Hi Mattias,
On Wed, 16 Dec 2020 at 09:28, matthias.bgg@kernel.org wrote:
From: Matthias Brugger mbrugger@suse.com
When calling srand_mac we use a weak seed dependent on the mac address. If present, use a RNG device instead to incerase entropy.
Signed-off-by: Matthias Brugger mbrugger@suse.com
Changes in v2:
- fix dm_rng_read() parameters
- add missing include file
net/net_rand.h | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/net_rand.h b/net/net_rand.h index 4bf9bd817e..e7299973a3 100644 --- a/net/net_rand.h +++ b/net/net_rand.h @@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ #define __NET_RAND_H__
#include <common.h> +#include <dm/uclass.h> +#include <rng.h>
/*
- Return a seed for the PRNG derived from the eth0 MAC address.
@@ -37,7 +39,22 @@ static inline unsigned int seed_mac(void) */ static inline void srand_mac(void) {
srand(seed_mac());+#if defined(CONFIG_DM_RNG)
if (IS_ENABLED())
Similar comment to the other patch
int ret;struct udevice *devp;u32 randv = 0;ret = uclass_get_device(UCLASS_RNG, 0, &devp);if (ret) {ret = dm_rng_read(devp, &randv, sizeof(randv));if (ret < 0)randv = 0;}if (randv)srand(randv);else+#endif
srand(seed_mac());}
#endif /* __NET_RAND_H__ */
2.29.2