGA loader is for fpga_load():
fpga { description = "FPGA binary"; data = /incbin/("${YOCTO_BS_PATH}"); type = "fpga"; compression = "none"; compatible = "zynqmp-fancy-fpga",
so you think we should capture on compatible the characteristics of the FPGA image?
um, right, makes sense then, thanks.
- compatible : compatible method for loading image. Mandatory for types: "fpga", and images that do not specify a load address. To use the generic fpga loading routine, use "u-boot,fpga-legacy"
hash-1 { algo = "${FIT_HASHISH}"; };};
Something like: "fpga" "fpga-auth" : authenticated "fpga-enc" : encrypted "fpga-sec" : encrypted and authenticated
Can these properties be inferred from the FPGA image? If not, they could be required when using a new fpga loader. I don't think they should be added to "fpga-legacy".
maybe.. with a bit of boot header parsing... But doing so would deviate from the current approach making it somewhat inconsistent: ie, there is no a common "fpga load" command but instead we have "fpga load" and "fpga loads" as separate commands so perhaps the parsing is not that obvious or it would have been done differently. I'd rather follow the current approach and just explicitly qualify the bitstream.
In past when I was adding support for bitstreams in 2016 by commit 62afc601883e ("image: Add boot_get_fpga() to load fpga with bootm") you can see that the problem was sort of the same as this one. But with handling different bitstream types. Because there are two types of bistreams in bin format and bit format. At that time I solved it by calling function in bit format first. If failed in bin format. And by comparing sizes it was determined if bitstream is in bit or bin format.
I would say that this algorithm is not valid anymore because you can also have compressed bistreams which are smaller then device itself but still they are full bistreams.
That being said I think when new types should be defined we should also optimized origin code for fpga loading to cover also partial bistreams and bistreams in bin and bit formats.
Thanks, Michal
Hi Jorge,
Have you succeeded to enable secure boot on ZynqMP with SPL (not Xilinx's FSBL)? Is it documented somewhere? Any configuration files/yocto recipes? Have you managed to resolve problem of the bitstream loaded in such a case by SPL?
I need to use an encrypted bitstream. However, it required the use of DeviceKeys in post-boot state which eventually requires secure boot.
Regards,
Adrian
On 04.10.2021 22:32, Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz, Foundries wrote:
Hello,
We are enabling secure boot on Zynqmp with SPL.
The issue however is that during secure boot, the bootrom not only validates the first loader (SPL and PMUFW combo) but it will also expect a signed bitstream during load(FPGA).
Since currently the SPL load of an FPGA image from FIT does not support loading images for authentication (fpga_loads), I'd like to discuss how to best implement such support.
A pretty standard file.its description of the FPGA loadable looks like this:
fpga { description = "FPGA binary"; data = /incbin/("${DEPLOY_DIR_IMAGE}/${SPL_FPGA_BINARY}"); type = "fpga"; arch = "${UBOOT_ARCH}"; compression = "none"; load = <${fpgaloadaddr}>; hash-1 { algo = "${FIT_HASH_ALG}"; }; };
We could extend imagetool.h struct image_tool_params to add more params or perhpas just define different 'types' of fpga?
Something like: "fpga" "fpga-auth" : authenticated "fpga-enc" : encrypted "fpga-sec" : encrypted and authenticated
Then it would be a matter of modifying https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/common/spl/spl_fit.c#L572
any thoughts?
TIA Jorge
On 19/01/22, Adrian Fiergolski wrote:
Hi Jorge,
hi Adrian,
Have you succeeded to enable secure boot on ZynqMP with SPL (not Xilinx's FSBL)? Is it documented somewhere? Any configuration files/yocto recipes?
somewhere there: https://github.com/foundriesio/meta-lmp
Have you managed to resolve problem of the bitstream loaded in such a case by SPL?
Yes. I wrote the docs here below: https://docs.foundries.io/latest/reference-manual/security/authentication-xi...
I need to use an encrypted bitstream. However, it required the use of DeviceKeys in post-boot state which eventually requires secure boot.
Regards,
hope that helps
Adrian
On 19/01/22, Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz, Foundries wrote:
On 19/01/22, Adrian Fiergolski wrote:
Hi Jorge,
hi Adrian,
Have you succeeded to enable secure boot on ZynqMP with SPL (not Xilinx's FSBL)? Is it documented somewhere? Any configuration files/yocto recipes?
somewhere there: https://github.com/foundriesio/meta-lmp
Have you managed to resolve problem of the bitstream loaded in such a case by SPL?
Yes. I wrote the docs here below: https://docs.foundries.io/latest/reference-manual/security/authentication-xi...
this might help you as well if you use OP-TEE and require RPMB access.
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/4874
I need to use an encrypted bitstream. However, it required the use of DeviceKeys in post-boot state which eventually requires secure boot.
Regards,
hope that helps
Adrian
On 19/01/22, Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz, Foundries wrote:
On 19/01/22, Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz, Foundries wrote:
On 19/01/22, Adrian Fiergolski wrote:
Hi Jorge,
hi Adrian,
Have you succeeded to enable secure boot on ZynqMP with SPL (not Xilinx's FSBL)? Is it documented somewhere? Any configuration files/yocto recipes?
somewhere there: https://github.com/foundriesio/meta-lmp
Have you managed to resolve problem of the bitstream loaded in such a case by SPL?
Yes. I wrote the docs here below: https://docs.foundries.io/latest/reference-manual/security/authentication-xi...
this might help you as well if you use OP-TEE and require RPMB access.
forgot to add, the PR to load the bistream was followed up by Oleksandr (in copy). but not totally sure if it was merged yet as Simon asked for tests and those might be pending.
I need to use an encrypted bitstream. However, it required the use of DeviceKeys in post-boot state which eventually requires secure boot.
Regards,
hope that helps
Adrian
Hi Adrian,
On Wed, Jan 19, 2022 at 7:23 PM Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz, Foundries jorge@foundries.io wrote:
On 19/01/22, Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz, Foundries wrote:
On 19/01/22, Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz, Foundries wrote:
On 19/01/22, Adrian Fiergolski wrote:
Hi Jorge,
hi Adrian,
Have you succeeded to enable secure boot on ZynqMP with SPL (not Xilinx's FSBL)? Is it documented somewhere? Any configuration files/yocto recipes?
somewhere there: https://github.com/foundriesio/meta-lmp
Have you managed to resolve problem of the bitstream loaded in such a case by SPL?
Yes. I wrote the docs here below: https://docs.foundries.io/latest/reference-manual/security/authentication-xi...
this might help you as well if you use OP-TEE and require RPMB access.
forgot to add, the PR to load the bistream was followed up by Oleksandr (in copy). but not totally sure if it was merged yet as Simon asked for tests and those might be pending.
You can try this solution for the Xilinx u-boot 2020.07 https://github.com/foundriesio/u-boot/pull/116 or this one for the mainline u-boot: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/uboot/list/?series=276743
I need to use an encrypted bitstream. However, it required the use of DeviceKeys in post-boot state which eventually requires secure boot.
Regards,
hope that helps
Adrian
Hi Jorge and Oleksandr,
Thank you for sharing all the links. I found there a lot of inspiration to meet my target of using encrypted bitfiles.
I have also shared with the community a patch, on top of your changes, adding encrypted bitfile support in u-boot.
Regards,
Adrian
On 19.01.2022 18:48, Oleksandr Suvorov wrote:
Hi Adrian,
On Wed, Jan 19, 2022 at 7:23 PM Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz, Foundries jorge@foundries.io wrote:
On 19/01/22, Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz, Foundries wrote:
On 19/01/22, Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz, Foundries wrote:
On 19/01/22, Adrian Fiergolski wrote:
Hi Jorge,
hi Adrian,
Have you succeeded to enable secure boot on ZynqMP with SPL (not Xilinx's FSBL)? Is it documented somewhere? Any configuration files/yocto recipes?
somewhere there: https://github.com/foundriesio/meta-lmp
Have you managed to resolve problem of the bitstream loaded in such a case by SPL?
Yes. I wrote the docs here below: https://docs.foundries.io/latest/reference-manual/security/authentication-xi...
this might help you as well if you use OP-TEE and require RPMB access.
forgot to add, the PR to load the bistream was followed up by Oleksandr (in copy). but not totally sure if it was merged yet as Simon asked for tests and those might be pending.
You can try this solution for the Xilinx u-boot 2020.07 https://github.com/foundriesio/u-boot/pull/116 or this one for the mainline u-boot: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/uboot/list/?series=276743
I need to use an encrypted bitstream. However, it required the use of DeviceKeys in post-boot state which eventually requires secure boot.
Regards,
hope that helps
Adrian
On 07/02/22, Adrian Fiergolski wrote:
Hi Jorge and Oleksandr,
Thank you for sharing all the links. I found there a lot of inspiration to meet my target of using encrypted bitfiles.
thanks Adrian. Glad to hear that
I have also shared with the community a patch, on top of your changes, adding encrypted bitfile support in u-boot.
awesome. btw how is the bitstream decrypted? I didnt look into that, I suppose there is probably a doc somewhere?
Regards,
Adrian
On 19.01.2022 18:48, Oleksandr Suvorov wrote:
Hi Adrian,
On Wed, Jan 19, 2022 at 7:23 PM Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz, Foundries jorge@foundries.io wrote:
On 19/01/22, Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz, Foundries wrote:
On 19/01/22, Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz, Foundries wrote:
On 19/01/22, Adrian Fiergolski wrote:
Hi Jorge,
hi Adrian,
Have you succeeded to enable secure boot on ZynqMP with SPL (not Xilinx's FSBL)? Is it documented somewhere? Any configuration files/yocto recipes?
somewhere there: https://github.com/foundriesio/meta-lmp
Have you managed to resolve problem of the bitstream loaded in such a case by SPL?
Yes. I wrote the docs here below: https://docs.foundries.io/latest/reference-manual/security/authentication-xi...
this might help you as well if you use OP-TEE and require RPMB access.
forgot to add, the PR to load the bistream was followed up by Oleksandr (in copy). but not totally sure if it was merged yet as Simon asked for tests and those might be pending.
You can try this solution for the Xilinx u-boot 2020.07 https://github.com/foundriesio/u-boot/pull/116 or this one for the mainline u-boot: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/uboot/list/?series=276743
I need to use an encrypted bitstream. However, it required the use of DeviceKeys in post-boot state which eventually requires secure boot.
Regards,
hope that helps
Adrian
Hi,
On 09.02.2022 08:51, Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz, Foundries wrote:
I have also shared with the community a patch, on top of your changes, adding encrypted bitfile support in u-boot.
awesome. btw how is the bitstream decrypted? I didnt look into that, I suppose there is probably a doc somewhere?
It uses ZynqMP's CSU, AES-GCM and device keys (stored either in BBRAM or eFuses). It's described in UG1085 under the Loading bitstream (in encrypt only secure boot mode) subchapter.
Regards,
Adrian
participants (5)
-
Adrian Fiergolski -
Alex G. -
Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz, Foundries -
Michal Simek -
Oleksandr Suvorov