On Thu, Nov 03, 2022 at 05:35:33PM -0400, Sean Anderson wrote:
As discussed previously [1,2], the source command is not safe to use with verified boot unless there is a key with required = "images" (which has its own problems). This is because if such a key is absent, signatures are verified but not required. It is assumed that configuration nodes will provide the signature. Because the source command does not use configurations to determine the image to source, effectively no verification takes place.
To address this, allow specifying configuration nodes. We use the same syntax as the bootm command (helpfully provided for us by fit_parse_conf). By default, we first try the default config and then the default image. To force using a config, # must be present in the command (e.g. `source $loadaddr#my-conf`). For convenience, the config may be omitted, just like the address may be (e.g. `source #`). This also works for images (`source :` behaves exactly like `source` currently does).
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/u-boot/7d711133-d513-5bcb-52f2-a9dbaa9eeded@prevas.d... [2] https://lore.kernel.org/u-boot/042dcb34-f85f-351e-1b0e-513f89005fdd@gmail.co...
Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson sean.anderson@seco.com Reviewed-by: Simon Glass sjg@chromium.org
Currently, there's two problems. One, fit_conf_get_prop_node() should be called (I believe) with IH_PHASE_NONE, which I can do when applying. However, two, fit_config_verify() depends on CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(FIT_SIGNATURE) and I'm less immediately sure how to rework that in to this patch. Can you please rebase on top of current next? Thanks.