Re-crypt support was extended to devices without burnt SBK. In case SBK is not set, place from where it is read is filled with zeroes. This patch adds support for ebtupdate function to detect nosbk device and avoid crypto operations for it.
Tested-by: Maksim Kurnosenko asusx2@mail.ru Signed-off-by: Svyatoslav Ryhel clamor95@gmail.com --- arch/arm/mach-tegra/tegra20/bct.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++---------- arch/arm/mach-tegra/tegra30/bct.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++---------- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-tegra/tegra20/bct.c b/arch/arm/mach-tegra/tegra20/bct.c index 5eb48990b6..b2c44f3d23 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-tegra/tegra20/bct.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-tegra/tegra20/bct.c @@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ #include "bct.h" #include "uboot_aes.h"
+/* Device with "sbk burned: false" will expose zero key */ +const u8 nosbk[AES128_KEY_LENGTH] = { 0 }; + /* * @param bct boot config table start in RAM * @param ect bootloader start in RAM @@ -23,22 +26,27 @@ static int bct_patch(u8 *bct, u8 *ebt, u32 ebt_size) u8 ebt_hash[AES128_KEY_LENGTH] = { 0 }; u8 sbk[AES128_KEY_LENGTH] = { 0 }; u8 *bct_hash = bct; + bool encrypted; int ret;
bct += BCT_HASH;
+ ebt_size = roundup(ebt_size, EBT_ALIGNMENT); + memcpy(sbk, (u8 *)(bct + BCT_LENGTH), NVBOOT_CMAC_AES_HASH_LENGTH * 4);
- ret = decrypt_data_block(bct, BCT_LENGTH, sbk); - if (ret) - return 1; + encrypted = memcmp(&sbk, &nosbk, AES128_KEY_LENGTH);
- ebt_size = roundup(ebt_size, EBT_ALIGNMENT); + if (encrypted) { + ret = decrypt_data_block(bct, BCT_LENGTH, sbk); + if (ret) + return 1;
- ret = encrypt_data_block(ebt, ebt_size, sbk); - if (ret) - return 1; + ret = encrypt_data_block(ebt, ebt_size, sbk); + if (ret) + return 1; + }
ret = sign_enc_data_block(ebt, ebt_size, ebt_hash, sbk); if (ret) @@ -52,9 +60,11 @@ static int bct_patch(u8 *bct, u8 *ebt, u32 ebt_size) bct_tbl->bootloader[0].load_addr = CONFIG_SPL_TEXT_BASE; bct_tbl->bootloader[0].length = ebt_size;
- ret = encrypt_data_block(bct, BCT_LENGTH, sbk); - if (ret) - return 1; + if (encrypted) { + ret = encrypt_data_block(bct, BCT_LENGTH, sbk); + if (ret) + return 1; + }
ret = sign_enc_data_block(bct, BCT_LENGTH, bct_hash, sbk); if (ret) diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-tegra/tegra30/bct.c b/arch/arm/mach-tegra/tegra30/bct.c index c56958da69..cff1a3e98d 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-tegra/tegra30/bct.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-tegra/tegra30/bct.c @@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ #include "bct.h" #include "uboot_aes.h"
+/* Device with "sbk burned: false" will expose zero key */ +const u8 nosbk[AES128_KEY_LENGTH] = { 0 }; + /* * @param bct boot config table start in RAM * @param ect bootloader start in RAM @@ -23,22 +26,27 @@ static int bct_patch(u8 *bct, u8 *ebt, u32 ebt_size) u8 ebt_hash[AES128_KEY_LENGTH] = { 0 }; u8 sbk[AES128_KEY_LENGTH] = { 0 }; u8 *bct_hash = bct; + bool encrypted; int ret;
bct += BCT_HASH;
+ ebt_size = roundup(ebt_size, EBT_ALIGNMENT); + memcpy(sbk, (u8 *)(bct + BCT_LENGTH), NVBOOT_CMAC_AES_HASH_LENGTH * 4);
- ret = decrypt_data_block(bct, BCT_LENGTH, sbk); - if (ret) - return 1; + encrypted = memcmp(&sbk, &nosbk, AES128_KEY_LENGTH);
- ebt_size = roundup(ebt_size, EBT_ALIGNMENT); + if (encrypted) { + ret = decrypt_data_block(bct, BCT_LENGTH, sbk); + if (ret) + return 1;
- ret = encrypt_data_block(ebt, ebt_size, sbk); - if (ret) - return 1; + ret = encrypt_data_block(ebt, ebt_size, sbk); + if (ret) + return 1; + }
ret = sign_enc_data_block(ebt, ebt_size, ebt_hash, sbk); if (ret) @@ -52,9 +60,11 @@ static int bct_patch(u8 *bct, u8 *ebt, u32 ebt_size) bct_tbl->bootloader[0].load_addr = CONFIG_SPL_TEXT_BASE; bct_tbl->bootloader[0].length = ebt_size;
- ret = encrypt_data_block(bct, BCT_LENGTH, sbk); - if (ret) - return 1; + if (encrypted) { + ret = encrypt_data_block(bct, BCT_LENGTH, sbk); + if (ret) + return 1; + }
ret = sign_enc_data_block(bct, BCT_LENGTH, bct_hash, sbk); if (ret)