Hi Jon,
Thank you for the patch.
On ven., mai 31, 2024 at 17:20, Jonathan Humphreys j-humphreys@ti.com wrote:
Few cosmetic fixes for clarity and spelling mistakes.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Humphreys j-humphreys@ti.com
Reviewed-by: Mattijs Korpershoek mkorpershoek@baylibre.com
doc/board/ti/k3.rst | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/board/ti/k3.rst b/doc/board/ti/k3.rst index a1c01d1cf02..927f3976d34 100644 --- a/doc/board/ti/k3.rst +++ b/doc/board/ti/k3.rst @@ -51,14 +51,14 @@ For all K3 SoCs the first core started will be inside the Security Management Subsystem (SMS) which will secure the device and start a core in the wakeup domain to run the ROM code. ROM will then initialize the boot media needed to load the binaries packaged inside `tiboot3.bin`, -including a 32bit U-Boot SPL, (called the wakup SPL) that ROM will jump +including a 32bit U-Boot SPL, (called the wakeup SPL) that ROM will jump to after it has finished loading everything into internal SRAM.
.. image:: img/boot_flow_01.svg :alt: Boot flow up to wakeup domain SPL
The wakeup SPL, running on a wakeup domain core, will initialize DDR and -any peripherals needed load the larger binaries inside the `tispl.bin` +any peripherals needed to load the larger binaries inside the `tispl.bin` into DDR. Once loaded the wakeup SPL will start one of the 'big' application cores inside the main domain to initialize the main domain, starting with Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A), before moving on to start @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ essentially 4 unique but very similar flows:
- Combined binary with a split firmware: (eg: AM62)
For devices that utilize the split binary approach, ROM is not capable -of loading the firmware into the SoC requiring the wakeup domain's +of loading the firmware into the SoC, requiring the wakeup domain's U-Boot SPL to load the firmware.
Devices with a split firmware will have two firmwares loaded into the @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ K3 HS-SE (High Security - Security Enforced) devices enforce an authenticated boot flow for secure boot. HS-FS (High Security - Field Securable) is the state of a K3 device before it has been eFused with customer security keys. In the HS-FS state the authentication still can -function as in HS-SE but as there are no customer keys to verify the -signatures against the authentication will pass for certificates signed +function as in HS-SE, but as there are no customer keys to verify the +signatures against, the authentication will pass for certificates signed with any key.
Chain of trust
2.34.1