
Hi Sam,
Sorry for the late reply,
On Fri, Aug 2, 2019 at 9:57 PM Sam Protsenko semen.protsenko@linaro.org wrote:
Hi Igor, Jens,
Can you please comments on next topics:
- With enabled A/B partitions, we have boot_a/boot_b, system_a/system_b, vendor_a/vendor_b partitions. Therefore requested_partitions[] should be slotted (which is done in this RFC patch). But this patch doesn' handle item (2) below.
- With dynamic partitions enabled, we don't have system/vendor anymore; instead we have single "super" partitions. Therefore requested_partitions[] table contains wrong partitions list for that particular case.
This case can be handled in the latest libavb by 49936b4c010(libavb: Support vbmeta blobs in beginning of partition) [1]. Anyway, this will require to pull the latest libavb sources into U-boot.
Question: can we allow user to select which partition to verify, instead of trying to verify hard-coded partitions from requested_partitions[] table? This would solve both (1) and (2) items. But I'm not sure about next possible issues: a. Wouldn't it break chain of trust somehow?
It wont. If the user can obtain access to U-boot shell or edit U-boot env, the chain of trust is already broken (he can just wipe off `avb_verify` cmd invocation and that's it). But anyway, at first, check this solution [1].
b. Is it ok to run avb_slot_verify() several times (one time per one partition?
If (a) or (b) is of any concern, then maybe we can provide a way for the user to pass any number of arguments to 'avb verify', like this:
=> avb verify boot_a super_a dtbo_a
so help synopsis for 'avb verify' can be like this:
avb verify <partition> ...
What do you think about this? Which would be the best course of action to fix both issues (1) and (2)?
Thanks.
Signed-off-by: Sam Protsenko semen.protsenko@linaro.org
cmd/avb.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/cmd/avb.c b/cmd/avb.c index 3f6fd763a0..d1942d6605 100644 --- a/cmd/avb.c +++ b/cmd/avb.c @@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ int do_avb_verify_part(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, AvbSlotVerifyData *out_data; char *cmdline; char *extra_args;
char *slot_suffix = ""; bool unlocked = false; int res = CMD_RET_FAILURE;
@@ -244,9 +245,12 @@ int do_avb_verify_part(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, return CMD_RET_FAILURE; }
if (argc != 1)
if (argc < 1 || argc > 2) return CMD_RET_USAGE;
if (argc == 2)
slot_suffix = argv[1];
printf("## Android Verified Boot 2.0 version %s\n", avb_version_string());
@@ -259,7 +263,7 @@ int do_avb_verify_part(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, slot_result = avb_slot_verify(avb_ops, requested_partitions,
"",
slot_suffix, unlocked, AVB_HASHTREE_ERROR_MODE_RESTART_AND_INVALIDATE, &out_data);
@@ -419,7 +423,7 @@ static cmd_tbl_t cmd_avb[] = { U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(read_part, 5, 0, do_avb_read_part, "", ""), U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(read_part_hex, 4, 0, do_avb_read_part_hex, "", ""), U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(write_part, 5, 0, do_avb_write_part, "", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(verify, 1, 0, do_avb_verify_part, "", ""),
U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(verify, 2, 0, do_avb_verify_part, "", ""),
#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_TA_AVB U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(read_pvalue, 3, 0, do_avb_read_pvalue, "", ""), U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(write_pvalue, 3, 0, do_avb_write_pvalue, "", ""), @@ -462,6 +466,7 @@ U_BOOT_CMD( "avb read_pvalue <name> <bytes> - read a persistent value <name>\n" "avb write_pvalue <name> <value> - write a persistent value <name>\n" #endif
"avb verify - run verification process using hash data\n"
"avb verify [slot_suffix] - run verification process using hash data\n" " from vbmeta structure\n"
" [slot_suffix] - _a, _b, etc (if vbmeta partition is slotted)\n" );
-- 2.20.1
Thanks
[1] https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/+/49936b4c0109411fdd3...