
Hi Steffen,
On Tue, 13 Apr 2021 at 10:16, Steffen Jaeckel jaeckel-floss@eyet-services.de wrote:
Hook into the autoboot flow as an alternative to the existing mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Jaeckel jaeckel-floss@eyet-services.de
common/Kconfig.boot | 23 +++++++++++++--- common/autoboot.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/common/Kconfig.boot b/common/Kconfig.boot index 9c335f4f8c..59fec48c5d 100644 --- a/common/Kconfig.boot +++ b/common/Kconfig.boot @@ -802,10 +802,16 @@ config AUTOBOOT_ENCRYPTION depends on AUTOBOOT_KEYED help This option allows a string to be entered into U-Boot to stop the
autoboot. The string itself is hashed and compared against the hash
in the environment variable 'bootstopkeysha256'. If it matches then
boot stops and a command-line prompt is presented.
autoboot.
The behavior depends whether CONFIG_CRYPT_PW is enabled or not.
In case CONFIG_CRYPT_PW is enabled, the string will be forwarded
to the crypt-based functionality and be compared against the
string in the environment variable 'bootstopkeycrypt'.
In case CONFIG_CRYPT_PW is disabled the string itself is hashed
and compared against the hash in the environment variable
'bootstopkeysha256'.
If it matches in either case then boot stops and
a command-line prompt is presented. This provides a way to ship a secure production device which can also be accessed at the U-Boot command line.
@@ -843,6 +849,15 @@ config AUTOBOOT_KEYED_CTRLC Setting this variable provides an escape sequence from the limited "password" strings.
+config AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_CRYPT
string "Stop autobooting via crypt-hashed password"
depends on AUTOBOOT_KEYED && AUTOBOOT_ENCRYPTION
help
This option adds the feature to only stop the autobooting,
and therefore boot into the U-Boot prompt, when the input
string / password matches a values that is hashed via
one of support crypt options and saved in the environment.
config AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_SHA256 string "Stop autobooting via SHA256 encrypted password" depends on AUTOBOOT_KEYED && AUTOBOOT_ENCRYPTION diff --git a/common/autoboot.c b/common/autoboot.c index 0bb08e7a4c..732a01d0e5 100644 --- a/common/autoboot.c +++ b/common/autoboot.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include <linux/delay.h> #include <u-boot/sha256.h> #include <bootcount.h> +#include <crypt.h>
DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR;
@@ -38,18 +39,62 @@ DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR; static int stored_bootdelay; static int menukey;
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_ENCRYPTION -#define AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_SHA256 CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_SHA256 -#else -#define AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_SHA256 "" +#if defined(CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_ENCRYPTION) +#if defined(CONFIG_CRYPT_PW) && defined(CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_CRYPT) +#define AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_ENC CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_CRYPT +#define HAS_STOP_STR_CRYPT 1 +#elif defined(CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_SHA256) +#define AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_ENC CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_SHA256 +#endif +#endif +#if !defined(AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_ENC) +#define AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_ENC "" #endif
I wonder if we actually need all this now that things are in Kconfig? Can we use IS_ENABLED() in the code instead?
#ifdef CONFIG_USE_AUTOBOOT_MENUKEY #define AUTOBOOT_MENUKEY CONFIG_USE_AUTOBOOT_MENUKEY #else #define AUTOBOOT_MENUKEY 0 #endif
+static int passwd_abort_crypt(uint64_t etime)
Please add function comment
Also unsigned long if you can...if you need 64-bit on 32-bit machines it is u64...but why? That is a very large number of milliseconds!
+{
const char *crypt_env_str = env_get("bootstopkeycrypt");
char presskey[MAX_DELAY_STOP_STR];
u_int presskey_len = 0;
uint
Can you drop the presskey_ prefix on these. There is no other kind of key, so just 'key' and 'len' (or num_keys) is good enough.
int abort = 0;
if (IS_ENABLED(HAS_STOP_STR_CRYPT) && !crypt_env_str)
We normally use IS_ENABLED with a CONFIG_....
crypt_env_str = AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_ENC;
if (!crypt_env_str)
return 0;
/*
* We expect the stop-string to be newline terminated.
*/
/* ... */ is the single-line comment format
do {
if (tstc()) {
/* Check for input string overflow */
if (presskey_len >= MAX_DELAY_STOP_STR)
return 0;
presskey[presskey_len] = getchar();
if ((presskey[presskey_len] == '\r') ||
(presskey[presskey_len] == '\n')) {
presskey[presskey_len] = '\0';
crypt_compare(crypt_env_str, presskey, &abort);
/* you had one chance */
break;
} else {
presskey_len++;
}
}
} while (get_ticks() <= etime);
return abort;
+}
/*
- Use a "constant-length" time compare function for this
- hash compare:
@@ -89,7 +134,7 @@ static int passwd_abort_sha256(uint64_t etime) int ret;
if (sha_env_str == NULL)
sha_env_str = AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_SHA256;
sha_env_str = AUTOBOOT_STOP_STR_ENC; presskey = malloc_cache_aligned(MAX_DELAY_STOP_STR); c = strstr(sha_env_str, ":");
@@ -245,10 +290,14 @@ static int abortboot_key_sequence(int bootdelay) printf(CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_PROMPT, bootdelay); # endif
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_ENCRYPTION))
abort = passwd_abort_sha256(etime);
else
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AUTOBOOT_ENCRYPTION)) {
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPT_PW))
abort = passwd_abort_crypt(etime);
else
abort = passwd_abort_sha256(etime);
} else { abort = passwd_abort_key(etime);
} if (!abort) debug_bootkeys("key timeout\n");
-- 2.30.1
Regards, SImon