12 Mar
2020
12 Mar
'20
5:48 p.m.
On Fri, Feb 21, 2020 at 03:12:57PM +0900, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
For FIT verification, all the properties of a public key come from "control fdt" pointed to by fdt_blob. In UEFI secure boot, on the other hand, a public key is located and retrieved from dedicated signature database stored as UEFI variables.
Added two fields may hold values of a public key if fdt_blob is NULL, and will be used in rsa_verify_with_pkey() to verify a signature in UEFI sub-system.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro takahiro.akashi@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org
Applied to u-boot/next, thanks!
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Tom