Add a structure to describe an algorithm which can sign and (later) verify images.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org --- Changes in v3: None Changes in v2: - Adjust how signing enable works in image.h - Rebase on previous patches - Tweak tools/Makefile to make image signing optional - Update README to fix typos and clarify some points - gd->fdt_blob is now available on all archs (generic board landed)
README | 5 + common/Makefile | 1 + common/image-sig.c | 42 +++++++++ doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt | 216 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/image.h | 90 +++++++++++++++++- tools/Makefile | 6 ++ 6 files changed, 358 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 common/image-sig.c create mode 100644 doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt
diff --git a/README b/README index 33bda8c..3e586c3 100644 --- a/README +++ b/README @@ -2781,6 +2781,11 @@ FIT uImage format: most specific compatibility entry of U-Boot's fdt's root node. The order of entries in the configuration's fdt is ignored.
+ CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE + This option enables signature verification of FIT uImages, + using a hash signed and verified using RSA. See + doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt for more details. + - Standalone program support: CONFIG_STANDALONE_LOAD_ADDR
diff --git a/common/Makefile b/common/Makefile index d40fb1f..84ae279 100644 --- a/common/Makefile +++ b/common/Makefile @@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ COBJS-y += dlmalloc.o COBJS-y += image.o COBJS-$(CONFIG_OF_LIBFDT) += image-fdt.o COBJS-$(CONFIG_FIT) += image-fit.o +COBJS-$(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE) += image-sig.o COBJS-y += memsize.o COBJS-y += stdio.o
diff --git a/common/image-sig.c b/common/image-sig.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..841c662 --- /dev/null +++ b/common/image-sig.c @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013, Google Inc. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of + * the License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, + * MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#ifdef USE_HOSTCC +#include "mkimage.h" +#include <time.h> +#else +#include <common.h> +#endif /* !USE_HOSTCC*/ +#include <errno.h> +#include <image.h> + +struct image_sig_algo image_sig_algos[] = { +}; + +struct image_sig_algo *image_get_sig_algo(const char *name) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(image_sig_algos); i++) { + if (!strcmp(image_sig_algos[i].name, name)) + return &image_sig_algos[i]; + } + + return NULL; +} diff --git a/doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt b/doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0d145e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt @@ -0,0 +1,216 @@ +U-Boot FIT Signature Verification +================================= + +Introduction +------------ +FIT supports hashing of images so that these hashes can be checked on +loading. This protects against corruption of the image. However it does not +prevent the substitution of one image for another. + +The signature feature allows the hash to be signed with a private key such +that it can be verified using a public key later. Provided that the private +key is kept secret and the public key is stored in a non-volatile place, +any image can be verified in this way. + +See verified-boot.txt for more general information on verified boot. + + +Concepts +-------- +Some familiarity with public key cryptography is assumed in this section. + +The procedure for signing is as follows: + + - hash an image in the FIT + - sign the hash with a private key to produce a signature + - store the resulting signature in the FIT + +The procedure for verification is: + + - read the FIT + - obtain the public key + - extract the signature from the FIT + - hash the image from the FIT + - verify (with the public key) that the extracted signature matches the + hash + +The signing is generally performed by mkimage, as part of making a firmware +image for the device. The verification is normally done in U-Boot on the +device. + + +Algorithms +---------- +In principle any suitable algorithm can be used to sign and verify a hash. +At present only one class of algorithms is supported: SHA1 hashing with RSA. +This works by hashing the image to produce a 20-byte hash. + +While it is acceptable to bring in large cryptographic libraries such as +openssl on the host side (e.g. mkimage), it is not desirable for U-Boot. +For the run-time verification side, it is important to keep code and data +size as small as possible. + +For this reason the RSA image verification uses pre-processed public keys +which can be used with a very small amount of code - just some extraction +of data from the FDT and exponentiation mod n. Code size impact is a little +under 5KB on Tegra Seaboard, for example. + +It is relatively straightforward to add new algorithms if required. If +another RSA variant is needed, then it can be added to the table in +image-sig.c. If another algorithm is needed (such as DSA) then it can be +placed alongside rsa.c, and its functions added to the table in image-sig.c +also. + + +Creating an RSA key and certificate +----------------------------------- +To create a new public key, size 2048 bits: + +$ openssl genrsa -F4 -out keys/dev.key 2048 + +To create a certificate for this: + +$ openssl req -batch -new -x509 -key keys/dev.key -out keys/dev.crt + +If you like you can look at the public key also: + +$ openssl rsa -in keys/dev.key -pubout + + +Device Tree Bindings +-------------------- +The following properties are required in the FIT's signature node(s) to +allow thes signer to operate. These should be added to the .its file. +Signature nodes sit at the same level as hash nodes and are called +signature@1, signature@2, etc. + +- algo: Algorithm name (e.g. "sha1,rs2048") + +- key-name-hint: Name of key to use for signing. The keys will normally be in +a single directory (parameter -k to mkimage). For a given key <name>, its +private key is stored in <name>.key and the certificate is stored in +<name>.crt. + +When the image is signed, the following properties are added (mandatory): + +- value: The signature data (e.g. 256 bytes for 2048-bit RSA) + +When the image is signed, the following properties are optional: + +- timestamp: Time when image was signed (standard Unix time_t format) + +- signer-name: Name of the signer (e.g. "mkimage") + +- signer-version: Version string of the signer (e.g. "2013.01") + +- comment: Additional information about the signer or image + + +Example: See sign-images.its for an example image tree source file. + + +Public Key Storage +------------------ +In order to verify an image that has been signed with a public key we need to +have a trusted public key. This cannot be stored in the signed image, since +it would be easy to alter. For this implementation we choose to store the +public key in U-Boot's control FDT (using CONFIG_OF_CONTROL). + +Public keys should be stored as sub-nodes in a /signature node. Required +properties are: + +- algo: Algorithm name (e.g. "sha1,rs2048") + +Optional properties are: + +- key-name-hint: Name of key used for signing. This is only a hint since it +is possible for the name to be changed. Verification can proceed by checking +all available signing keys until one matches. + +- required: If present this indicates that the key must be verified for the +image / configuration to be considered valid. Only required keys are +normally verified by the FIT image booting algorithm. Valid values are +"image" to force verification of all images, and "conf" to force verfication +of the selected configuration (which then relies on hashes in the images to +verify those). + +Each signing algorithm has its own additional properties. + +For RSA the following are mandatory: + +- rsa,num-bits: Number of key bits (e.g. 2048) +- rsa,modulus: Modulus (N) as a big-endian multi-word integer +- rsa,r-squared: (2^num-bits)^2 as a big-endian multi-word integer +- rsa,n0-inverse: -1 / modulus[0] mod 2^32 + + +Verification +------------ +FITs are verified when loaded. After the configuration is selected a list +of required images is produced. If there are 'required' public keys, then +each image must be verified against those keys. This means that every image +that might be used by the target needs to be signed with 'required' keys. + +This happens automatically as part of a bootm command when FITs are used. + + +Enabling FIT Verification +------------------------- +In addition to the options to enable FIT itself, the following CONFIGs must +be enabled: + +CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE - enable signing and verfication in FITs +CONFIG_RSA - enable RSA algorithm for signing + + +Testing +------- +An easy way to test signing and verfication is to use the test script +provided in test/vboot/vboot_test.sh. This uses sandbox (a special version +of U-Boot which runs under Linux) to show the operation of a 'bootm' +command loading and verifying images. + +A sample run is show below: + +$ make O=sandbox sandbox_config +$ make O=sandbox +$ O=sandbox ./test/vboot/vboot_test.sh +Simple Verified Boot Test +========================= + +Please see doc/uImage.FIT/verified-boot.txt for more information + +Build keys +Build FIT with signed images +Test Verified Boot Run: unsigned signatures:: OK +Sign images +Test Verified Boot Run: signed images: OK +Build FIT with signed configuration +Test Verified Boot Run: unsigned config: OK +Sign images +Test Verified Boot Run: signed config: OK + +Test passed + + +Future Work +----------- +- Roll-back protection using a TPM is done using the tpm command. This can +be scripted, but we might consider a default way of doing this, built into +bootm. + + +Possible Future Work +-------------------- +- Add support for other RSA/SHA variants, such as rsa4096,sha512. +- Other algorithms besides RSA +- More sandbox tests for failure modes +- Passwords for keys/certificates +- Perhaps implement OAEP +- Enhance bootm to permit scripted signature verification (so that a script +can verify an image but not actually boot it) + + +Simon Glass +sjg@chromium.org +1-1-13 diff --git a/include/image.h b/include/image.h index 4415bcf..3f61682 100644 --- a/include/image.h +++ b/include/image.h @@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ struct lmb; #define CONFIG_OF_LIBFDT 1 #define CONFIG_FIT_VERBOSE 1 /* enable fit_format_{error,warning}() */
+/* Support FIT image signing on host */ +#define CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE + #define IMAGE_ENABLE_IGNORE 0 #define IMAGE_INDENT_STRING ""
@@ -670,11 +673,12 @@ int image_setup_linux(bootm_headers_t *images); #define FIT_IMAGES_PATH "/images" #define FIT_CONFS_PATH "/configurations"
-/* hash node */ +/* hash/signature node */ #define FIT_HASH_NODENAME "hash" #define FIT_ALGO_PROP "algo" #define FIT_VALUE_PROP "value" #define FIT_IGNORE_PROP "uboot-ignore" +#define FIT_SIG_NODENAME "signature"
/* image node */ #define FIT_DATA_PROP "data" @@ -804,15 +808,19 @@ int calculate_hash(const void *data, int data_len, const char *algo, uint8_t *value, int *value_len);
/* - * At present we only support verification on the device + * At present we only support signing on the host, and verification on the + * device */ #if defined(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE) # ifdef USE_HOSTCC +# define IMAGE_ENABLE_SIGN 1 # define IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY 0 #else +# define IMAGE_ENABLE_SIGN 0 # define IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY 1 # endif #else +# define IMAGE_ENABLE_SIGN 0 # define IMAGE_ENABLE_VERIFY 0 #endif
@@ -828,6 +836,84 @@ int calculate_hash(const void *data, int data_len, const char *algo, #define IMAGE_ENABLE_BEST_MATCH 0 #endif
+/* Information passed to the signing routines */ +struct image_sign_info { + const char *keydir; /* Directory conaining keys */ + const char *keyname; /* Name of key to use */ + void *fit; /* Pointer to FIT blob */ + int node_offset; /* Offset of signature node */ + struct image_sig_algo *algo; /* Algorithm information */ + const void *fdt_blob; /* FDT containing public keys */ + int required_keynode; /* Node offset of key to use: -1=any */ + const char *require_keys; /* Value for 'required' property */ +}; + +/* A part of an image, used for hashing */ +struct image_region { + const void *data; + int size; +}; + +struct image_sig_algo { + const char *name; /* Name of algorithm */ + + /** + * sign() - calculate and return signature for given input data + * + * @info: Specifies key and FIT information + * @data: Pointer to the input data + * @data_len: Data length + * @sigp: Set to an allocated buffer holding the signature + * @sig_len: Set to length of the calculated hash + * + * This computes input data signature according to selected algorithm. + * Resulting signature value is placed in an allocated buffer, the + * pointer is returned as *sigp. The length of the calculated + * signature is returned via the sig_len pointer argument. The caller + * should free *sigp. + * + * @return: 0, on success, -ve on error + */ + int (*sign)(struct image_sign_info *info, + const struct image_region region[], + int region_count, uint8_t **sigp, uint *sig_len); + + /** + * add_verify_data() - Add verification information to FDT + * + * Add public key information to the FDT node, suitable for + * verification at run-time. The information added depends on the + * algorithm being used. + * + * @info: Specifies key and FIT information + * @keydest: Destination FDT blob for public key data + * @return: 0, on success, -ve on error + */ + int (*add_verify_data)(struct image_sign_info *info, void *keydest); + + /** + * verify() - Verify a signature against some data + * + * @info: Specifies key and FIT information + * @data: Pointer to the input data + * @data_len: Data length + * @sig: Signature + * @sig_len: Number of bytes in signature + * @return 0 if verified, -ve on error + */ + int (*verify)(struct image_sign_info *info, + const struct image_region region[], int region_count, + uint8_t *sig, uint sig_len); +}; + +/** + * image_get_sig_algo() - Look up a signature algortihm + * + * @param name Name of algorithm + * @return pointer to algorithm information, or NULL if not found + */ +struct image_sig_algo *image_get_sig_algo(const char *name); + static inline int fit_image_check_target_arch(const void *fdt, int node) { return fit_image_check_arch(fdt, node, IH_ARCH_DEFAULT); diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile index 569dc77..38fd934 100644 --- a/tools/Makefile +++ b/tools/Makefile @@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ BIN_FILES-y += proftool(SFX) EXT_OBJ_FILES-$(CONFIG_BUILD_ENVCRC) += common/env_embedded.o EXT_OBJ_FILES-y += common/image.o EXT_OBJ_FILES-$(CONFIG_FIT) += common/image-fit.o +EXT_OBJ_FILES-y += common/image-sig.o EXT_OBJ_FILES-y += lib/crc32.o EXT_OBJ_FILES-y += lib/md5.o EXT_OBJ_FILES-y += lib/sha1.o @@ -161,6 +162,10 @@ HOSTSRCS += $(addprefix $(SRCTREE)/lib/libfdt/,$(LIBFDT_OBJ_FILES-y:.o=.c)) BINS := $(addprefix $(obj),$(sort $(BIN_FILES-y))) LIBFDT_OBJS := $(addprefix $(obj),$(LIBFDT_OBJ_FILES-y))
+# We cannot check CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE here since it is not set on the host +FIT_SIG_OBJ_FILES := image-sig.o +FIT_SIG_OBJS := $(addprefix $(obj),$(FIT_SIG_OBJ_FILES)) + HOSTOBJS := $(addprefix $(obj),$(OBJ_FILES-y)) NOPEDOBJS := $(addprefix $(obj),$(NOPED_OBJ_FILES-y))
@@ -220,6 +225,7 @@ $(obj)mkimage$(SFX): $(obj)aisimage.o \ $(obj)image-fit.o \ $(obj)image.o \ $(obj)image-host.o \ + $(FIT_SIG_OBJS) \ $(obj)imximage.o \ $(obj)kwbimage.o \ $(obj)pblimage.o \