On 16/12/2020 14:20, Torsten Duwe wrote:
On Wed, 16 Dec 2020 11:41:17 +0100 matthias.bgg@kernel.org wrote:
From: Matthias Brugger mbrugger@suse.com
When calling srand_mac we use a weak seed dependent on the mac address. If present, use a RNG device instead to incerase entropy.
Signed-off-by: Matthias Brugger mbrugger@suse.com
net/net_rand.h | 18 +++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/net_rand.h b/net/net_rand.h index 4bf9bd817e..600c3d825e 100644 --- a/net/net_rand.h +++ b/net/net_rand.h @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #define __NET_RAND_H__
#include <common.h> +#include <rng.h>
/*
- Return a seed for the PRNG derived from the eth0 MAC address.
@@ -37,7 +38,22 @@ static inline unsigned int seed_mac(void) */ static inline void srand_mac(void) {
- srand(seed_mac());
+#if defined(CONFIG_DM_RNG)
- int ret;
- struct udevice *devp;
- u32 randv = 0;
- ret = uclass_get_device(UCLASS_RNG, 0, &devp);
- if (ret) {
ret = dm_rng_read(dev, randv, sizeof(randv));Haven't tested this (yet), but shouldn't this be ret = dm_rng_read(devp, &randv, sizeof(randv)); ^ ^ ?
Ups, yes you are right. I'll send a v2.
Regards, Matthias