Hi Ilias,
On Thu, 10 Nov 2022 at 01:04, Ilias Apalodimas ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org wrote:
Hi Kojima-san
On Wed, Nov 09, 2022 at 12:37:27PM +0900, Masahisa Kojima wrote:
This commit adds the menu-driven UEFI Secure Boot Key enrollment interface. User can enroll PK, KEK, db and dbx by selecting file. Only the signed EFI Signature List(s) with an authenticated header, typically '.auth' file, is accepted.
To clear the PK, KEK, db and dbx, user needs to enroll the null key signed by PK or KEK.
Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima masahisa.kojima@linaro.org
Changes in v7:
- only accept .auth file.
- remove creating time based authenticated variable
- update commit message
- use efi_file_size()
Changes in v6:
- use efi_secure_boot_enabled()
- replace with WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0 from pe.h
- call efi_build_signature_store() to check the valid EFI Signature List
- update comment
Changes in v4:
- add CONFIG_EFI_MM_COMM_TEE dependency
- fix error handling
Changes in v3:
- fix error handling
Changes in v2:
- allow to enroll .esl file
- fix typos
- add function comments
cmd/Makefile | 5 + cmd/eficonfig.c | 3 + cmd/eficonfig_sbkey.c | 242 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/efi_config.h | 5 + 4 files changed, 255 insertions(+) create mode 100644 cmd/eficonfig_sbkey.c
diff --git a/cmd/Makefile b/cmd/Makefile index 2444d116c0..0b6a96c1d9 100644 --- a/cmd/Makefile +++ b/cmd/Makefile @@ -66,6 +66,11 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CMD_EEPROM) += eeprom.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI) += efi.o obj-$(CONFIG_CMD_EFIDEBUG) += efidebug.o obj-$(CONFIG_CMD_EFICONFIG) += eficonfig.o +ifdef CONFIG_CMD_EFICONFIG +ifdef CONFIG_EFI_MM_COMM_TEE +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT) += eficonfig_sbkey.o +endif +endif obj-$(CONFIG_CMD_ELF) += elf.o obj-$(CONFIG_CMD_EROFS) += erofs.o obj-$(CONFIG_HUSH_PARSER) += exit.o diff --git a/cmd/eficonfig.c b/cmd/eficonfig.c index 12babb76c2..d79194794b 100644 --- a/cmd/eficonfig.c +++ b/cmd/eficonfig.c @@ -2435,6 +2435,9 @@ static const struct eficonfig_item maintenance_menu_items[] = { {"Edit Boot Option", eficonfig_process_edit_boot_option}, {"Change Boot Order", eficonfig_process_change_boot_order}, {"Delete Boot Option", eficonfig_process_delete_boot_option}, +#if (CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(EFI_SECURE_BOOT) && CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(EFI_MM_COMM_TEE))
{"Secure Boot Configuration", eficonfig_process_secure_boot_config},+#endif {"Quit", eficonfig_process_quit}, };
diff --git a/cmd/eficonfig_sbkey.c b/cmd/eficonfig_sbkey.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1e9eb3f51e --- /dev/null +++ b/cmd/eficonfig_sbkey.c @@ -0,0 +1,242 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/*
- Menu-driven UEFI Secure Boot Key Maintenance
- Copyright (c) 2022 Masahisa Kojima, Linaro Limited
- */
+#include <ansi.h> +#include <common.h> +#include <charset.h> +#include <hexdump.h> +#include <log.h> +#include <malloc.h> +#include <menu.h> +#include <efi_loader.h> +#include <efi_config.h> +#include <efi_variable.h> +#include <crypto/pkcs7_parser.h>
+enum efi_sbkey_signature_type {
SIG_TYPE_X509 = 0,SIG_TYPE_HASH,SIG_TYPE_CRL,SIG_TYPE_RSA2048,+};
+struct eficonfig_sigtype_to_str {
efi_guid_t sig_type;char *str;enum efi_sbkey_signature_type type;+};
+static const struct eficonfig_sigtype_to_str sigtype_to_str[] = {
{EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, "X509", SIG_TYPE_X509},{EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, "SHA256", SIG_TYPE_HASH},{EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, "X509_SHA256 CRL", SIG_TYPE_CRL},{EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, "X509_SHA384 CRL", SIG_TYPE_CRL},{EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, "X509_SHA512 CRL", SIG_TYPE_CRL},/* U-Boot does not support the following signature types */+/* {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, "RSA2048", SIG_TYPE_RSA2048}, */ +/* {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID, "RSA2048_SHA256", SIG_TYPE_RSA2048}, */ +/* {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, "SHA1", SIG_TYPE_HASH}, */ +/* {EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA_GUID, "RSA2048_SHA", SIG_TYPE_RSA2048 }, */ +/* {EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, "SHA224", SIG_TYPE_HASH}, */ +/* {EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, "SHA384", SIG_TYPE_HASH}, */ +/* {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, "SHA512", SIG_TYPE_HASH}, */ +};
+/**
- file_have_auth_header() - check file has EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 header
- @buf: pointer to file
- @size: file size
- Return: true if file has auth header, false otherwise
- */
+static bool file_have_auth_header(void *buf, efi_uintn_t size) +{
struct efi_variable_authentication_2 *auth = buf;if (auth->auth_info.hdr.wCertificateType != WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID)return false;if (guidcmp(&auth->auth_info.cert_type, &efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7))return false;return true;+}
+/**
- eficonfig_process_enroll_key() - enroll key into signature database
- @data: pointer to the data for each entry
- Return: status code
- */
+static efi_status_t eficonfig_process_enroll_key(void *data) +{
u32 attr;char *buf = NULL;efi_uintn_t size;efi_status_t ret;struct efi_file_handle *f;struct efi_file_handle *root;struct eficonfig_select_file_info file_info;file_info.current_path = calloc(1, EFICONFIG_FILE_PATH_BUF_SIZE);if (!file_info.current_path) {ret = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;goto out;}ret = eficonfig_process_select_file(&file_info);if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)goto out;ret = efi_open_volume_int(file_info.current_volume, &root);if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)goto out;ret = efi_file_open_int(root, &f, file_info.current_path, EFI_FILE_MODE_READ, 0);if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)goto out;I think it would be better here if we could use efi_file_from_path(). I think we can't easily do that atm since we can't convert the filename to a device path with efi_dp_from_file() since we don't have the block info.
Here we have a device path of volume(file_info.current_volume) and filename(file_info.current_path), so we can create a full device path to call efi_file_from_path(). # cmd/eficonfig.c::create_selected_device_path() create the full device path, we can reuse it.
Since that requires a further clean up, I am fine keeping it as-is for now, but add a comment saying we should replace that with efi_file_from_path() eventually.
Probably I don't understand what is improved when we replace current code with efi_file_from_path().
ret = efi_file_size(f, &size);if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)goto out;buf = calloc(1, size);if (!buf) {ret = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;goto out;}if (size == 0) {eficonfig_print_msg("ERROR! File is empty.");goto out;}ret = efi_file_read_int(f, &size, buf);if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) {eficonfig_print_msg("ERROR! Failed to read file.");goto out;}if (!file_have_auth_header(buf, size)) {eficonfig_print_msg("ERROR! Invalid file format. Only .auth variables is allowed.");ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;goto out;}attr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE |EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS |EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;/* PK can enroll only one certificate */if (u16_strcmp(data, u"PK")) {efi_uintn_t db_size = 0;/* check the variable exists. If exists, add APPEND_WRITE attribute */ret = efi_get_variable_int(data, efi_auth_var_get_guid(data), NULL,&db_size, NULL, NULL);if (ret == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)attr |= EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE;}ret = efi_set_variable_int((u16 *)data, efi_auth_var_get_guid((u16 *)data),attr, size, buf, false);if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)eficonfig_print_msg("ERROR! Failed to update signature database");+out:
free(file_info.current_path);free(buf);Shouldn't we close the file handle here as well?
Yes, thank you for pointing this out.
Regards, Masahisa Kojima
/* return to the parent menu */ret = (ret == EFI_ABORTED) ? EFI_NOT_READY : ret;return ret;+}
+static struct eficonfig_item key_config_menu_items[] = {
{"Enroll New Key", eficonfig_process_enroll_key},{"Quit", eficonfig_process_quit},+};
+/**
- eficonfig_process_set_secure_boot_key() - display the key configuration menu
- @data: pointer to the data for each entry
- Return: status code
- */
+static efi_status_t eficonfig_process_set_secure_boot_key(void *data)
[...]