On 4/10/24 4:38 AM, Ilias Apalodimas wrote:
On Tue, 9 Apr 2024 at 23:14, Andrew Davis afd@ti.com wrote:
On 4/9/24 2:26 PM, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:
On 4/9/24 14:14, Andrew Davis wrote:
On 4/8/24 10:34 PM, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote:
On 4/8/24 23:33, Jonathan Humphreys wrote:
EFI signature list using TI dummy keys.
Adding vendor public keys into the code base to lock down generated binaries to the vendors unpublished private key does not match well with the intent of the GNU public license.
The matching private keys are already published in this same repo/directory (arch/arm/mach-k3/keys).
Andrew
Why should we create signed capsules which are already compromised by publishing the private key?
If you buy these devices you have two options, you can burn real keys, or you can burn these dummy keys. If you burn dummy keys then these images will boot and so will any image you or anyone else wants to boot on the device. (since the keys are published anyone can make images for them, that is how we do GP (general purpose) devices these days)
If you burn your own keys, then you switch out these keys here and your device will only boot images that you permit by signing with your keys.
I am not sure I am following you here. We don't burn anything in the case of EFI keys. They are placed in an elf section and we assume the device will have a chain of trust enabled, naturally verifying those keys along with the u-boot binary.
Right, you can (and probably should) use different keys stored in the boot stages to verify the next stages. I was more giving the background to why we publish our "private" keys at all here. Using the same keys for every stage (including burning it in as the HW root of trust key) is to make the examples here easier, but I think I see what you are saying. It could be better to generate a key-pair as part of this build for the EFI keys.
You'll find plenty of open source projects do the same and give out example keys to show how to use real keys, even official GNU projects.
Yes, but the keys defined here are useless unless you have a default defconfig that uses them and embeds them in the binary. I am not cc'ed in all the patches of the series, is that added somewhere? And if you unconditionally enable secure boot It would be far more interesting to embed the MS SHIM key along with that special key you are trying to define, so that firmware can boot COTS distros as well
Using MS SHIM keys here does sound interesting, I'll let Jon comment on if we want to add that to this series or save for later.
Thanks, Andrew
Thanks /Ilias
https://github.com/gpg/gnupg/tree/master/tests/openpgp/samplekeys
Andrew
Best regards
Heinrich
Best regards
Heinrich
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Humphreys j-humphreys@ti.com
arch/arm/mach-k3/keys/custMpk.esl | Bin 0 -> 1523 bytes 1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm/mach-k3/keys/custMpk.esl
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-k3/keys/custMpk.esl b/arch/arm/mach-k3/keys/custMpk.esl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2feb704e0a5fd126410de451d3c0fa4d3edccc52 GIT binary patch literal 1523 zcmZ1&d0^?2Da*aux2_hA(f&~MnUw(yu0v@E4?-F=u^u*PVqVQ8QZ((-^A*$m*Kg7c z&78AJODc2mtxpELY@Awc9&O)w85y}*84Mcd8gd(OvN4CUun9AT2E#ZUJWL@GhWtR) zKpA!(HkZVloWx>7bput902hy3NNPo5v4Uq_aY<2WZfaf$h@G5YRFGekSdyAzC~P1I zQpnB26;PC)oLXF*UsMbeWai-t@l*&dEdVMmF_blshP#N9QH-w`BJNO<sh6CeYal1i zYh-L-W?*PwYGi0=7A4MWYz$;tLb-$9{Y^|t$U)A?%D~*j#Lr;R#Kgta#Kg$3Uu2!< zjryX?*~({Md+?>+QS$x7=il`0?bc6sZ`Vxxl^6N{>i2E;SY*4-T$+0G;)5dxe+2CR z@4+)sDPWdQb@%6KTpDVdm)v}?GSpG(w_UV)&i+#e3fJowDZO)JR83lIcbw(hMu}}Y z2ZZwYAI-LVx@^G;HdkgxaX&Hnl_l3&{H|3l7uX@Vl5di{>fQQ{pDynFlySp2(z~g) z{LIBUzm&K9j_CMw_SIFfPdcT#zmg6g<ji}(R`6geJLk-#o7bK^&&fT}#2zsD`=c9g zFUCK<Fz@{2kel&$W6zl<d|WNk#ZsNRd{_N_SJxWvh0*K$j!m)c@oT>{#b(Lp`M3Uj zGOKycyEe+n{G(Rmg}jB!)0ySk-!kkj_R7#OT+}pcG0VXh?f+ftRvnyw#hUea^Iyfn ze|zgKPKrqe@jYWU?v<50X(n^lZ*G%j$JyCh`*Px|H*K=2WXP)hx>jng+}Q}N^KoDN z8dh8T-~Dmrp2?yk3O6Gqbz7O@<TEz<^zIa7d#PKtHKHeAg?V0DMSin^o3F|IEfQWk zcmJwBy6&2hKub%G{j3IK(?7m@uI43#1e~wSZJ5sTtDjrp@7@{O3(faN{`Gp}x{$M5 z{A7`c@pjfYq1Z=JvgZ^-zCC<(HFTBwYhTX$k`7IJX`SM!H}f`Mv+(Op6uVY(<(^o4 zpyXAj9nF_c-1A<UIel9%6Eh<NBXSA>W=dcRVPvS;*B%(4`P|iK>Vg$XDgN9sr}Df{ z7X0es=RPHr8RB+*)}q}h%gn?x9PO4y*Qog};x<<LS+lxk$@$kYlG_hXu6p%jvB<%l zmcsdI9w!^rFPt^&c~{1?L~DJ4TRPv>t%rn8xi;KBE9A!Dppb9yru|>RCb9PcXWpE> zKlQ}fzw*izXI|}|r!O*nb&cP9#VhHRn;B<SRflN2Jl(*;W4e0LD$ORRIdjjhURZH+ zXWR0Vllb2@>`1LC^xvIctvLCYhRA_6yCS~2&!0SH1xwv(O~<l(HQxHJxzF!T_>+5t z^|E$S{MM^8j9J5`sQ6pud{2Lz?k`zncbjvHj%eutjusUol}8;%cbPLCO|e;ZJ^tXe z_N{pmM}uCi3UWO3=hMc<s}m1Jx4GS4F(<_N`R|o+)eAK3Yx{o$ygRe!;<_EoF&UhP zrslJ=2XA9^$j#UDYwo;ZvZwb!|L%YP%v|ie|7-1PP+q3DZ&vEWgHHrjHv|NzEVjO? zKFeRbXv>iTPl?N16Xv@buq_d@TU<MB;uD_jX^$J`&*C>`uX0_s&g9M2C6cKx4E;{? zt`1&)Tk-yb?sKMPI~!}xt*d*!tMat!r1`}jul#i@lDB8rnu>ba_-^4!iQ5{|tb3TX z>fTMIw2!Me3{Dw*WZotC<4@h<H`zaL+~Es<{Ccj5yS7zyNU!YsTG`^JqA6NkU%vnV D66<<J
literal 0 HcmV?d00001